CEO stock-option compensation and the use of credit default swaps in relation to European bank risk by Al-Own, Bassam
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Edinburgh Napier University  
 
January 2015 
 
 
CEO stock-option compensation and the use of credit 
default swaps in relation to European bank risk 
 
Bassam Al-Own 
 
 
School of Accounting, Financial Services and Law 
Edinburgh Napier University 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements of 
Edinburgh Napier University, for the award of Doctor of Philosophy 
 
II 
 
Abstract 
This thesis investigates two main aspects related to the use of credit default swaps (CDS) by 
European banks. The first area of investigation focuses on the relationship between the 
CEOs’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock option compensation and the usage of CDS 
by banks.  
This thesis contributes to the existing literature in risk management with derivatives, which 
initially assumes that the use of derivatives is intended to reduce firm risk, by distinguishing 
between CDS use for hedging purposes and CDS use for trading purposes. The relationship 
between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and CDS use in banks, and the influence of CDS use 
on bank’s risk are investigated based on the purpose of CDS use.  
This thesis utilises the estimates of the Black-Scholes sensitivity of executives’ stock option 
portfolios to stock return volatility (vega) to test the relationship between CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives and CDS use. In addition, this thesis distinguishes between the effect of risk-taking 
incentives on CDS use for hedging purposes, and the effect of risk-taking incentives on CDS 
use for trading (speculating) purposes. 
The second key aspect of this thesis is to examine the effect of CDS use on bank risk by 
distinguishing between the effect of CDS use for hedging purposes and CDS use for trading 
purposes. The purpose of CDS use that depends upon the managers’ risk-taking incentives 
and the use of CDS can have different implications to the risk profile of the bank.  
Data for the period of 2006 – 2011 were hand collected from the annual reports of sixty 
European banks. The sample comprises publicly listed banks from European stock market 
indices and premier indices of the European Union countries (EU-27). 
In conducting the empirical testing, the two stages regression approach was used to adjust for 
the potential endogeneity that could arise between the risk-taking incentives of stock option 
compensation (vega), and CDS use. 
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The results show a significantly positive relationship between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives 
generated by stock option compensations and CDS use in banks for trading purposes. This 
implies that higher risk-taking incentives (vega) are associated with greater CDS use for 
trading purposes. Furthermore, there is a negative linkage between CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives and CDS use for hedging purposes at weak levels of statistical significance. 
The results also show strong evidence of a positive linkage between CDS use for trading 
purposes and bank risk. CDS use for trading purposes is associated with a higher bank’s beta 
and lower distance to default. Further, the results show a positive and significant relationship 
between CDS use for hedging purposes and bank risk. CDS use for hedging purposes is also 
associated with a higher beta of a bank and lower distance to default. These results are 
consistent with the theoretical predictions of Smith and Stulz (1985), who suggest that stock 
options can influence managers’ decisions to use derivatives and lead to greater alignment 
between the interests of managers and shareholders by mitigating managerial risk aversion. 
Thus, stock options provide managers with incentives to take on risk. 
Overall, the evidence presented in this thesis suggests that CEOs’ risk-taking incentives 
derived from stock options compensation is a key determinant of CDS use in banks. 
Moreover, banks’ CDS use increases bank risk regardless of the purpose of its use. Both 
hedging and speculating CDS activities are associated with a bank’s higher risk. 
This thesis provides an integrated understanding and builds a comprehensive picture of how 
CEOs’ stock option compensation can affect the purpose of CDS use, and how this use 
influences bank risk. It primarily extends previous empirical literature, which initially looked 
at derivatives as a risk reduction instrument, by distinguishing between CDS use for hedging 
purposes from CDS use for trading purposes.  
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Chapter 1: Motivation, objectives and outline of the 
thesis 
1.1  Introduction  
After the last financial crisis credit derivatives have received great criticism about their 
potential impact on the financial system. The criticism was very much targeted at the credit 
default swap (CDS), which is considered as one of the largest components of the credit 
derivatives market (Minton, Stulz, and Williamson, 2009; Norden, Buston, and Wagner, 
2011; Bedendo and Bruno, 2012; Calice, Ioannidis, and Williams, 2012). Indeed, CDS 
accounted for a proportion of 33% of the credit derivatives market in 2006 and 29% of it in 
2008.
1
  Statistics from the Bank for International Settlements (BIS) show that the volumes 
outstanding of over-the-counter (OTC)
2
 derivatives expanded at a brisk pace in the first half 
of 2006. Growth was particularly strong in the credit derivatives segment, where the notional 
amounts of outstanding CDS increased by 46%. 
This debate brings to attention the importance of studying the possible determinant of the use 
of CDS among firms. Further, it is equally important to analyse the impact of CDS use on 
firm risk. In fact, credit derivatives in general and CDS in particular have been blamed for the 
waves of the shockwaves caused by the last credit crisis (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Corsi, 
Hosni, and Marmi, 2011). However, others believe that credit derivatives can play a positive 
role in improving the financial system (Wagner and Marsh, 2006; Stulz, 2010).   
A major structural innovation in the financial system has been the development of a market 
for credit risk transfer (Calice and Ioannidis, 2012). Economists have generally believed that 
financial derivatives increase economic welfare by facilitating risk-sharing among investors.  
                                                          
1
 BBA Credit Derivatives Report 2008, May 2009. 
2
 OTC market: is a decentralised market where market participants agree on a trade without meeting through an 
organised exchange. 
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The use of credit derivatives has contributed to the improvement of the financial system and 
enabled firms to manage their portfolio of credit risks more efficiently during the period of 
2000–2004 (Acharya and Johnson, 2007; Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). Further, CDS are the 
most liquid instrument of several credit derivatives currently traded and represent the largest 
sector of the credit derivatives market (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh, 2005; Minton et al., 
2009; Bedendo and Bruno, 2012). Nevertheless, after the last financial crisis credit 
derivatives in general and CDS in particular have received great criticism about their 
potential impact on the stability of the financial system (Stulz, 2010). 
In search of explanations for the last financial crisis, another line of literature focuses on 
executives’ pay and the risk-taking incentive (Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann, 2010; 
Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Bruce and Skovoroda, 2013). Many 
recent studies identified the risk-taking incentives of compensation practices as a factor that 
contributed to the financial crisis, and believed that executive compensation programmes lead 
to excessive risk-taking and play a significant role in the financial crisis by encouraging 
executive to adopt riskier policies, which lead to higher overall firm risk (Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). Much attention has been paid to the role of equity-based 
compensation and the incentive effects of stock options on the financial stability 
(Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). 
The risk-taking incentives generated by executive compensation in financial firms have 
generated public concerns after the last financial crisis. In response to these concerns, recent 
empirical studies have attempted to investigate the impact of executive incentives to increase 
risk and risk choices made by executives, such as analysing the relationship between 
executive compensation and merge decisions (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011), the 
relationship between executive compensation and bank performance during the crisis 
(Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Tung and Wang, 2011), or executive compensation and bank 
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default risk predictors (Acrey, McCumber, and Nguyen, 2011). However, there is mixed 
evidence in the literature regarding whether incentive compensation increases risk-taking 
motivation among managers. 
Although prior literature explains the linkage between managerial risk-taking incentives and 
derivatives use, none of the recent studies, however, have tried to explore the linkage 
between executive compensation and risk-taking incentives in relation to credit derivatives 
use. The primary objective of this thesis is to investigate these two subjects in the context of 
derivatives use by European banks. The first aspect analyses the linkage between executive 
incentives to increase firm risk generated by stock option compensation and credit derivatives 
use. The second investigates how the use of credit derivatives influences bank’s risk.  
1.2 CDS 
1.2.1  CDS definition  
Credit derivatives are financial instruments that can be used to transfer credit risk from the 
party exposed to the risk (the protection buyer) to another party willing to assume that risk 
(the protection seller). The payoffs for a credit derivative are conditional on the occurrence of 
a credit event. The credit event is defined with respect to one or more reference entities and 
one or more reference assets issued by the reference entity (Blanco et al., 2005). In principle, 
credit derivatives are tools that enable banks to manage their portfolio of credit risks more 
efficiently (Minton et al., 2009). According to the International Accounting Standard 39 – 
Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement (IAS 39)
3
 a derivative instrument is 
defined as a financial instrument with all three of the following characteristics: (a) its value 
changes in response to changes in a specified underlying item; (b) it requires no initial net 
investment or an initial net investment that is smaller than would be required for other types 
                                                          
3
 Now it is IFRS 9 Financial Instruments (replacement of IAS 39). 
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of contracts that would be expected to have a similar response to changes in market factors; 
and (c) it is settled at a future date. 
CDS, the most common credit derivative instrument, is a contract that provides protection 
against the risk of a credit event by a particular firm or country. The buyer of the protection 
makes periodic payments to the protection seller until the occurrence of a credit event
4 
or the 
maturity date of the contract, whichever comes first. If a credit event occurs, the buyer is 
compensated for the loss incurred as a result of the credit event. If there is no default event 
before maturity, the protection seller pays nothing (Tavakoli, 1998; Blanco et al., 2005; 
Duffee and Zhou, 2001).  A diagrammatic illustration of CDS mechanics is presented in 
Figure. 1.1. 
 
Fig 1.1: A diagram of credit default swaps mechanics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
4
 Credit events for CDSs might include some or all of the following: bankruptcy, failure to pay, obligation 
default or acceleration, repudiation or moratorium, and restructuring (Blanco, Brennan, and Marsh, 2005). 
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of the reference entity) 
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CDS provide a very easy way to trade credit risk. Credit derivatives, especially CDS, allow 
investors to short credit risk over a longer period of time at a known cost by buying 
protection. The economic effect of a CDS contract is similar to that of an insurance contract 
(Duffee and Zhou, 2001; Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). The legal distinction comes from the 
fact that those buying a CDS can trade in and out of their contracts in a way that is not 
possible in the insurance market (Stulz, 2010). Thus, CDS contracts do not require an 
exposure to the underlying credit risk for the protection buyer (Corsi, Hosni, Marmi, 2011). 
Further, in a CDS contract it is not necessary for the protection buyer to hold an insured asset 
(the underlying loan) in order to claim "compensation" under a CDS. If the protection buyer 
does not hold the underlying security the CDS is said to be naked. Naked CDS can then be 
used to build speculative bets on the default of the third party (Corsi et al., 2011). Speculators 
can take long (short) positions in credit risk by selling (buying) protection without need to 
trade the cash instrument (Ericsson, Jacobs, and Oviedo, 2009; Berndt, Jarrow, and Kang, 
2007; Blanco et al., 2005). 
1.2.2 The credit crisis and derivatives  
After the collapse of some of the leading institutions in the financial market such as Bear 
Stearns and Lehman Brothers, credit derivatives have been blamed for part of institution 
defaults and financial instability associated with the credit crisis (Minton et al., 2009; Cont, 
2010; Stulz, 2010). The financial crisis in 2007 started as a credit crisis that caused major 
disruption to financial institutions in the United States (US) and Europe. A number of 
internationally active banking groups, with large credit-related exposure, were severely 
affected by this financial crisis (Calice and Ioannidis, 2012). 
The role of CDS in the financial crisis has been debated since early 2008. On the one hand, 
critics of CDS argue that the explosive growth of derivative markets and CDS is one of the 
16 
 
causes of the crisis and many of the problems highlighted by the crisis were due to credit 
derivatives use (King and Maier, 2009; Wignall and Atkinson, 2009; Das et al., 2014; Calice 
et al., 2012). On the other hand, some argue that credit derivatives play a positive role during 
the crisis and make banks and the financial system sounder (Stulz, 2010; Corsi et al., 2011; 
Bedendo and Bruno, 2012). 
After the last financial crisis CDS and other financial derivatives have clearly lost any 
presumption of innocence that they once enjoyed among economists, and they probably never 
had such a presumption with the general public (Stulz, 2010). This negative view about 
financial innovation and credit derivatives has appeared in the literature even before the crisis 
began (Rajan, 2006; Partnoy and Skeel, 2006; Instefjord, 2005; Thorbeckc, 1995). For 
example, Warren Buffett, the chairman, CEO and largest shareholder of Berkshire Hathaway 
wrote in the 2002 annual report of Berkshire Hathaway that: "derivatives are financial 
weapons of mass destruction, carrying dangers that, while now latent, are potentially lethal."
5
  
In contrast, the positive view about the role of derivatives is based on evidence that financial 
risk management with derivatives remains effective even during times of crises (Norden et 
al., 2011; Corsi et al., 2011; Bedendo and Bruno, 2012). In a speech about economic 
flexibility  to HM Treasury Enterprise Conference in London, the former head of the Federal 
Reserve System, Alan Greenspan stated that credit derivatives have contributed “to the 
development of a far more flexible, efficient, and hence resilient financial system than existed 
just a quarter-century ago.” 6 Similarly, Paul Tucker argued that ‘‘the innovation of credit 
derivatives has plausibly taken us a further step toward complete markets, in effect providing 
                                                          
5 Buffett, Warren. 2003. "Warren Buffett's Letters to Berkshire Shareholders 1977- 2002." February 21; 
Available at (www.berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2002pdf.pdf). 
6
 Greenspan’s speech ‘‘Economic Flexibility’’ before Her Majesty’s Treasury Enterprise Conference (London, 
26 January 2004). 
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a richer market for credit insurance than previously existed . . . (and) reducing the price of 
risk.’’7  
Another line of literature finds no evidence that derivatives use has increased the firm’s risk 
(Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Adam and Fernando, 2006). Goodhart (2005) believes that 
CDS will do most to allow banks to effectively achieve a desired level of diversification. 
However, he points out that “like all derivatives, CDS can be used for good or ill; what is 
perhaps most needed by regulators is greater transparency” (p.119). 
Introduced in the 1990s as a hedging tool, CDS soon took off as a way to trade (speculate) on 
the likelihood of a firm defaulting without having to trade its underlying loan. For much of 
this decade, they have been considered a means of spreading risk around the financial system 
(Calice and Ioannidis, 2012). 
After the last financial crisis, there are concerns about potential problems related to the 
trading of derivatives (Stulz, 2010). For example, Joseph Stiglitz, the former chief economist 
of the World Bank and the Nobel prize-winning, believes that large banks should be banned 
from trading derivatives including CDS. He said that large banks “....need more restrictions, 
such as no derivative trading.”8 Stulz (2010) has a different opinion about the use of CDS for 
trading purposes. He argues that if the CDS market is reduced to include only hedgers, with 
speculators banned, hedgers will not find counterparties because the market will have no 
liquidity. Speculators have to be able to trade on either side of a market for trading to occur in 
that market. 
                                                          
7
 Speech at the Euromoney Global Borrowers and Investors Forum (London, June 23, 2005). 
8 
Reported by Bloomberg, October 12, 2009: “Stiglitz Says Banks Should Be Banned From CDS Trading,” by 
Ben Moshinsky. 
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In summary, although CDS have been blamed for the shockwaves in the last credit crisis 
(e.g., Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Corsi et al., 2011), many others believe that credit 
derivatives can play a positive role in improving the financial system (e.g., Wagner and 
Marsh, 2006; Stulz, 2010). The positive view of the role of credit derivatives is related to the 
notion that the advent of credit derivatives as providing banks with a range of flexible 
instruments for selling loans and transferring loan risk (Minton et al., 2009). This thesis 
examines the effect of credit derivatives use on firms’ risk. Specifically, it investigates the 
influence of CDS use on a bank’s risk and distinguishes between the influences of CDS use 
for hedging purposes from the influences of CDS use for trading purposes. 
1.2.3  The credit crisis and executive compensation  
 
In the aftermath of the last financial crisis, another strand of academic studies has emerged 
and has attempted to link the crisis to the incentive effects of executive compensation 
policies. The focus was on whether firms’ performance during the recent credit crisis is 
related to the chief executive officer’s (CEO) incentives before the crisis (Acrey, McCumber, 
and Nguyen, 2011; Fahlenbrach and Stulz , 2011; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Tung and 
Wang, 2011; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). 
Following the last financial crisis, there is widespread concern that executive compensation 
arrangements could have encouraged excessive risk-taking. For example, Federal Reserve 
Chairman Ben Bernanke declared that: "Compensation practices at some banking 
organizations have led to misaligned incentives and excessive risk-taking, contributing to 
bank losses and financial instability".9 Some researchers argue that executive compensation 
represents one of the fundamental causes of the last credit crisis and believe that the 
incentives built into the compensation plans of many financial firms are correlated with the 
                                                          
9
 Federal Reserve press release, October 22, 2009. http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/press/bcreg/20091022a.htm 
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excessive risk-taking (Blinder, 2009; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann, 2010; Raviv and Sisli-
Ciamarra, 2013; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014).  
Prior to the financial crisis of 2007–2008, executive compensation in financial firms was 
largely overlooked (Tian and Yang, 2014). However, this has changed after the recent 
financial crisis, governments and regulators have taken steps to restrict executive pay 
arrangements in the financial firms and executive compensation has consistently been a focus 
of the reform agenda by regulators (Bhagat and Bolton, 2014; Dong, 2014). An important 
assumption behind these regulatory reform efforts is the view that incentives generated by 
executive compensation create excessive risk-taking (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Acrey et al., 
2011; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014).  
The major point of criticism of executive compensation is the potential concern about the 
risk-taking incentives provided by the equity-based compensation that consists of stock and 
stock options (Dong, Wang, and Xie, 2010).
10
 The use of stock options in executive 
compensation has become so widespread in financial firms and bank executives have 
received significant amounts of stock options as incentive compensation over the last decade 
(Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). The popular press and regulators 
hold the views that stock options were at least partially responsible for some of the high risk 
of the firms in the last decade (Dong et al., 2010). This is mainly due to a concern that stock 
options would motivate “excessive” risk-taking incentives. 
The literature that investigates these risk-taking incentives has focused on the separation of 
ownership and control and the structure of executive compensation. The conflicts of interest 
between shareholders and managers have attracted a great attention amongst researchers 
working on the theme of the principal-agent problem (Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Chen, 
Steiner, and Whyte, 2006; Coles, Daniel, and Naveen, 2006; John and John, 1993).  These 
                                                          
10
 Stock compensation includes CEOs’ restricted stock and long term incentive plans (LTIPs). 
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studies focus on the common argument that compensation with non-linear (convex) payoffs
11
 
as in stock options should be given to CEOs to remedy the effect of CEO risk aversion and 
provide the CEO with increased incentives to take on risky projects. This expects to lead to a 
positive impact on aligning shareholder and managerial risk preferences (Stulz, 1984; Smith 
and Stulz, 1985). 
The conflict of interest between managers and shareholders can be reduced when the 
management’s interests are better aligned with those of shareholders; in other words, if 
manager’s compensation increases when shareholders gain and fall when shareholders lose 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The managers are undiversified with respect to firm-specific 
wealth and exposed to more risk compared to diversified shareholders. Accordingly, it is 
possible that managers will tend to implement less risky policies. The increase in equity-
based compensation potentially offsets this tendency. Executive equity-based compensation 
is widely regarded as an effective way to align managers’ interests with those of their 
shareholders (Guay, 1999b; Knopf et al., 2002; Gao, 2010).  
The presence of stock options in the compensation plans induces decisions by managers that 
are good for shareholders. Shareholders can use stock options to structure managers’ wealth 
as a convex function of firm performance and this will mitigate the effect of managers’ risk 
aversion and provide the CEO with increased incentives to take more risk and increase 
shareholders’ value. Recently, empirical studies tried to investigate whether there is a 
correlation between compensation structure and the excessive risk-taking by firms 
contributing to the recent financial crisis and whether the interests of CEOs were aligned with 
those of their shareholders before the start of the crisis. However, there is mixed evidence 
                                                          
11
 The convexity of the wealth performance relation refers to the sensitivity of managers' wealth to the volatility 
of equity value. Greater convexity in the wealth-performance relation is expected to reduce manager’s risk 
aversion. 
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about the incentive compensation and the risk-taking incentives in the literature. On the one 
hand, some support the association between managers’ compensation and risk-taking 
incentives (e.g., Blinder, 2009; Bebchuk, Cohen, and Spamann, 2010; Tung and Wang, 2011; 
Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Bhagat and Bolton, 2014). On the other hand, some provide 
contrasting results with evidence that bank CEO incentives cannot be blamed for the financial 
crisis or for the performance of banks during that crisis (e.g., Acrey, McCumber, and 
Nguyen, 2011; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). 
It is evident from the above studies that there is a need for more research to examine how 
executives’ compensation influences the risk-taking incentives and the potential effect of 
executives’ risk-taking incentives. This thesis empirically addresses the association between 
executives’ equity based compensation and the incentives to increase risk in the banking 
sector by investigating the linkage between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and CDS use in the 
banking industry. Moreover, this thesis investigates how the incentive to increase banks’ risk 
is related to the purposes of CDS use (i.e., hedging and speculating).  
1.2.4  The rapid growth in the credit derivatives market  
The credit derivatives market has been hailed as the fastest growing financial market. While 
estimates of the volume of derivatives by different agencies differ, it is widely agreed that 
derivatives had been, prior to 2008, the fastest growing segment of the OTC market (Kothari, 
2009).  
OTC derivative trade typically involves a bank or a broker, and so it is possible to estimate 
the size of the OTC market for derivatives by surveying financial firms. The BIS has 
conducted such surveys of financial firms since 1998. It surveys 60 major derivatives dealers 
and eliminates double counting among the reporting institutions. The BIS reports the size of 
the OTC derivatives market by adding up the notional amounts of outstanding derivatives. 
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According to BIS surveys, the notional amount of OTC derivatives markets increased from 
$633 trillion at the end-2012 to $693 trillion at end-June 2013. 
In recent years, banks have dramatically increased their risk transfer activities. For one, they 
have done this through the use of credit derivatives, and mostly in the form of CDS (Nijskens 
and Wagner, 2011). In the past several years, credit derivatives have begun to be traded 
actively in financial markets. Credit derivatives were rapidly becoming one of the most 
successful financial innovations of the past decade prior to the global crisis (Longstaff, 
Mithal, and Neis, 2005). The credit derivatives market was developed rapidly during the early 
1990s. The derivative market was small but it has grown quickly since the 1990s (Duffee and 
Zhou, 2001).  
From being a fledgling market in the mid-1990s, credit derivative markets have increased 
tremendously over the last few years. The growth of the global credit derivatives market had 
outperformed the expectations from the 2004 BBA survey which predicted a market size of 
$8.2 trillion by 2006. The market exceeded 20 trillion dollars in outstanding notional 
principal in 2006 (Ericsson et al., 2009). According to the British Bankers Association, the 
global outstanding of credit derivatives grew from a $180 billion notional value in 1996 to 
exceed $20 trillion in 2006 (Alnassar, Al-shakrchy, and Almsafir, 2014). Figure 1.2 below 
shows the size of the credit derivatives since 2001. 
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Figure 1.2: the size of the credit derivatives since 2001 
The growth of the credit derivatives market can be explained by the increase of CDS use. As 
shown by statistics of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA)
12
 the 
market for CDS has grown dramatically over the last two decades. The notional amount 
outstanding of CDS grew from $ 8,422 billions at the end of 2004 to reach its peak of over $ 
62,173 billions at the end of 2007, and then decreased to $26,263 billion at the end of 2010. 
13 
In recent market survey the notional amount of CDS was over $24,349 billions in 2013.
14 
Figure 1.3 below shows the size of the CDS since 2001. 
                                                          
12
 ISDA is an international trade body of dealers, brokers, risk management professionals, and so on, in the 
derivatives trade.  
13
 International Swaps and Derivatives Association market survey, June 2010. 
14
 BIS Quarterly Review, June 2014 
24 
 
Figure 1.3: the size of the CDS since 2001, compiled based on ISDA data. 
This rapid growth in credit derivatives and CDS was mostly driven by an increased desire 
from banks and other financial institutions to manage their credit exposure (Smithson, 
Associates, and Mengle, 2006). In addition, the behaviour of the firms has changed to include 
not only buying credit protection to reduce the credit risk from their own lending activities 
but also to trade (speculate) in the credit derivatives market by selling protection on credits 
not currently in their portfolio (Olléon-Assouan, 2004; Smithson et al., 2006; Minton et al., 
2009). Using CDS can help banks to increase their lending activities, because the ability of 
banks to hedge loans that they have made using CDS limits their risk exposure (Stulz, 2010). 
However, the recent empirical evidence confirms that using CDS to take on credit risk is a 
common practice in financial firms (Minton et al., 2009; Adam and Guettler, 2010). 
Banks also use other derivatives contract, the most common types derivatives contracts used 
by banks are interest rate derivatives, foreign exchange derivatives, equity derivatives and 
commodity derivatives. 
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1.3 Managerial risk-taking incentives and the payoff structure of stock 
options 
1.3.1 Managerial risk-taking incentives 
This thesis investigates the relationship between executive stock option compensation and 
credit derivatives use. Particularly, this research focuses on the linkage between the risk-
taking incentives inherent in a CEO’s stock option compensation and CDS use for hedging 
purposes or trading purposes.  
Agency theory of the firm presents two models of the conflicts. The first is the conflict 
between shareholders and managers following the separation of ownership and control in 
modern corporations. The second discusses the relationships among other stakeholders 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976). The first aspect of this thesis is related to manager’s 
shareholders conflicts and the difference between them in risk preferences. The conflict 
generated by managerial risk aversion combined with an excessive concentration of CEO 
wealth in a single firm encourages managers to reduce firm risk more than may be desirable 
from the outside shareholders’ perspective. 
Managers make the actual decision to hedge using derivatives. If managers and owners are 
separate, agency problems should affect the hedging decisions of the firm. One possible 
result is that managers who have their wealth concentrated in their firm may hedge in a 
manner that does not maximize the shareholders’ value (Rogers, 2002). This is because 
managers have limited ability to diversify their own personal wealth and their career earning 
from their own employment position is related to the existence of the firm. Therefore, 
managers seek to reduce the probability of bankruptcy in order to enhance their job security 
and have the incentives to use derivatives to reduce the firm’s risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
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One mode of mitigating such agency conflict is through the design of executive 
compensation contracts (Stulz, 1984; Tufano, 1998; Buck, Bruce, Main, and Udueni, 2003). 
 According to the principal-agent model, the firm’s shareholders seek to design the most 
efficient compensation packages in order to attract and motivate the CEO to maximize firm 
value. Therefore, shareholders try to design optimal compensation packages that provide 
CEOs with incentives to align their mutual interests. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that 
compensation contract can minimize the divergence of interests between shareholders and 
managers. However, others argue that the effect of managerial compensation depends on the 
payoff structure of each component and therefore, not all executive compensation 
components may be equally effective in aligning the risk preferences of shareholders and 
managers (Guay, 1999b). 
The literature on agency costs argues that both executives and shareholders are aware of the 
potential conflicts of interest and the abuses generated because of this conflict (England, 
1988). As a result, the agency costs create incentives for both groups to take action to 
minimize and control the problem. To protect their interests, shareholders have reasons to 
develop compensation contracts that are designed to channel the behaviour of executives in 
desirable directions and limit their ability to engage in unacceptable activities that reduce the 
firm value. Accordingly, shareholders will prefer compensation components that induce 
executives to take more risky investments and reduce the compensation that would increase 
executives’ risk aversion. 
According to Smith and Stulz (1985), managers whose compensation is a linear function of 
firm value have incentives to reduce firm’s risk. Hence, such managers are expected to use 
more derivatives and hedge more. Shareholders have incentives to choose a compensation 
plan that discourages managers from devoting excessive resources to hedging. This can be 
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accomplished by making the manager's compensation a more convex function of firm value. 
They point out that stock options can make the manager's expected utility a convex function 
of the value of the firm. Managers with greater stock options would prefer less hedging 
because the payoff of stock options encourages managers to reduce derivatives use for 
hedging. They also argue that executives with greater stock holdings would prefer to engage 
more in financial risk management and use more derivatives for hedging purposes as the 
stock grants provide linear payoffs as a function of stock prices. 
1.3.2  Payoff structure of stock options 
Prior empirical studies on equity-based wealth have employed various measures to capture 
the risk-taking incentives of executive stock options. These measures include binary variables 
for the presence or absence of stock options, the number of options held by executives, and 
the value of stock options.  
Core and Guay (2002) present a more appropriate approach to measure executive option 
portfolio value and risk-taking incentives by using the partial derivatives of the dividend-
adjusted Black–Scholes equation with respect to stock return volatility and stock price. They 
propose the use of the sensitivity of managers’ option portfolio value to measure their risk-
taking incentives by using data from only the current year’s annual report.  
They estimate the sensitivities of managers' stock option portfolios to stock return volatility 
(vega) and managers' stock and stock option portfolios to stock price (delta).
15
 These 
sensitivities can act in opposing directions in shaping managers' risk preferences. Literature 
shows that executive stock options and stock portfolios can be characterised as being either 
linear or convex depending on the sensitivity of the value of the compensation payoff to 
                                                          
15
 Vega: the sensitivity of the option value with respect to a 1% change in stock volatility. Delta: the sensitivity 
of the stock and option portfolio to changes in the price of the firm’s stock.  
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movements of either stock price or stock return volatility (e. g., Knopf et al., 2002; Géczy et 
al., 2007). 
1.4 Motivation 
The difference between past crises and that which appears to have started in 2007 is the 
presence of the credit derivatives market (Calice et al., 2012). The use of CDS, which 
represents the most common credit derivatives instrument, has been blamed for severe losses 
at a number of banks, hedge funds and insurance companies during the past financial crisis 
(Adam and Guettler, 2010; Corsi et al., 2011; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011). 
At the same time, the event of the last financial crisis has had a great impact on the debate 
about the role of CEO compensation. Theoretical and empirical literature shows that 
executive compensation induced risk-taking incentives can influence managers' risk aversion 
and this can influence how managers use CDS (Rogers, 2002; Bartram et al., 2011). 
During the 1990s, executive stock options became the single largest component of CEO 
compensation (Brisley, 2006). The use of stock option compensation in the banking industry 
has become more prevalent, and the percentage of stock option compensation relative to total 
managerial compensation has also increased compared with industrial firms (Chen et al., 
2006). Conyon, Core, and Guay (2011) document a 92% increase in median UK CEO pay for 
the period from 1997 to 2003 and find that risk-adjusted pay for the UK CEOs increased 
largely due to growth in UK CEO pay over that period. In the same instance, Renneboog and 
Zhao (2011) show that by 2007, the total remuneration for the CEO had almost doubled 
relative to 1996 and equity-based compensation represents the most valuable aspect of a CEO 
compensation package in 1,758 UK companies.   
 Recently, criticism of the role of executives’ compensation is widely targeting the 
compensation structure of the executives in the banking industry and considers the excessive 
risk-taking of executives as one of the causes of the last crisis (Tung and Wang, 2011).  
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Studying the impact of compensation contract on derivatives use is evidently important as 
literature shows that executive compensation has grown rapidly in recent years (Perry and 
Zenner, 2000; Blinder, 2009; Acrey et al., 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). In fact the 
relationship between the composition of CEO compensation and financial risk management is 
relatively unexplored area in finance (Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). Moreover, there is a 
dearth of empirical studies on the costs and benefits of CDS and other derivatives, not just in 
the last two years, but in the last several decades (Stulz, 2010).  
1.5 Objectives  
This thesis aims to achieve two key objectives. The first objective is to explore the incentive 
effects of CEO stock options on the use of CDS, and how this is related to the purpose of 
CDS use (i.e., hedge credit risk or take on credit risk).  
The focus on the role of stock option compensation, which is considered as an important 
component in aligning the incentives of CEO with their shareholders by increasing the risk-
taking incentives of the CEO and influence their behaviour to use derivatives through 
providing the holder with a disincentive to hedge.  
This thesis aims to provide a deeper understanding of the interdependent relation that exists 
between executive compensation and corporate derivatives use by measuring the risk-taking 
incentive of the managers with vega.  
The second objective of this thesis is to explain how the use of CDS influences the firm’s risk 
by distinguishing between the effect of CDS use for hedging and CDS use for trading. 
There is an extensive and long established academic literature, which has focused the 
attention primarily on the idea that derivatives are implemented by firms as a financial risk 
management tools to reduce risk. There has been, however, little effort made to relate the use 
of CDS to firms’ risk based on the purpose or the strategy of this use in the banking industry. 
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The data collected to examine these two objectives made it possible to differentiate between 
two major CDS use strategies: CDS use for hedging purposes and CDS for trading purposes.  
In summary, this research not only examines the degree to which executive risk-taking 
incentive are related to credit derivatives use in the form of CDS in the banking industry, but 
also distinguishes between banks that use credit derivatives for speculative and banks that use 
credit derivatives exclusively for hedging. Moreover, this thesis investigates the effects of 
CDS use on a firm’s risk based on CDS strategies which are being used in the banking 
industry. To my knowledge, there has been no empirical study examining the link between 
executive compensation induced risk-taking incentives and CDS use, or how the use of CDS 
affects the banks’ risk by distinguishing between the purpose of using CDS in the European 
banking industry. Accordingly, this thesis will examine the linkage between executive 
incentive to increase risk generated by stock option compensation and CDS usage and then 
assess the effect of CDS use on bank’s risk using a sample of European banks. Prior 
empirical literature has provided evidence using a sample from non-financial firms and has 
found mixed results. The existing empirical evidence on the corporate use of derivatives in 
the banking industry is limited and largely based on the US firms. 
1.6 Contribution  
The present research contributes to the existing literature in several ways. Its major 
contribution lies in two areas related to CDS use in the banking industry. The first is 
providing an empirical examination of the risk-taking incentives of banks’ CEOs stock option 
compensation and CDS use. The second is investigating the relationship between CDS use 
and firms’ risk in the banking industry. It is well known theoretically that derivatives use is 
associated with reducing the firm’s risk. In practice, however, investigation of such effects is 
rendered difficult by the fact that researchers are generally unable to identify the exact nature 
of this use, whose effects could get exacerbated by specific implementation or use of 
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derivatives (Géczy et al., 2007). This thesis takes advantage of a better disclosure 
requirements in place for firms to report the purpose of CDS use in order to overcome this 
difficulty.  
This thesis contributes to the literature by investigating CDS use in banks and distinguishing 
between the purposes of CDS use by using information disclosed by banks in their annual 
reports. Prior empirical studies discuss managers’ incentives to use derivatives and assumed 
that derivatives are used for financial risk management.  
This thesis focuses on CDS use in the banking industry. The compensation structure of banks 
is different from that of industrial firms (Adams and Mehran, 2003).The banking industry is 
an important context of study for the question due to several distinctive characteristics that 
banks have, for example, they operate in a more regulated environment, have fewer growth 
options with substantially greater leverage, and are protected by deposit insurance schemes 
(Bai and Elyasiani, 2013).  
Although several empirical studies have examined the association between managerial 
compensation and derivatives use for non-financial firms (Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010; 
Knopf, Nam and Thornton, 2002; Gay and Nam, 1998), little is known about the relationship 
between compensation induced risk-taking incentives and CDS use in the banking sector 
(Williams and Michael, 2008).  
Previous empirical studies focus more on the nonfinancial industry and mostly use US 
samples. Relatively small empirical literature exists on credit derivatives. To my knowledge, 
this is the first attempt to examine the association between executive risk-taking incentives, 
CDS use and a firm’s risk in the banking industry and distinguishing between CDS use for 
hedging and CDS use for trading.  
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This thesis contributes to the literature by using a more appropriate measure (vega) to test the 
incentives of executives to use derivatives. Following Core and Guay (2002), vega is used to 
measure the CEOs’ incentives to increase risk.  
Vega is considered a more appropriate measure to capture managers' risk-taking incentives 
because it can provide a more precise measure for CEOs’ stock options comparing to the 
simple measures such as the number or the value of stock options (Gao, 2010; Cohen et al., 
2000; Knopf et al., 2002). Furthermore, vega can be calculated by using data from only the 
current year’s annual report (Core and Guay, 2002). 
Theoretically, this thesis contributes to the literature by focusing on the relationship between 
CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and the motive of CDS use (i.e., hedging purposes and trading 
purposes). Particularly, CDS use for trading which receives little attention compared with 
derivatives use for hedging. Prior theoretical and empirical literature predominately explains 
the association between risk-taking incentives and derivatives use for hedging purposes. This 
thesis examines the linkage between executives’ stock option compensation and credit 
derivatives use for trading in the banking industry in more detail. In addition, it investigates 
the association between the different purposes of CDS use and banks’ risk in the context of 
the European banking industry.  
The empirical findings on the relationship between the risk-taking incentives inherent in 
stock option compensation and CDS use have important implications for regulators and 
policy makers and show the effect of stock options in inducing risk-taking in the banking 
industry.  
CEO stock options induce stronger risk-taking incentives. Consistent with the conclusions of 
Bebchuk et al. (2010) and Bai and Elyasiani(2013), bank regulators should monitor risk-
taking incentives of executive compensation, in particular the largest banks, in order to 
enhance bank stability.  
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The results presented for the relationship between CDS use and European bank risk show that 
the use of CDS has a positive effect on banks’ risk. Banks participation in CDS markets 
result in an increase in the riskiness of the banks. This latter finding has clear implications for 
the regulatory debate and the concern over the consequences of the widespread CDS use. 
1.7 The outline of the thesis  
Chapter two presents the theoretical and empirical literature about the two aspects of the 
thesis. First, it discusses the linkage between executive risk-taking incentives of stock option 
compensation and the use of derivatives. Second, it discusses the relationship between 
derivatives use and a firm’s risk. Chapter three presents the data and methodology adopted in 
this thesis. The chapter then defines the variables used in both the CDS model and firm’s risk 
model. Data sources and the sample selection criteria are also presented in Chapter three.  
Chapter four explores and visualises the data used in this thesis. Chapter five includes the 
empirical results and discusses the effect of risk-taking incentives from stock option 
compensation on CDS use for trading purposes. Chapter four also presents the results for the 
second aspect of this thesis, the influence of CDS use for trading on banks risk. Furthermore, 
the influence of CDS use for trading on banks risk before, during, and after the financial 
crisis is discussed in Chapter four.  
Chapter six reports the results of empirical analysis which examines the effect of the risk-
taking incentives of stock option compensation on CDS use for hedging purposes. The results 
of how CDS use for hedging influence bank risk are also reported and discussed in Chapter 
six. The relationship between CDS use for hedging and bank risk before, during, and after the 
financial crisis is also discussed in Chapter six.  
Finally, Chapter seven includes a thesis summary, a further discussion of the research 
outcomes in general, implications for the financial and economic arena, limitations, future 
work concerning this research, and the conclusion. 
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2 Chapter 2: Theory, empirical evidence, 
and research questions 
2.1 Introduction  
The relationship between risk-taking incentives generated by stock option compensation and 
derivatives use remains a vital topic for economists, regulators and academics who are 
concerned about derivatives use by banks and the soundness of the financial system.  
With the development of the derivatives market, active financial risk management has 
become an important part of modern corporate strategy, and executives have ranked risk 
management as one of their most important objectives (Bartram, 2000). Previous literature in 
this area has deemed corporate derivatives use as part of financial risk management activities 
and the fundamental assumption in nearly all of this literature has been that managers use 
derivatives for hedging (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Rogers, 2002). In fact, firms 
use derivatives not only for hedging but also for trading (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011; Fung et al., 2012). However, for a long time it was 
believed that risk management is irrelevant to the value of the firm and the arguments were 
based on the financial irrelevance theories of Modigliani and Miller (1958). 
The Modigliani and Miller (1958) and Miller and Modigliani (1963) irrelevance propositions 
suggest that, if the financial market is perfect and in the absence of market imperfections, 
financial risk management does not increase firm value and the decision to hedge corporate 
exposures is irrelevant to firm value. Hedging irrelevance proposition to firm value arises 
because individual investors who are only rewarded for bearing systematic risk can already 
costless hedge any firm specific risk in their own account through holding a diversified 
investment portfolio, and then corporate risk hedging cannot add value to the firm or to 
investors. However, in the real world it is apparent that firms engage in hedging activities on 
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a regular basis and hedging activities represent an important part of corporate objectives that 
enable executives to manage firm’s risk (Froot et al., 1993; Minton et al., 2009; Aretz and 
Bartram, 2010).   
The Modigliani and Miller theorem of 1958-1963 represents the cornerstone of modern 
corporate finance, financial decisions, and financial risk management literature. However, 
much of the understanding of corporate risk management is based on models that are driven 
by relaxing one or more of the MM assumptions.
16
 These models describe how various 
capital market imperfections shape firms’ hedging policies and explain why corporate 
hedging can be rational or value-enhancing. 
 The theoretical literature explains the relevance of financial risk management decisions to 
firm value and highlights two classes of determinants on managers' decisions to hedge. The 
first one focuses on hedging as a means to maximize shareholders’ value by reducing the 
likelihood of costly financial distress, underinvestment costs and expected taxes (Smith and 
Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993). The second focuses on managerial risk aversion as a driver of 
financial risk management and show that managers use risk management to maximize their 
private utility (Stulz, 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985; Tufano, 1996). In addition to these two 
determinants of derivatives use, the risk-taking incentive of the managers can play an 
essential role in corporate use of derivatives.  
This thesis focuses on the managerial risk aversion and the risk-taking incentives of the 
managers, which represent an important factor that can influence a manager’s decisions to 
use derivatives. The manager’s risk aversion provides incentives to use derivatives for risk 
                                                          
16 The basic M&M irrelevance proposition is based on the following key assumptions: 1) Perfect financial 
markets: no taxes, no transaction costs, no bankruptcy costs, no agency cost; 2) Competitive: perfect 
competition, no barriers to entry, equivalence in borrowing costs for companies and investors; 3) Rational 
investors: more return is good and more risk is bad; 4) Equal access to costless information: symmetry of 
market information, companies and investors have the same information. 
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management because his compensation is a function of firm value (Stulz, 1984). However, 
shareholders can counteract the effects of managers’ risk aversion through stock option 
compensation, which increases the risk-taking of the managers. Theory predicts that firms 
whose managers hold more stock options are less inclined to use derivatives for hedging 
because of the risk-taking incentives generated by stock option plans (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
The conflict of interests resulting from separation of ownership and control of the firm have 
attracted great attention among researchers working on the theme of the principal-agent 
problem with attempt to study agency conflicts arising from risk-related incentive when 
managers make financing choices like hedging by using derivatives (e.g., John and John, 
1993; Aggarwal and Samwick, 1999; Chen et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2006).  
According to the theory of the risk-related incentives problem, risk-neutral shareholders 
would like firm executives to undertake all positive net present value (NPV) projects 
including risky projects. Positive NPV projects will increase firm value and increase 
shareholders’ wealth. However, the risk aversion of the firm’s managers results from the 
significant portion of their wealth invested in the firm, which incentivises them to reduce firm 
risk. Managers who hold undiversified portfolios relative to shareholders have more concern 
about the downside of risky projects because managers’ wealth is exposed to the risk of 
project returns. Risk-averse managers would prefer to undertake only less risky positive NPV 
projects, thus giving up some positive but risky NPV projects that shareholders would like 
them to undertake (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002). A risk-related agency 
problem arises because managers care about systematic risk as well as firm risk. 
Shareholders, however, care only about the systematic risk, since they can diversify their 
portfolios to compensate for the firms’ risk. Moreover, corporate managers are actually 
making investment and financing decisions including the financial risk management 
decisions in accordance with their risk-taking incentives; therefore the risk-taking incentives 
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of managers is considered an important determinant of corporate hedging policy (Stulz, 1984; 
Tufano, 1996).  
Jensen and Meckling (1976) illustrate that shareholders are expected to tie managers' wealth 
to the firm’s stock price in order to reduce the risk-related agency problem. Shareholders can 
award some specific forms of stock option compensation to motivate managers to accept 
high-risk investment projects. Since the pay off of stock options compensation generates a 
positive relationship between a manager's wealth and firm risk, compensation components 
with convex payoffs can reduce the divergence of interests between managers and 
shareholders and induce risk-averse managers to use less derivatives to hedge risk and use 
more derivatives for trading if they view trading as an investment in valuable risk-increasing 
projects that they may otherwise forgo (Guay, 1999b). Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that the 
providing managers with more stock options in their compensation contract will mitigate 
managerial risk aversion and induce managers to make optimal investment and finance 
decisions.  
This thesis extends the empirical literature on corporate derivatives use and explores how the 
risk-taking incentives of managers influence their decisions about derivatives use, and the 
consequences of derivatives activities on a firm’s risk using data that distinguish between 
hedging and speculative purposes motivate by using derivatives. If firms are truly hedging, 
then a negative association is expected between derivatives use for hedging and a firm’s risk. 
However, investigating the impact of derivatives use on a firm’s risk is not separated from the 
first aspect of this thesis (i.e., risk-taking incentives and derivatives use).  
This chapter describes research that has attempted to explain theoretically and empirically the 
linkage between managerial risk-taking incentives and derivatives use. This chapter also 
discusses and includes many previous empirical studies that investigate the use of derivatives 
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and their impact on firm’s risk. The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 
2.2 provides a detailed overview of the relationship between CEO stock options 
compensation and derivatives use. The theoretical literature and the empirical studies on the 
relationship between the risk-taking incentives and derivatives use are discussed separately in 
subsections. Section 2.3 presents the theoretical literature on the effect of derivatives use on 
firms’ risk based on the purpose of derivatives use. A literature review of the empirical 
studies on derivatives use and a firm’s risk is also summarised. This chapter also outlines the 
research questions and hypotheses. Section 2.4 summarises the whole chapter.     
2.2 Theoretical literature: CEO stock option compensation and 
derivatives use  
2.2.1 CEO risk aversion and derivatives use  
Corporate derivatives use for financial risk management can arise as a result of managerial 
risk aversion (Stulz, 1984; Tufano, 1998). Managers whose human capital and wealth are 
poorly diversified have an incentive to reduce firm risk more than may be desirable from the 
perspective of the well-diversified shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). If the managers 
have concave utility functions,
 17
 and the variability of a manager’s compensation is 
positively related to the volatility of the corporate income or cash flows, then corporate 
volatility can be costly for the managers. If managers believe that it will be less costly for the 
firm to manage this risk than to manage it on their own account, they will direct their firms to 
use more derivatives to manage the firm’s risk. Therefore, when managers' wealth is related 
to the firm’s performance, the risk-aversion of managers can induce them to pursue financial 
risk management using more derivatives to hedge the firm’s risk (Ertugrul, et al, 2008).  
                                                          
17
  A concave utility function implies that the utility of stock-based wealth increases at a decreasing rate as the 
sensitivities to price and volatility increase.  
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Stulz (1984) and Smith and Stulz (1985) describe the nature of the relationship between 
managerial risk aversion and derivatives use. The manager maximizes expected wealth and 
utility over his lifetime and managers' expected utility depends on the distribution of the 
firm's payoffs (i.e., is negatively affected by the variance of the firm’s expected profits). 
Managers have an incentive to reduce the fluctuations in the firm share price to reduce the 
risk of their wealth invested in the firm.  
Hedging can change the distribution of the firm's payoffs and, therefore, change the 
managers' expected utility (Graham and Rogers, 2002). Managers will benefit from hedging 
by reducing the uncertainty associated with the level of their wealth as a function of firm 
value and by reducing the likelihood that they are disciplined for poor firm performance 
(Whidbee and Wohar, 1999). Derivatives that are used to hedge firm’s risk represent a chance 
for managers to protect their wealth invested in the firm and managers can undertake 
derivatives use for financial risk management in an attempt to make them better off by 
reducing the variance of total firm value and a firm’s risk exposures.  
The managerial risk aversion theory describes one important source of an agency problem 
between managers and shareholders. Smith and Stulz (1985) argue that a manager’s hedging 
incentives are influenced by managerial risk aversion. Managers are exposed to higher risk 
compared with shareholders and therefore they will seek to protect their personal wealth and 
reduce their exposure to firm’s risk at the expense of shareholders when the interests of 
managers are not perfectly aligned with those of the shareholders. This conflict of interests is 
expected to impact the usage of derivatives and managers tend to use more derivatives for 
hedging purposes. 
The risk-related incentive problem impacts the hedging decisions of the firm. One possible 
result is that managers may hedge in a manner that does not maximize the value of the firm 
and tend to use derivatives to hedge as much as possible because their wealth will be higher 
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when firm value is hedged (Adkins et al., 2007). Therefore, the shareholders will be 
concerned that managers will use derivatives for hedging to reduce their exposure and focus 
on the firm’s specific risk instead of the total risk exposure of the firm. Although it is costly 
for both outside shareholders and managers to bear market risk, diversified shareholders have 
a clear cost advantage in bearing firm-specific risk, but managers typically hold large 
positions in their firms and are thus undiversified (Jin, 2002).  
Overall, the managers will direct the firm to use derivatives to hedge when they believe that 
hedging will reduce their exposure to additional risk and to protect their personal investment 
portfolio. Further, when agency problems likely exist, managers have incentive to hedge 
more than is optimal from the perspective of a well-diversified shareholder, leading to 
suboptimal hedging strategies.  
2.2.2 CEO stock option compensation, derivatives use, and risk-taking theory 
One method to mitigate managerial risk aversion is to design compensation contracts that 
have a convex payoff structure of the firm's stock price and to give the managers incentives 
to choose actions that increase firm value and maximize the shareholders’ wealth by 
increasing the value of their equity invested in the firm (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
Stock option compensation can be useful in motivating risk-averse managers to engage in 
risky projects preferred by shareholders. In addition to hedging with derivatives, managers 
can also use derivatives to adopt risky projects. The literature shows that derivatives can be 
used to hedge market exposure or to speculate on movements in the value of the underlying 
asset and managers can engage in speculating using derivatives (Stulz, 1996; Hentschel and 
Kothari, 2001; Adam and Fernando, 2006). Speculating with derivatives generally implies 
that managers are using derivatives with the primary intention of making a profit or 
increasing risk (Géczy et al., 2007). 
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The convexity in the payoff of stock options encourages managers to reduce derivatives use 
for risk management. Smith and Stulz (1985) based their arguments on the sensitivity of stock 
options to stock return volatility. Hedging with derivatives enables managers to diversify risk 
and to be less exposed to stock price volatility. Smith and Stulz (1985) show that more stock 
options in an executive’s compensation package can influence their hedging behaviour and 
provide a disincentive hedging behaviour. The explanation is that stock options create a 
convex function between the executives’ utility and the firm value. The stock option value 
has a convex relationship with the underlying stock price and volatility. Thus, the value of 
managers’ stock options increases with the volatility of the firm’s stock return. This 
sensitivity to stock return volatility should encourage managers to take more risk. Therefore, 
providing managers with more stock options in their compensation package will induce 
appropriate action by managers, reduce risk-related incentive problems, and align the 
interests of managers and shareholders. In this case managers will benefit from increased firm 
risk since this will lead to increase volatility of the firm’s value hence the value of their stock 
options will increase.  
Option-based compensation has become an important compensation vehicle for most 
companies to align the CEO’s interest with shareholders (Duan and Wei, 2009; Rogers, 2002; 
Coles et al., 2006). Further, it is an effective tool for shareholders to mitigate the effects of 
excessive risk-aversion by giving managers incentives to adopt rather than avoid risky 
projects (Hirshleifer and Suh, 1992).   
Theoretical literature predicts the existence of a positive relationship between option-based 
compensation and incentives for managers to increase firm risk because stock price volatility 
increases managers’ option values. Such models predict a positive association between the 
stock option compensation and derivatives use for speculation, even if speculation only 
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increases the volatility of underlying firm value without a commensurate return to risk 
(Géczy et al., 2007). 
Executive stock options and behavioural responses  
Some studies argue that stock option compensation may not always result in a better 
alignment of interests between managers and shareholders. These studies describe how the 
behavioural responses of managers, such as discretionary accounting practices and earning 
smoothing can influence the incentive provided by stock option compensation.  
The perspective of agency theory states that compensation contract may sometimes motivate 
managers to manipulate performance results (Moradi et al., 2015). Prior research in earning 
management, via discretionary accruals, describes many reasons for manipulating the results 
of operations, one of which is a bonus plan (Gaver et al., 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon, 
2006). This shows that executives’ decisions to smooth earnings can be related to the 
contractual motive of executive compensation (Healy and Palepu, 2000). Therefore, earnings 
smoothing can be viewed as an outcome of executives’ opportunistic behaviour to maximize 
their compensation (Das et al., 2013). 
In executive compensation literature, earnings smoothing is defined as under-reporting or 
over-reporting of earnings via discretionary accruals to manage earnings volatility (Goel and 
Thakor, 2003; Bouwman, 2014). Thus, earnings smoothing makes reported earnings 
sometimes higher than economic earnings and sometimes lower.  
Prior empirical studies show that managers use their authority to choose accounting methods 
to achieve their goals (Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012).  
Earnings management may occur through the use of discretionary accruals when managers 
use judgment in financial reporting and in structuring transactions to alter reported results in 
order to influence the value of their compensation which depend on reported figures (Healy 
and Wahlen, 1998). For example, Gaver et al. (1995) and Burgstahler and Dichev (1997) 
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show that when earnings before discretionary accruals fall below the lower bound, specified 
by the bonus plan, managers select income increasing discretionary accruals. This indicates 
that managers manipulate reported earnings for their own gains and their incentives to use 
earnings smoothing increase when they have a direct stake in the reported numbers. 
Accordingly, managers may exploit accounting rules to manage their reported earnings with 
the intent of obtaining some private gain and they view this as a useful tool to dress up 
financial statements to increase bonuses and job security at the expense of shareholders 
(Healey and Wahlen, 1999; Roychowdhury, 2006; Cohen et al., 2008; Zang, 2012).  
Large stock option compensation may influence managerial behaviour and provide an 
incentive to manipulate firms reported earnings, in order to increase the value of their stock 
options (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002). Bergstresser and Philippon (2006) and Das et al. 
(2013) present empirical evidence that earning management via discretionary accruals is 
more pronounced at firms where the CEO’s total compensation is more closely tied to the 
value of stock options. They argue that managers with more stock compensation will tend to 
smooth more, while stock options encourage the manager to increase stock price volatility. 
This is mainly because higher stock price volatility increases the value of the options. 
Managers will tend to overstate earnings when the option component is relatively large, and 
when the sensitivity of the option value to stock price is relatively high (Gao and Shrieves, 
2002). Denis, Hanouna and Sarin (2006) find that there is a significant positive association 
between opportunistic management choices and stock option incentives. 
These studies show that providing managers with incentives compensation requires careful 
consideration of their possible good and ill effects. In this context, earnings management can 
be viewed as a mechanism that allows managers to avoid the undesirable consequences of 
risk on the value of their stock options. Such behaviour would make sense for managers 
whose bonus-linked incentives are focused on meeting explicit targets for earnings. 
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2.2.3 CDS use for hedging purposes and CDS use for trading purposes 
CDS for hedging purposes 
The related literature introduces different classifications for risk that investors face. Some 
categorise risk into three different types: business risk, strategic risk, and financial risk 
(Jorion, 1997). Others show that risk can be broken into two parts: financial risk and non-
financial risk (Cabedo and Tirado, 2004). According to modern portfolio theory, the total risk 
of the firm can be decomposed into systematic risk (also called aggregate risk or market risk) 
and Idiosyncratic Risk (firm-specific or non- systematic risk).  
Idiosyncratic risk is the risk that is unique to a particular security and can be associated with 
such risks as business, financial, and liquidity, etc. Shareholders can diversify away the 
idiosyncratic risk of a particular security by holding a sufficiently large basket of assets. 
Idiosyncratic risk of an individual security that caused by factors unique to that security can 
be greatly reduced or even totally eliminated by investors who hold a diversified collection 
(portfolio) of securities. Hedging with derivatives can be used to reduce and diversify 
idiosyncratic risk (Tufano, 1996; Berk and DeMarzo, 2001; Jin and Jorion, 2006; Gao, 2010). 
An example of non-systematic risk is the poor earnings of firms, reputation, or a strike 
amongst a firm’s employees, and the availability of raw materials (Moyer et al., 1998, P 191). 
While systematic risk (market risk) affects the aggregate market and cannot be eliminated by 
diversification.  
The systematic risk of a security refers to that portion of the return variability caused by 
factors affecting the security market as whole. Thus, systematic risk is related to broad 
swings in the stock market and can be described as unavoidable risk (Ross et al., 2000; Berk 
and DeMarzo, 2001). Some common sources of systematic risk are political, economic and 
social risks, over which an organisation has little control, such as war, change in purchasing 
power (inflation), interest rate changes, and currency exchange rate risk. As systematic risk 
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cannot be eliminated through diversification or hedging, it commands returns in excess of the 
risk free rate investment (while idiosyncratic risk does not command such returns because it 
can be eliminated by diversification). 
Acharya and Bisin (2009) show how the incentive of managers can influence their hedging 
behaviour. Managers may pass up profitable projects with idiosyncratic risk in favour of 
standard projects that have greater aggregate risk. This risk-substitution moral hazard arises 
when managers can affect the risk composition of their firms’ cash flow and enables 
managers to be better diversified. However, such risk substitution occurs at the cost of 
reducing the firm’s market value and may lead to excessive systematic risk.  
Literature shows that it is important to distinguish between systematic and idiosyncratic risk 
when studying the effect of the risk-taking incentives provided by stock option compensation 
(e.g., Tufano, 1996; Jin and Jorion; 2006). Stock option compensation may induce risk-averse 
managers to increase total firm’s risk by increasing systematic instead of idiosyncratic risk. 
This is mainly because an increase in systematic risk can result in a greater stock option value 
compared with an equivalent increase in idiosyncratic risk. This differential risk-taking 
incentive stems from CEOs’ ability to use hedging in order to reduce any unwanted increase 
in their firm’s risk. Therefore stock option compensation might not necessarily induce 
managers to undertake positive NPV projects that are primarily characterized by idiosyncratic 
risk when projects with systematic risk are available as an alternative (Armstrong and 
Vashishtha, 2012).  
The risk diversification potential of credit derivatives has been widely discussed and 
acknowledged (Hirtle, 2009). CDS, which represents the largest sector of the credit 
derivatives market, are considered an important tool that enables firms to manage their 
portfolio of credit risks more efficiently (Minton et al., 2009). Indeed, CDS create new 
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hedging opportunities and the development of the CDS market provide managers with a new, 
less expensive way to hedge or lay off a firm’s credit risk (Ashcraft and Santos, 2009). 
Managers are responsible for taking many decisions on behalf of the shareholders, such as 
financial risk management decisions, investment decisions, and financing decisions (Rogers, 
2002; Adkins et al., 2007). Financial risk management activity undertaken by a firm’s 
executive can be driven by the objective of protecting managerial interest. Therefore, the 
effect of managerial incentive can be positively related to the decision to use CDS for 
hedging purposes. 
Managers are viewed as less-diversified compared to the shareholders, and have limited 
ability to diversify their wealth, which is tied to the firm value (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). 
These conditions encourage managers to avoid risk-taking by implementing conservative 
strategies such as using derivatives more to hedge the firm’s risk. Therefore, undiversified 
managers have a higher incentive for firm risk reduction since their compensation and firm-
specific wealth invested in the firm, both through stock ownership and human capital which 
related to the ongoing existence of the firm. Further, managers believe that if they take more 
risk, all the benefits will go to the shareholders and they will bear all the cost of that 
excessive risky investment such as losing their jobs (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Tufano, 
1996). 
Shareholders can diversify away the non-systematic risk of a particular firm by holding a 
sufficiently large basket of assets. Consequently, based on the modern portfolio theory 
shareholders can be considered as risk-neutral investors. However, managers are still 
considered to be risk-averse to not only market risk but also firm-specific risk and this will 
increase their incentive to avoid risk using more financial risk management since there is a 
significant amount of their wealth and income tied to firm performance (Jensen and 
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Meckling, 1976; Stulz, 1996). This is the assumption underlying the risk-related incentive 
problem described through the traditional principal agent theory.  
A firm’s risk represents a “non-systematic or diversifiable” risk that shareholders can 
eliminate by holding diversified portfolios (Stulz, 1996). Diversification represents an 
inexpensive risk management tool for shareholders and makes them indifferent to the firm’s 
specific risk. Therefore, shareholders prefer less CDS for hedging and are more willing to 
invest in risky investment projects, which maximize their value (Stulz, 1984; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002). The theory implies that poorly-diversified managers will direct their firms to 
engage in hedging to protect their interests and they are expected to use more CDS to reduce 
the firm’s risk to a level that conflict with shareholders’ interests.  
This thesis examines the influence of the risk-taking incentive induced by stock options on 
the decision to use CDS for hedging purposes by European banks. This thesis is different to 
prior empirical studies because it is the first to address the influence of managers’ risk-taking 
incentives on CDS use. Further, this thesis takes advantage of the more detailed disclosure 
requirements that classify derivatives as hedging derivatives or speculating derivatives, where 
many prior studies have assumed that firms are generally using derivatives for hedging. 
However, prior empirical literature has provided conclusions that vary by sector, period, 
country, and econometric techniques used in the analysis, thereby making it difficult to 
generalize about the real motivations of companies using these financial instruments (Tufano, 
1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Chen et al., 2006; Coles et al., 
2006). 
 CDS use for trading purposes   
The use of derivatives by firms as assumed in the literature is for managing firm risk, and the 
empirical evidence in the literature to suggest that derivatives are an instrument used to avoid 
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risk by assuming that firms use derivative for hedging (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; 
Gay and Nam. 1998). Alternatively, another interesting application relates the potential for 
firms to use derivatives to take on risk by using derivatives for trading (speculating).  
CDS can increase or decrease firm’s risk and the value of the firm, depending on the motive 
of CDS usage (Fung et al., 2012). Managers can simply use CDS as an extension of taking 
more credit risk and as tools to increase the firm’s credit exposures and increase return 
volatility (Stulz, 1996; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Rossi, 
2011). The existing empirical research on credit derivatives use shows that the CDS position 
of many banks is for dealer (trading) activities and not for credit risk management and that 
credit derivatives use for hedging is limited (Minton et al., 2009). This show that firms can 
use CDS for income generation and this likely increases the firms’ exposure to credit risk 
(Fung et al., 2012). Further, banks can increase their risk-taking when managers use CDS to 
source new credit risk, such as by selling protection in the CDS market. This shows that 
banks can use CDS to hedge any risk they may have by buying protection using CDS, while 
at the same time buying credit risk by selling protection in the CDS market (Nijskens and 
Wagner, 2011). The literature suggests that firms that use more derivatives to speculate are 
likely to believe that they have a comparative information advantage relative to the market, 
and hence view speculation as a positive net present value (NPV) and profitable activity 
(Géczy et al., 2007). 
Speculation can be viewed as a profit-making activity in rational markets if the firm has an 
information advantage related to the prices of the instruments underlying the derivatives, or it 
must have economies of scale in transaction costs allowing for profitable arbitrage 
opportunities. Shareholders are likely to support the use of derivatives for speculation if 
speculation is a profit-making activity (Géczy et al., 1997; Adam and Fernando, 2006). 
49 
 
From the above it can be clearly noted that the existing literature shows that the reasons 
behind using derivatives for speculating are obviously different from the reasons behind 
using derivatives for hedging (Adkins et al., 2007). The actual corporate use of derivatives 
does not seem to correspond closely to the theory. In practice many companies appear to be 
using financial risk management to pursue goals other than reducing volatility (Stulz, 1996).  
Recently, firms have been required to report derivatives used for trading purposes separately 
from derivatives used for hedging purposes.
18
  
2.2.4 Risk-taking incentive and derivatives use: Review of the previous literature 
 
The risk-taking incentive of the stock option-based compensation is considered a determinant 
of the financial risk management choice. Several empirical studies support this argument 
(Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002; Adkins et 
al., 2007; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). In the banking industry the use of stock option 
compensation has become more prevalent, and the percentage of stock option compensation 
relative to total managerial compensation has also increased compared with industrial firms 
(Chen et al., 2006). Appendix A summarises the empirical literature about risk-taking 
incentives of stock options and derivatives usage.    
Several studies have tried to empirically investigate the linkage between compensation 
induce risk-taking incentives and corporate derivative use. One strand of literature has 
modelled risk-taking incentives using proportion of stock options.  For example, Tufano 
(1996) uses commodity derivatives to examine financial risk management practices within 
the gold and mining industry. His sample consists of 48 firms from the period of 1990 to 
                                                          
18
 This is achieved through International Accounting Standard statement number 39 (IAS 39): Financial 
Instruments Recognition and Measurement. IAS 39 determines how financial instruments are classified into 
various categories depending upon the type of instrument, which then determines the subsequent measurement 
of the instrument. IAS 39 was reissued in December 2003, applies to annual periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2005. 
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1993. The results support the managerial risk-aversion argument. He argues that firms’ 
managers who hold more options tend to hedge less, while firms’ managers who hold more 
stock follow a more conservative policy and hedge more. He finds that financial risk 
management is negatively related to the number of options and positively related to the 
number of stocks held by managers.  
Gay and Nam (1998) use a sample of 325 US nonfinancial companies in 1995. They use 
stock and stock option to proxy for managers’ risk aversion. Based on the theoretical 
prediction of Smith and Stulz (1985) and the empirical findings of Tufano (1996) they predict 
a positive relationship between managerial shareholding and the use of derivatives, and a 
negative relationship between stock option-holding and derivative usage. The results contrast 
with their predictions. They find a positive relationship between option and derivatives usage 
and a negative linkage between managerial shareholdings and derivatives usage. 
Also, Géczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997) who use a different measure for risk-taking 
incentives over a different time period find a positive relationship between managerial stock 
options and derivative usage. They use the log of the market value of the shares obtained by 
using outstanding options. They use a sample of 372 US nonfinancial firms in 1990. This 
positive relationship between stock options and derivatives use does not support managerial 
incentives theory of hedging. Similarly, Knopf et al. (2002) find a positive relationship 
between managerial stock options and hedging derivatives when they measure the risk-taking 
incentive generated by stock options using the number or the value of the shares that could be 
obtained by exercising options. The results of Géczy et al. (1997) and Gay and Nam (1998) 
contradict the theoretical prediction that stock option compensation increases the risk-taking 
incentives of the executives and provide them with an incentive to reduce the use of 
derivatives for risk management.  These results show the need for further investigation of the 
relationship between the risk-taking incentive of the stock options and derivative use. 
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The literature emphasises that a more precise measure of the incentives faced by managers 
should be used, because using variables such as the number or value of options or stock held 
are noisy proxies and do not fully capture managers’ risk-taking incentives. The correct 
variables for risk-taking incentive should measure the total sensitivities of wealth to stock 
price and volatility (Knopf et al., 2002; Core, Guay, and Larcker, 2003). 
 According to Smith and Stulz (1985) managers will induce the firm to hedge less as the 
sensitivity of the manager's wealth to stock volatility increases. Guay (1999b) proposes a 
more direct estimate of sensitivity to measure the managerial risk-taking incentive. He uses 
vega, which represents the sensitivity of managers wealth to firm risk. Vega measures the 
changes in managers’ options value generated by changes in stock return volatility.19 Higher 
vega induces managers to take more risky investment choices, and therefore, to align 
managers’ incentive with those of shareholders.20 He shows that firms use stock option 
compensation to control for the risk-related incentive problem and to motivate managers to 
invest in valuable risk-increasing projects that they may otherwise forgo.  
The same sensitivity measure is adopted other empirical studies. Knopf et al. (2002), 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), and Ertugrul, Sezer, and Sirmans (2008) are among the 
empirical studies that examine the risk-taking incentive generated by stock options 
compensation and hedging derivatives. Knopf et al. (2002), Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), and 
Ertugrul, Sezer, and Sirmans (2008) implement the procedure introduced by Guay (1999b) to 
estimate managers’ risk-taking incentives (i.e., the option portfolio sensitivity to volatility).  
Knopf et al. (2002) test the relationship between managers' risk preferences and hedging 
activities using a sample of 260 US nonfinancial firms in 1996. They use different measures 
for managerial risk-taking incentives. They use the sensitivity of managers' stock option 
                                                          
19 Vega is defined as the dollar value change in the executive’s option portfolio for a 1% change in the 
annualised standard deviation of stock returns. 
20 Guay (1999) estimates vega for CEO common stockholdings. However, he finds that common stockholdings 
provide essentially no risk-taking incentives. 
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portfolios to stock return volatility (vega) to test the linkage between managers’ risk-taking 
incentives and hedging activities. They document a negative relationship between the 
sensitivity of the stock option portfolio to stock return volatility, and the firms’ use of 
derivatives. This is consistent with the theoretical prediction in Smith and Stulz (1985).
21
  
Some empirical evidence focuses on a single industry to study the effect of stock options on 
derivative usage. Similar results about the relationship between stock option compensation 
and risk-taking incentive are reported within a single industry. Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) 
use a sample of 117 US firms in the oil and gas industry between 1993 and 1997. They 
examine how stock options influence managers’ incentives to invest in risky projects. They 
find that the sensitivity of executive stock options to stock return volatility is associated with 
less hedging. Their results are consistent with the theory that stock options reduce the 
managerial incentive problem and support the managerial risk-aversion hypothesis. In the 
same instance, it is indicated that the CEO’s sensitivity to stock return volatility is negatively 
related to hedging in support of managerial risk aversion arguments. Ertugrul et al. (2008) 
provide evidence from the real estate investment trust industry to support a managerial risk-
aversion motive for corporate hedging. They use a sample of 100 firms in 1999, 100 firms in 
2000, and 112 in 2001 in the US. They find a significant negative linkage between the 
sensitivity of a CEO’s stock options portfolio to stock return volatility and hedging. Their 
evidence supports the managerial risk-aversion motive for corporate hedging. 
Different measures for risk-taking incentives   
Another group of studies proposes a different measure to examine the linkage between 
financial risk management and risk-taking incentives (Rogers, 2002; Supanvanij and Strauss, 
2010). For instance, Rogers (2002) uses the ratio of vega-to-delta to measure risk-taking 
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 Knopf et al. (2002) use the number of the stock option to proxy for the risk-taking incentive and find a 
positive relation between stock options and derivatives use which contradicts the theoretical prediction in Smith 
and Stulz (1985).  
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incentives of CEOs. He investigates the association between a CEO’s risk-taking incentives 
and the corporate interest rate or foreign currency derivative usage. Rogers’s sample consists 
of 569 randomly selected US firms whose accounting year ended between December 15, 
1994–October 31, 1995. He finds a negative relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives 
and derivatives holding. More recently, Supanvanij and Strauss (2010) analyse the effect of 
CEO compensation on the use of derivatives. They use a sample consisting of 198 US 
nonfinancial firms during 1994–2000.  They find a negative linkage between hedging and 
stock options. They show that executives’ stock options represent one of the significant 
factors that determine derivative usage.  
While much attention has been paid to the linkage between the managerial risk-taking 
incentives generated by stock option compensation and derivatives usage in industrial firms, 
extant research has overlooked this issue in the banking sector. Only a few empirical studies 
test the linkage between the executive risk-taking incentives and derivatives usage in the 
banking industry. Using a sample of 252 US large bank holding companies from the period of 
1996 through 2000, Adkins, Carter, and Simpson (2007) examine how managerial 
compensation and ownership influence the usage of foreign-exchange derivatives. They 
conclude that the use of derivatives is negatively related to the value of CEO option awards 
but positively related to managerial ownership. These results are consistent with the 
theoretical argument of Smith and Stulz (1985). 
There are also different strands of empirical evidence on compensation literature have 
attempted to address the relationship between stock options and risk-taking incentives of 
executives in relation to corporate investment and finance decisions, and the effect of risk-
taking incentives on the risk choices made by firm executives. These studies investigate how 
the risk-taking incentive generated by stock options affects observable managerial decisions 
that can alter a firm’s risk and stock-return volatility. Managers can implement different risk-
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taking activities other than reducing derivatives use to increase firm risk because stock price 
volatility increases their stock options’ values (Géczy et al., 2007). For example, Coles, 
Daniel and Naveen (2006) examine the linkage between managerial risk-taking incentive and 
firm’s investment and debt policy. They use a sample of 10,687 US nonfinancial firms from 
the period 1992 to 2002. They document a positive relationship between the vega of CEO 
option holdings and firm’s risky policy (higher R&D, lower capital expenditures, higher 
leverage). Another strand of empirical studies explores executive risk-taking in the banking 
industry. For example, Chen et al. (2006) use a sample of 591 US bank-CEO-years 
observations between 1992 and 2000. They use four market measures of risk to capture how 
option compensation induces risk-taking.
22
 They show that stock option compensation 
incentivises risk-taking in the banking industry. They document a positive linkage between 
the value of stock options and risk taking. Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011) use a sample of 
172 US bank merges to investigate how the structure of CEO compensation at the acquiring 
banks affects the default risk implications of mergers. They find that the executive risk-taking 
incentive (vega) is associated with a higher riskiness in CEOs' investment choices. Higher 
vega induces executives to make riskier choices in their mergers and acquisition decisions.  
More recently, Bai and Elyasiani (2013) investigate the relationship between the riskiness of 
banks and their executive compensation structure. They find that higher sensitivity of CEO 
wealth to stock return volatility (vega) induces the CEOs to implement riskier policies, such 
as increasing non-traditional banking activities, leading to higher return volatility and lower 
bank stability. In contrast, Acrey et al. (2011) find that the value of the CEO’s stock options 
seems to mitigate bank risk. Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2011) point out that the banks with 
higher option compensation for their CEOs did not perform worse during the crisis. 
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 Total, systematic, idiosyncratic, and interest rate risk. 
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In summary, many empirical studies show that there is no significant linkage between 
managerial motive and derivative usage (Géczy et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Haushalter, 
2000; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001). More interestingly, Acrey et al. (2011) find that the use of 
stock options is negatively correlated with bank risk. In the presence of mixed evidence from 
prior studies, this study hypothesises that the use of stock options will induce managers to use 
more derivatives for trading purposes through using CDS, which represent one of the largest 
components of the credit derivatives market.  
2.2.5 Research gap and research questions 
Prior empirical studies in this area tried to examine the linkage between executive 
compensation and the usage of derivatives (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; Rajgopal 
and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002; Adkins et al., 2007; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). 
However, a review of the empirical and analytical literature in financial risk management 
shows that previous studies have focused on the linkage between the executive risk-taking 
incentive and the usage of derivatives by assuming that firms use derivatives for hedging 
(e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998). Some other studies went 
further to explain why firms use derivatives in connection with executive risk-taking 
incentives. Their argument suggests that the negative relationship between the risk-taking 
incentive and derivatives usage is evident that firms use derivatives for hedging and the 
primary goal is to mitigate the firm’s risk. For example, Rogers (2002) and Tufano (1996) 
illustrate that when there is a negative association between derivatives usage and risk taking-
incentive then this is consistent with the notion that derivatives are held for hedging. Géczy et 
al. (1997) and Knopf et al. (2002) state that their measure of hedging activities might not 
capture firms that use derivatives for trading purposes instead of hedging. Géczy et al. (2007) 
try to overcome this issue by using survey data to identify whether firms use derivatives for 
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risk management or speculating purposes. They find that nonfinancial firms whose managers 
have higher risk-taking incentives are more likely to use derivatives for speculative purposes. 
However, using surveys is a less accurate method to check how firms use derivatives, 
because executives might be less explicit in admitting that they hold derivatives to speculate 
rather than reduce the firm’s risk (Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010; Rossi, 2011). In addition, it 
is difficult to ascertain the roles, which selective or dishonest responses play in survey data 
(Hentschel and Kothari, 2001). 
As indicated above, previous empirical studies consider derivatives as a whole without 
differentiating them on the basis of the motive of using derivatives. Taking advantage of the 
recent development on both derivatives and compensation reporting
23
, this research advances 
the credit risk management literature by making these differentiations. Furthermore, prior 
empirical studies focus on foreign exchange derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and 
currency and commodity derivatives. This study also contributes to the literature by analysing 
the linkage between executive risk-taking incentive and credit derivatives by using data on 
CDS, which are considered one of the largest categories of credit derivative market (Minton 
et al., 2009; Calice et al., 2012; Norden et al., 2011).
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Moreover, many earlier studies have used very simple measures for stock options, such as the 
number of stock options (Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998) and the value of the stock 
options (Géczy et al., 1997). However, these simple proxies provide weak explanations for 
the risk-taking incentives of executives (Guay, 1999b). This research follows Core and 
Guay’s (2002) methodology to use vega as a measure for risk-taking incentives. Using vega 
to measure risk-taking incentives is effectively unbiased and 99% correlated with the 
                                                          
23 The quality of the published information on the firms’ derivatives has increased after the adoption of 
International Accounting Standards No. 39(IAS 39) and Financial Accounting Standards No. 133 (FAS133) 
Supanvanij and Strauss (2010). 
24
 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, market survey 2007; International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association market survey, 2009. 
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measures that would be obtained if the parameters of a CEO’s option portfolio were 
completely known (Gao, 2010). In addition, empirical studies point out that this measure is 
considered a better way to estimate the impact of the managerial compensation incentive on 
bank risk (Cohen et al., 2000; Knopf et al., 2002). 
Overall, there is no empirical research on the role of executive stock options compensation on 
CDS use. Although the above studies focus mainly on analysing how stock options encourage 
managers to become less risk averse, these studies have documented mixed results and show 
that empirical studies are not consistent with regard to the incentive effects of executives’ 
stock options compensation. Further, a considerable numbers of the existing literature has 
focused on nonfinancial firms. A limited number of empirical studies have examined 
financial firms. In addition, most of this work in this area is mainly based on US data. 
Thus, based on the previous discussion of the relationship between risk-taking incentives of 
stock option compensation and derivatives use, the first research question is formulated as 
follows: 
Research Question 1: Do the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock option 
compensation influence the use of CDS? This question is extended to include the 
following sub-questions: 
- Do the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation influence the use 
of CDS for hedging purposes? 
- Do the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation influence the use 
of CDS for trading purposes? 
The above questions will be investigated based on the following hypotheses: 
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H1 (a): higher risk-taking incentives of stock option compensations are associated with 
less CDS use for hedging purposes. 
H2 (a): higher risk-taking incentives of stock option compensations are associated with 
greater CDS use for trading purposes. 
2.3 CDS usage and firm risk 
2.3.1 Impact of CDS use for hedging purposes on firm risk 
In a classic Modigliani and Miller (1958) world with perfect capital markets, hedging should 
be irrelevant. Hedging financial risk does not increase firm value because shareholders can 
undo any financial risk management activities implemented by the firm at the same cost. In 
other words, shareholders possess the requisite tools and information to create their desired 
risk profiles, and therefore, there is no reason for a firm to hedge. The theoretical literature on 
hedging relaxes Modigliani and Miller’s (1958) assumptions and develops specific reasons 
why individual firms may choose to hedge (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993). 
Prior studies in financial risk management show that derivatives use that reduces return 
volatility is viewed as hedging derivatives (Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Fung et al., 2012). 
Smith and Stulz (1985) show that hedging reduces the firm’s return volatility that result from 
imperfections in the capital market. They show that return volatility is costly and that firms 
use financial risk management with derivatives to reduce stock return volatility. Therefore, 
when firms use derivatives to hedge, the stock return volatility of firms should fall after they 
start using derivatives (Stulz, 2004).  In recent years, firms have dramatically increased their 
risk transfer activities through the use of credit derivatives, and mostly in the form of CDS 
(Nijskens and Wagner, 2011).  
Hedging can increase shareholders value because it reduces the cost associated with financial 
distress. According to Smith and Stulz (1985) firms with existing debt can benefit from using 
derivative for hedging, as hedging may reduce the cost of debt by reducing the volatility of a 
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firm's cash flows or earnings and smoothing the cash flow, which reduces the probability of 
default. Hedging activities reduce the probability of financial distress and reduce the present 
value of financial distress. Consequently, hedging increases shareholders’ wealth because it 
decreases the expected value of direct bankruptcy costs. Moreover, hedging can increase 
shareholder value because hedging reduces the variability of the taxable income and increases 
the present value of tax shields by smoothing out earnings. Another rational for financial risk 
management is the cost of underinvestment problem. Froot at al. (1993) show that when the 
cost of external financing is higher than the cost of internal financing, hedging can mitigate 
the underinvestment problem because it ensures the availability of more internally generated 
funds that could be used to undertake the available investment opportunities. Accordingly, 
firm with greater volatility in stock return or cash flows have greater potential benefits of 
using hedging derivatives because hedging alleviates their return volatility and ensures that a 
firm has sufficient internal funds by reducing unnecessary fluctuations (Géczy et al., 1997; 
Haushalter, 2000).  
Based on these theoretical arguments, the empirical literature has attempted to investigate 
why companies use derivatives. These theories implicitly assume that firms reduce the risks 
they face by using more derivatives. Therefore, the managerial risk aversion hypothesis 
assumes that risk management strategies are implemented, principally, to enhance the 
position of the firm’s management and to reduce firm’s risk. Empirical evidence in this area 
is relatively limited to a very small number of US studies. 
2.3.2 Impact of CDS use for trading purposes on firm risk 
The theoretical literature about managerial risk-taking incentives make an intuitive prediction 
of a positive relationship between option-based compensation and incentives for managers to 
take risks with respect to derivatives because stock price volatility increases call option 
values. Accordingly a positive association is predicted between the sensitivity of a manager's 
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compensation to equity price volatility and speculation, even if speculation only increases the 
volatility of underlying firm value without a corresponding return to risk (Géczy et al., 2007). 
 Stulz (1996) argues that firm compensation schemes can lead managers to speculate when 
their compensation packages reward them for such behaviour. In general, firms for which 
options are a more important component of managerial compensation are less likely to use 
derivatives to hedge (Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011). Managers who hold options 
benefit from increases in volatility, since their options will be worth more if the stock price 
rises, but the option will never be worth less than zero if the stock price falls (Stulz, 2004). 
Managers can use derivatives to speculate. Since speculative activity is not expected to be 
correlated, on average, with firms’ underlying exposures, derivative securities used for this 
purpose are anticipated to increase firm risk (Guay, 1999a). The potential motives of 
managers to speculate is higher when they believe that they have a comparative information 
advantage relative to the market, and hence to view speculation as a positive net present value 
(NPV) and profitable activity (Stulz, 1996; Géczy et al., 2007). Stulz (1996) uses the term 
"selective hedging" to refer to the strategies of managers who incorporate their market views 
into their hedging policy.  
In addition, managers in highly leveraged firms are subject to a greater risk-shifting problem 
because high leverage allows shareholders to capture most of the gains from the risky 
projects while the downside risk of those projects is largely born by depositors and deposit 
insurers (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, if the interest of the executives is aligned 
with those of the shareholders, then executives have greater incentives to shift risk on behalf 
of shareholders (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). The shareholders have 
an incentive to provide managers with more stock option compensation in order to induce 
them to take on additional risk like using more CDS for trading purposes. Hence, increased 
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option-based compensation may aggravate the risk-shifting problem associated with leverage 
in financial firms (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). 
The existing theories of corporate hedging assume that the use of derivatives does not itself 
increase a firm’s value. Rather, the use of derivatives is thought to add value by alleviating a 
variety of market imperfections through hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993). 
However, it is possible that managers believe they can create value for shareholders by 
incorporating speculative elements into their hedging programmes.  
Empirical literature provides evidence that most of the banks use credit derivatives for 
trading purposes more than for the hedging of loans (Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Adam and 
Fernando, 2006; Minton et al., 2009; Fung et al., 2012). Whidbee and Wohar (1999) 
mentioned that banks use derivatives for speculative purposes, but most firms in the banking 
industry argue that the primary objective for using derivatives is to reduce risk exposures. 
Rossi (2011) also confirms that firms are using derivatives for speculating purposes. He finds 
a significant number of non-financial firms speculate in the derivatives market. 
Despite the importance of the topic and the great debate about the role of credit derivatives 
after the last financial crisis, it appears that derivatives use for trading purposes is not well-
explained by existing financial risk management theory and it seems to be essentially no 
theoretical model that explains the link between derivatives use for trading purposes and a 
firm’s riskiness (Tufano, 1996; Aretz and Bartram, 2010).  
There are however, two notable indirect exceptions. Instefjord (2005) provides a simple 
model driven by costs of financial distress to discuss if credit derivative use has a 
destabilizing effect on the banking sector. He believes that derivatives use for trading 
purposes makes banks riskier and considered them to be a potential threat to bank stability. 
There are also theories that predict that firm owners might use derivatives to increase firms’ 
risk. These theories build on the Black and Scholes (1973) analogy between options and 
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corporate claims. The analogy suggests that high volatility is beneficial to equity shareholders 
at the expense of debtholders. In leverage firms, shareholders’ claim on firm value has the 
properties of a call option on the assets of the firm. Therefore shareholders will capture most 
of the gain from risky projects, while the debtholders will face the downside risk of those 
projects.  Accordingly, shareholders have a rationale to provide their managers with 
incentives to use derivatives if they believe that this will increase their equity value at the 
expense of debtholders. However, Duffee and Zhou (2001) argue that the introduction of a 
credit-derivatives market does not necessarily benefit the bank. They point out that theory 
alone cannot determine whether a market for credit derivatives will help banks better manage 
their loan credit risks. They also believe that this issue is ultimately an empirical one. 
Empirically, literature provides limited evidence to bear on the implications that these 
theories have for the firms’ use of derivatives. In large part, this lack of evidence can be 
related to poor data availability.  
Overall, the relationship between credit derivatives and a firm’s risk is highly important in 
banking since banks dominate most derivatives markets and are considered to be heavy users 
of credit derivatives (Minton et al., 2009). Several theoretical models have been developed, 
and different empirical methodologies have been adopted in order to investigate the market 
implications of using hedging derivatives. However, after the rapid growth in the credit 
derivative market and the great debate about the role of CDS in the stability of the banking 
industry, derivatives trading activities have become increasingly important.   
2.3.3 Derivatives use and firm risk: Review of the previous literature 
Literature on financial risk management examines which theory of hedging is consistent with 
the use of derivatives. A large number of studies have examined the extent and nature of 
derivatives use. Indeed, most empirical studies tried to find evidence on the purpose of using 
derivatives.  
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However, existing financial risk management studies ignore the linkage between the purposes 
of derivatives usage and a firm’s risk. Prior empirical analysis tried to answer whether firms 
use derivatives to hedge or to speculate. The net impact of derivative usage on a firm’s risk 
is, therefore, an empirical issue. There is no study in the existing literature exploring the 
linkage between CDS usage and a firm’s risk, which distinguishes between CDS use for 
hedging purposes and CDS use for trading purposes in European banks. 
 Moreover, the majority of the empirical works have focused on nonfinancial firms to discuss 
this issue. Some of these studies are based on survey data, such as Géczy et al. (2007). They 
use survey data to identify speculators among 341 US publicly traded nonfinancial firms. 
They investigate the linkage between managerial compensation and speculation and find that 
speculating firms try to encourage managers to speculate through incentive-aligning 
compensation. They believe that riskier companies will use more derivatives for speculating 
purposes. 
Tufano (1996) uses a sample of 48 gold mining firms. He reports evidence that is consistent 
with the use of derivatives for hedging to reduce risk in response to risk aversion by 
managers and owners. Allayannis and Ofek (2001) examine whether firms use foreign 
currency derivatives for hedging purposes or for speculative purposes. They use a sample of 
S&P 500 nonfinancial firms in 1993. They suggest that using derivatives for hedging will 
reduce a firm’s foreign exchange-rate exposure. The results suggest that firms use derivatives 
for hedging purposes. They find a negative association between foreign currency derivative 
use and firm exchange-rate exposure. In contrast, Faulkender (2005) uses data for 133 US 
firms in the chemical industry from the period of 1994 to 1999. He finds evidence of 
speculation in firms' interest rate risk-management practices. He argues that firms use interest 
rate derivatives not to hedge firm-specific interest rate exposure. 
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Rossi (2011) uses data from a sample of 200 nonfinancial companies in 2007-2009 to 
examine derivative usage in publicly-traded Brazilian companies. He analyses the net 
position of companies in currency derivatives and their foreign exchange exposure. He 
concludes that a large number of Brazilian companies use currency derivatives to speculate 
during the financial crisis because these firms have some informational advantage in the 
exchange market. He identifies two main types of speculators: companies that speculate by 
increasing the volume of derivatives but used them in accordance with their currency 
exposure and companies that speculate by adopting positions contrary to their exchange rate 
exposure. Nevertheless, he points out that both types tried to obtain gains.  
Another line of empirical studies examines the impact of derivatives usage on firm value. For 
example, Tufano (1998) discusses the theoretical implications of corporate hedging in 
relationship to firm value. His theoretical model produces both costs and benefits associated 
with derivatives usage. According to Tufano, the existence of agency costs between managers 
and shareholders when using derivatives can reduce firm value. Using a sample consisting of 
1746 nonfinancial US firms during the year of 1991 through 2000,  Fauver and Naranjo 
(2010) contend that greater agency and monitoring problems are important factors that 
explain why firms use derivatives to speculate and this usage reduces a firm’s value on 
average. Looking at a sample of 720 large US nonfinancial firms between 1990 and 1995, 
Allayannis and Weston (2001) examine the use of foreign currency derivatives and their 
impact on firm value. They find a positive association between derivatives usage and firm 
value. Jin and Jorion (2006) examine the hedging activities of 119 US oil and gas firms from 
1998 to 2001 and find insignificant effects of hedging on market value. In contrast, Adam 
and Fernando (2006) use a sample of 92 US gold mining firms from 1989 to 1999. They 
document that firms have consistently realised economically significant cash flow gains from 
their derivatives transactions and this increases shareholders’ value.  
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Guay (1999a) uses a sample of 254 non-financial firms from 1990 to 1995. He finds that 
firms use derivatives to hedge risk. He finds that derivatives usage is associated with the 
reduction in the total risk, idiosyncratic risk, and risk exposures to interest rate changes, but 
he finds no significant change in the market risk. In contrast with the previous empirical 
evidence, using a sample of 425 large US corporations between 1991 and 1993, Hentschel 
and Kothari (2001) investigate whether the use of derivatives reduces or increases a firm’s 
riskiness. They do not find a significant difference between derivative users and nonusers. 
Further, they do not find a linkage between the volatility of a firm’s stock return and the size 
of its derivatives position. 
Adam and Guettler (2010) examine the use of CDS in the US mutual fund industry. They use 
a sample of the largest 100 corporate bond funds in the US between 2004 and 2008. They 
conclude that fund managers use CDS to take on credit risk rather than to hedge credit risk. 
They explain that managers increase fund risk to improve their relative performance. They 
document that funds, which use CDS exhibit lower returns and the same or slightly higher 
standard deviations than funds that do not use CDS.  
Two recent papers by Bartram, Brown and Conrad (2011) and Fung et al. (2012) deal with 
the linkage between derivatives usage and a firm’s risk. Bartram et al. (2011) investigate the 
effects of derivatives on a firm’s risk and value. They conduct their study using a sample 
comprising 6,888 nonfinancial firms from 47 countries. They find that firms that use 
derivatives have lower estimated values of both total and systematic risk, suggesting that 
derivatives are used to hedge risk. 
The empirical study most closely related to the second aspect of this research (i.e., CDS use 
and firm risk) is a study by Fung, Wen, and Zhang (2012). They empirically distinguish 
between the purposes of derivatives usage. Fung et al. (2012) examine the effects of CDS 
usage on the risk profile and firm value of US insurance companies for the period 2001-2009. 
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They use a sample consisting of 113 Property/Casualty and 78 life insurance companies. 
They distinguish between the usage of CDS for hedging purposes and for income 
generation.
25
For the life insurance sample, the results indicate that the CDS transactions for 
hedging or income generation are associated with higher market risk, idiosyncratic risk, and 
total risk. For PC insurers, risk is significantly and positively impacted by CDS transactions 
for the purpose of income generation. 
A few recent related studies investigate derivatives usage in the banking industry. For 
instance, Minton, Stulz, and Williamson (2009) examine the use of credit derivatives by US 
bank holdings. They use a sample of 395 banks from 1999 to 2005. They find that only 23 
large banks out of 395 use credit derivatives and most of their derivatives positions are held 
for trading activities rather than for hedging of loans. They note that the use of credit 
derivatives by banks to hedge loans is limited. 
In a sample of 335 US commercial banks for the years 2003 through 2009, Cyree, Huang, 
and Lindley (2012) document no difference on the bank values from CDS use, neither in high 
growth periods nor in the low growth periods.
26 
They prove that derivatives generally did not 
cause the last financial crisis because they find no significant evidence that derivatives use 
has increased banks’ speculating behaviour and significantly contributed to the loss of value 
during the last crisis.  
Nijskens and Wagner (2011) investigate the relationship between credit risk transfer activities 
at banks and their riskiness. They examine the association between the use of CDS and a 
bank’s risk as measured by a bank’s share price beta. Their CDS sample consists of 38 banks 
from 1998 to 2006. They find that the use of CDS is associated with an increase in a bank’s 
                                                          
25
 Income generation involves writing derivatives, which can involve speculation. 
26 High growth period is the pre-crash period of 2003–2005; low growth period is the period 2007–2009 during 
the crash. 
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risk. They believe that CDS use increases bank risk more in the short run because banks use 
CDS to source new credit risk. 
Derivatives use and the changes in firm risk 
There is an extensive empirical literature discussing the determinants of derivatives use for 
hedging and focuses mainly on explaining scenarios in which firms benefit from derivatives 
use for hedging and how derivatives use for hedging leads to a reduction in firm risk. 
However, there is empirical evidence in the literature suggesting that under some 
circumstances this argument may not hold true in all cases.  
Several studies find that firm risk is not influenced by derivatives use. For example, 
Hentschel and Kothari (2001) investigate the effects of derivatives use on firms' risk 
characteristics and  conclude that the risk characteristics of firms that use derivatives 
intensively and hold large derivatives positions are not different from the risk characteristics 
of the firm that do not use derivatives. Their results show that firms’ risk is not increased 
because of derivatives use. In the same time derivatives use does not lead to mitigate firm 
risk. Using a sample from the mutual fund industry, Koski and Pontiff (1999) also document 
no differences in risk between mutual fund that use derivatives and those that do not. They 
argue that if managers use derivatives to hedge, they will be able to maintain desired risk 
exposure more easily by combining derivatives use with non-derivatives use (non-derivatives 
investments) to maintain target risk levels comparable to those of funds that do not use 
derivatives. 
In line with the studies mentioned above, Shiu, Moles, and Shin (2010) present empirical 
evidence from the banking industry showing that bank risk is not influenced by derivatives 
use. However, they argue that banks use currency derivatives as an alternative tool to 
establish the desired level of risk-taking through the use of exchange rate derivatives for 
trading purposes. 
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Derivatives use for hedging purposes can increase firm risk  
Empirical literature on risk management also indicates that derivatives use for hedging 
purposes can contribute to a higher firm risk.  Minton et al. (2009) and Nijskens and Wagner 
(2011) illustrate that banks are using CDS to source new credit risk by hedging any 
undiversified exposures they may have, and in the same time taking more credit risk by 
selling protection in the CDS market. 
In summary, although the theoretical literature in risk management discusses corporate 
derivatives use as a risk reduction instrument (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993), 
evidence provided by empirical studies indicates that one potential result of firms’ derivatives 
use is an increase in firm riskiness. Banks that shed part of their risk exposure using 
derivatives can have an incentive to take on more risk which offsets the risk reduction 
achieved through the use of derivatives and leave the overall level of bank risk unaffected or 
even higher.  
Much debate has taken place on the issue of how firms use derivatives and what constitutes 
the main purpose of using derivatives. However, it seems that the issue of how the usage of 
these derivatives influences the firm’s risk has received little attention. One of the objectives 
of this study is to examine the linkage between a firm’s risk and the usage of the derivatives 
for hedging purposes and for trading purposes separately. In particular, this study asks 
whether executive usage of CDS for hedging reduces a firms’ risk or not. Further, it asks 
whether executive usage of CDS for speculating leads to more or less firm risk. Appendix (B) 
summarises the empirical literature about derivatives usage and a firm’s risk.  
2.3.4 Research gap and research questions 
The existing theories of corporate risk management assume that the use of derivatives adds 
value to the firm by alleviating a variety of market imperfections and hedging a firm’s risk. In 
practice, firms are using derivatives not only for hedging, but also for trading (Géczy et al., 
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1997; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001). Managers can use derivatives to increase a firm’s risk 
when they try to create value for shareholders by incorporating speculative elements into 
their derivatives use (Faulkender, 2005; Géczy et al., 2007) 
The earlier empirical research in this area has tried to primarily examine how firms use 
derivatives and what strategy the managers are following when they use derivatives (e.g., 
Tufano, 1996; Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Faulkender, 2005; Adam and Guettler, 2010). A 
review of the empirical literature in derivatives use shows that previous studies have 
generally overlooked the effect of derivatives use on a firm’s risk. This is possibly due to a 
lack of adequate firm-specific data on derivatives usage (Adam and Fernando, 2006). In fact, 
although data on derivatives use have become available in the last 2 decades, very few 
empirical studies discuss the effect of derivatives use on a firm’s risk and provide mixed 
evidence (Bartram et al., 2011). Much of the empirical evidence provided in the literature 
assumes that managers engage in derivatives use mainly to minimize a firm’s risk and tries to 
determine whether firms use derivatives for risk management or for speculative (Allayannis 
and Ofek, 2001; Chernenko and Faulkender, 2011). Yet, little research has been devoted to 
examine the effect of derivatives use on a firm’s risk and little is known about the effect of 
credit derivatives activity on a firm’s risk.  
In addition to the above, the limited available empirical evidence of the effect of derivatives 
on a firms risk focuses on the consequence of derivatives use in general without 
differentiating between the purpose of derivatives use (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Faulkender, 2005). Taking advantage of the recent development on derivatives reporting, this 
research advances the literature on derivatives use by studying the linkage between the 
purposes of CDS use and the firm’s risk.  
Prior empirical studies focus on foreign exchange derivatives, interest rate derivatives, and 
currency and commodity derivatives (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; Hentschel and Kothari, 
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2001; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Bartram, Brown, and Fehle, 2009). Surprisingly, research 
investigating the consequence of credit derivatives use on a firms' risk has not received the 
same attention in the existing finance literature. Such research is important because with the 
recent developments in the credit derivatives market, it is possible that firms use CDS to 
reduce or to increase their risk exposures (Minton et al., 2009). Moreover, after the last 
financial crisis the effect of CDS use has been a principal concern and significant issue for 
economists and regulatory entities (Stulz, 2010; Adam and Guettler, 2011; Bedendo and 
Bruno, 2012). Furthermore, although the derivative securities that have caused the most harm 
during the last financial crisis have been those held by financial firms, less attention has been 
paid to the effect of derivatives use on a firm’s risk in financial firms (Bartram et al., 2011). 
One purpose of this thesis is to fill this gap in the literature by examining the difference 
between the effect of CDS use for hedging and CDS use for trading on a firm’s risk. 
Overall, earlier empirical research primarily tried to examine firms’ use of derivatives by 
assuming that managers engage in derivatives mainly to minimize firms’ risk and to hedge 
risk exposure. Little empirical research discusses the impact of credit derivatives use on a 
firm’s risk, and the focus of these studies was mainly on derivatives use in general without 
differentiation between the effects of derivatives use for hedging from derivatives use for 
trading. 
Thus, based on the previous discussion of the relationship between derivatives use and firm 
risk, the second research question is formulated as follows: 
Research Question 2: Does CDS use influence bank risk? This question is extended to 
include the following sub-questions: 
- Does CDS use for hedging purposes influence bank risk? 
- Does CDS use for trading purposes influence bank risk? 
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The above questions will be investigated based on the following hypotheses: 
H1 (b): there is a negative association between CDS use for hedging purposes and bank 
risk. 
 H2 (b): there is a positive association between CDS use for trading purposes and bank 
risk. 
2.4 Summary  
The above sections have shown a detailed overview of the key aspects of the relationship 
between executives’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock option compensation and 
corporate derivatives use. The basis of the theoretical arguments of corporate derivatives use 
assumes that maximising shareholder wealth and managerial risk aversion can explain a 
firm’s use of derivatives. The theoretical literature highlights that risk management practices 
are associated with managerial risk aversion. Managers who are more risk-averse than 
shareholders would be more likely to use derivatives for hedging to reduce risk. The greater 
risk aversion would be associated with greater concavity of the utility function and thus 
stronger incentives to manage risk with derivatives. Therefore, managers' private preferences 
seem to impact corporate derivatives use decisions and would induce them to hedge more 
than is optimal from the perspective of the well-diversified shareholders. 
The risk-taking incentive of managers generated by stock option compensation is considered 
an important determinant of corporate derivatives use (Stulz, 1984; Tufano, 1996). Smith and 
Stulz (1985) suggest that shareholders can impact management’s risk aversion through stock 
options compensation; more stock options can influence managerial derivatives use and align 
the risk-taking incentives of the managers with their shareholders. They indicate that the 
convexities of stock options compensation provide greater incentives for managerial risk-
seeking preference and reduce derivatives use for hedging purposes. The stock options 
provide convex payoffs and induce managers to take on greater risk and manage less of 
firm’s risk because hedging derivatives may reduce the volatility and the value of their 
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option. This thesis investigates how the risk-taking incentive generated by stock option 
compensation influences managers’ derivatives use decisions.  
The second part of this chapter summarises the theoretical and empirical literature that 
investigates the linkage between a firm’s risk and derivatives use. Smith and Stulz (1985) and 
Guay (1999a) focus on managerial risk aversion and built their argument on the basis that 
derivatives are hedging instruments used to mitigate a firm’s risk. Most of the empirical 
studies focus mainly on investigating the purpose of derivatives use and tried to determine 
whether firms use derivatives to reduce risk or to take more risk (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Haushalter, 2000). However, very few studies test 
directly the linkage between derivatives use and the firm’s risk. These studies focus generally 
on derivatives use without distinguishing between derivatives that are used for hedging from 
derivatives used for trading. This thesis extends the literature by classifying CDS use into 
CDS use for hedging and CDS use for trading to examine the linkage between CDS use and a 
firm’s risk. 
Prior empirical evidence in these two areas is relatively limited to a very small number of US 
studies. Furthermore, while several empirical studies have examined the association between 
managerial compensation and derivatives use for non-financial firms, little has been known 
of the relationship between using derivatives and risk-taking incentives in the banking sector. 
This thesis examines the relationship between risk-taking incentives of stock option 
compensation and CDS. Furthermore, this thesis empirically investigates how the purpose of 
CDS use influences a firm’s risk.   
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Figure 2.1: An illustration of the theoretical framework 
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Chapter 3: Research methods 
3.1 Introduction  
This chapter describes and explains the methodological aspect applied to examine two main 
issues: 1) the first issue is the relationship between the risk-taking incentives of CEO’s stock 
options compensation and CDS use; 2) the second issue is the effect of CDS use on firm’s 
risk. This chapter explores the sample background, data collection process, sample selection 
criteria, and data sources.  
This chapter starts with a summary of the research questions and hypotheses. Section 3.3 
presents the discussion of the sample of this research, the sample selection criteria, and the 
data source. Section 3.4 defines the key variables and how these variables are measured. 
Section 3.5 presents the control variables. This is followed by Section 3.6 which is devoted to 
discuss the endogeneity issues.  The two stages regression approach is described in Section 
3.7. Section 3.8 explains the various robustness tests.  
3.2 Sample and data sources  
This thesis uses secondary data collected mainly from the European banks’ annual reports 
and Datastream. The importance of CDS comes from the fact that this financial instrument 
represents the largest sector of the credit derivatives market that are intended to mitigate a 
firm’s credit risk (Longstaff, Mithal, and Neis, 2005; Minton et al., 2009).  
The data used in this thesis is balanced panel data. There are several advantages of using 
panel data such as, more accurate inference of model parameters because panel data captures 
variation across time; controlling the impact of omitted variables; and avoids the problem that 
arises from the differences across individuals in the number of measurements (Kennedy, 
2003; Hsiao, 2007). Further, using balanced panel data reduces the noise introduced by firm 
heterogeneity because it allows an observation of the same bank every year (Baltagi, 2001).  
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This study is based on a sample extracted from European publicly listed banks. The decision 
to choose European banks and this time span was taken because the relatively rich data 
available related to the disclosure of derivatives after introducing the International 
Accounting Standard IFRS 9 Financial Instruments (replacement of IAS 39) which became 
effective for European firms from the accounting period beginning on or after 1 January 2005 
(Duh, Hsu, and Alves, 2012). Firms should disclose their objectives for holding derivatives 
and distinguish between derivatives held for trading and those that are held for hedging 
(Barth and Landsman, 2010). Before the beginning of the financial year in which IAS 39 was 
first adopted, the disclosure of derivatives use was not mandated and data on derivatives 
usage by firms outside the US was disclosed on a largely voluntary basis (Bartram et al., 
2009). When firms apply common international accounting standards this make it more 
practical to study international derivative use in the banking industry. 
The influence of the risk-taking of executive stock options on derivatives use has been 
previously studied for industrial firms by a number of studies (e.g., Supanvanij and Strauss, 
2010; Knopf, et al., 2002; Gay and Nam, 1998; Géczy et al., 1997). However, the results for 
nonfinancial firms are not necessarily applicable to the financial firms (Chen et al., 2006; Bai 
and Elyasiani, 2013). Early findings in the literature prove that compensation packages in the 
banking industry tend to be structured differently from other industries (Adams and Mehran, 
2003). Moreover, the use of stock option compensation in the banking industry has witnessed 
a dramatic increase (Chen et al 2006; Conyon et al., 2013). 
Houston and James (1995) find that CEOs in banks receive less cash compensation and have 
a smaller percentage of their total compensation in the form of options and stock, compared 
to CEOs in other industries. They explain this difference in compensation structure by the 
different nature of the firm's assets and investment opportunity set in banks compared to 
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nonbanking industries. They document little evidence that CEO’s compensation packages in 
banking are designed to encourage excessive risk taking.  
In contrast, recent empirical studies (e.g., Becher et al., 2005) show that the differences in 
executives’ compensation structure between banks and industrial firms appear to diminish as 
the banks are further deregulated. As a result, banks are turning toward the use of more stock 
and stock options to align shareholder and executive interests, and bank compensation 
structures are becoming more comparable with those of the industrial firms (Bai and 
Elyasiani, 2013).  
Despite this change in executives’ compensation structure, earlier studies (e.g., Chen et al., 
2006; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013) stress that CEOs’ risk-taking incentives in the banks have 
traditionally been dissimilar to the industrial firms. The differences in risk-taking incentives 
between banks and industrial firms can be explained in large part by the fact that banks 
operate in a regulated industry, have fewer growth options, substantially greater leverage, and 
coverage by deposit insurance schemes which bear some of the costs of financial distress (Bai 
and Elyasiani, 2013).   
3.2.1 Sampling process and selection criteria 
The list of European banks is drawn from two main indices: European stock market indices 
and premier indices of the European Union countries (EU-27) (Fasshauer, Glaum, and Street, 
2008). The number of banks included in these indices is 112 banks. However, since 38 banks 
are cross-listed, the initial potential sample size is 72 banks. Some banks are also dropped 
from the sample based on the following criteria: not providing English copy of the annual 
reports, merger or acquisition, and missing data. Table 3.1 summarises the Sample selection 
process. 
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Taking all of the abovementioned reasons together, additional 12 companies were dropped 
from the sample. The final sample consists of 60 banks that were listed on 22 European stock 
exchanges indices or included in one of three European indices (i.e., FTSE Eurotop 100 
Index, FTSE Eurofirst 300 Index, and Euronext100 Index).
27
  
Listed 
banks 
Reasons for including Table 3.1: Sample selection process 
 
31 
 
FTSE Eurotop 100 Index 
Criteria 1  
 
Banks listed in these European stock 
market indices 
13 FTSEurofirst 300 Index 
6 
Euronext100 
 
 
72 
 
Premier segment of 27 European stock exchanges. 
Criteria 2 
Banks included in the premier indices 
of 27 European countries 
 
Reasons for excluding 
 
Deleted 
13 Listed on more than one of the indices Cross-listed  
3 An English copy is not available Annual report not available in English 
1 Merged or acquired during the sample period Merger or acquisition  
10 
Banks that do not provide enough details of CEO compensation Missing data 
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Total sample companies 
 
This set of publicly listed banks is chosen for two important reasons. Firstly, publicly listed 
firms are more likely to comply with accounting standards and disclose detailed information 
about their executives compensation (Bai and Elyasiani, 2013; Conyon et al., 2011; Gao, 
2010). Moreover, publicly traded firms are incited by international accounting 
standards/international financial reporting standards (IASs/IFRSs) to report their derivatives 
activities in their annual financial statements and this increases the availability of richer data 
because of the mandatory disclosure requirements (Judge, 2006). As of 2005, almost all 
publicly listed firms in European and many other countries are required to prepare financial 
statements in accordance with International Financial Reporting Standards, and firms that 
                                                          
27 Fasshauer, Glaum and Street (2008) adopt the same approach to analysis the defined benefit pension 
disclosure of European companies. 
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adopt IAS appear to provide higher accounting quality (Barth, Landsman, and Lang, 2008; 
Fasshauer, Glaum, and Street, 2008).  
Secondly, listed firms are normally large and more likely to engage in credit derivatives 
activities because they benefit from economies of scale (Minton et al., 2009; Supanvanij and 
Strauss, 2010; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011).28 A positive association between large firms 
and derivatives disclosure level has been recognised in derivatives-reporting literature (e.g., 
Beretta and Bozzolan, 2004; Linsley and Shrives, 2006; Zhou and Wang, 2013). 
The limited amount of previous empirical studies in this area can be explained by the lack of 
publicly available information on corporate hedging activity (Mian, 1996; Supanvanij and 
Strauss, 2010).  In the absence of specific reporting requirements, firms have not voluntarily 
disclosed derivatives activities in their financial statements in a uniform manner.  
Banks and insurance companies are major groups of active participants in CDS markets 
(Fung et al., 2012). However, the core aim of this thesis is to examine CDS use in the 
banking industry. There is a notable difference between derivatives use in insurance 
companies compared to the banking industry (Castries and Claveranne, 2010). Insurance 
companies are using derivatives mostly for hedging purposes, and have regulatory or legal 
restrictions on their ability to enter into derivatives contracts (Cummins et al., 2001; Castries 
and Claveranne, 2010). In addition, using reported data from only one industry will help to 
control for cross-industry differences in investment opportunity sets, reporting practices, and 
regulatory environment (Colquitt and Hoyt, 1997).
29
  
 Virtually all firms belong at least to one of these European indices: FTSE Eurotop 100 
Index, FTS Eurofirst 300 Index, and Euronext100, and premier indices of EU-27. Table 3.2 
presents a summary of the sample based on the country, stock market index, number of banks 
                                                          
28 The benefits from economies of scale for large firm are related to the disclosure costs, information and 
transaction costs on derivative.  
29 Hentschel and Kothari (2001) also exclude insurance companies because of the wide range of financial 
activities by insurance firms that makes it difficult to classify them into financial and non-financial corporations. 
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used in the sample and mentioned in the stock market index, and number of publicly listed 
banks in the stock market.  
   Table 3.2: A summary of the sample based on the country, market index, number of banks included, and number of publicly listed 
banks in the stock market. 
Country 
Market 
index 
Number of 
banks in stock 
market 
Number of 
banks in the 
sample and the 
percentage 
Country Market index 
Number of 
banks in stock 
market 
Number of 
banks in the 
sample and the 
percentage 
UK FTSE100 9 5 (55.6%) Denmark OMX 20 28 2 (7.1%) 
Italy MIB-30 19 6 (31.6%) Belgium BEL20 4 2(50%) 
Spain IBEX 35 10 5 (50%) Sweden OMXS 30 4 4(100%) 
Germany DAX 30 13 3 (23.1%) Austria ATX 8 1(12.5%) 
France CAC40 20 4(20%) Bulgaria SOFIX 5 3(60%) 
Portugal PSI-20 4 4(100%) Lithuania OMX Vilnius 2 2(100%) 
Malta MSE 4 3(75%) Hungary BUX 2 2(100%) 
Poland WIG20 16 3 (18.8%) Switzerland SMI 24 1(4.2%) 
Slovenia LJSE 3 3 (100%) Ireland ISEQ-20 2 1(50%) 
Romania BET 3 2 (66.7%) Norway OBX 22 1(4.5%) 
Cyprus CySE 20 4 2 (50%) Czech republic PX Index 1 1(100%) 
Total  105 40   102 20 
 
Banks are classified as users or non-users of CDS based on a search of their annual reports 
for information about the use of CDS. Appendix C shows the complete list of the banks 
classified as CDS user or CDS non-user, and their market capitalisation. 
Banks in the following 22 countries will be included in the sample: the UK, Italy, Spain, 
Germany, Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France, Portugal, Sweden, Cyprus, Bulgaria, 
Lithuania, Czech Republic, Hungary, Malta, Poland, Romania, Slovenia, Switzerland, and 
Norway. The sample used in this thesis represents about 83% (£670,494 millions) of the 
market capitalisation of European publicly listed banks (£804,196.42 millions).   
3.2.2 Sample period  
The sample examined in the present research comprises 60 European banks and covers 6 year 
periods from 2006 to 2011. Thus, in total 360 annual reports were sought, obtained and 
analysed. This thesis covers a period which witnesses an increase in the quality of financial 
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reporting after the mandatory IAS/IFRS adoption for listed companies in European countries 
(Duh et al., 2012; Palea, 2013). 
In 2002 the European Union agreed that from January 2005 international accounting 
standards/international financial reporting standards (IASs/IFRSs) would apply for the 
consolidated accounts of the EU listed companies (Barth et al, 2008). Starting from 2005, 
IAS/IFRS adoption has been mandatory in all the member states of the European Union with 
the ultimate goal of increasing transparency in financial reporting.  
In addition, this time period (2006-2011) covers the period before, during and after the last 
credit crisis. The event of the last crisis attracted the interest of regulators and academics 
about the role of both risk-taking incentives arising from stock options and CDS use in the 
crisis. Thus, investigating these issues over a six-year period enables the sample to be divided 
into three different subsamples: a pre-crisis period, crisis period, and post-crisis period. 
3.2.3 Data sources 
In this thesis, secondary data is used to answer the two research questions. The data has been 
collected from two main sources: bank’s annual reports and Datastream database. Data is 
collected as follows: 
CDS and derivatives data: Consistent with many prior empirical studies on derivatives use, 
the data on CDS is hand-collected from banks’ annual reports (e.g., Allayannis and Ofek, 
2001; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). CDS users are identified 
by searching the annual reports for key words like credit default swap, default contract, 
single-name default swaps, default swap, and CDS. The details about the notional value of 
CDS contracts are collected from banks’ balances sheet and the additional disclosure in the 
notes.  
Derivatives disclosure practice of European banks is in fact diverse. For example, the UK 
banks provide a common reporting framework and more detailed information compared with 
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other European countries. This makes the data collection of CDS and other derivatives labour 
and time intensive. Some annual reports only disclose the total value of credit derivatives 
contracts without classifying the figures into different credit derivatives categories. However, 
they clearly explain that most of their credit derivatives positions are in the form of CDS. 
Remuneration data: Unlike US firms, compensation data for European firms is not readily 
available in machine-readable form, and there is no database which provides a complete 
classification of compensation data for European firms (Conyon et al., 2011; Renneboog and 
Zhao, 2011). Therefore, compensation data requires hand-collection using banks’ annual 
reports. Empirical studies point out that assembling data on executive compensation across 
European countries is difficult due to the different country governance structures, legal and 
accounting systems and alternative ways of measuring executive compensation (e.g., Abowd 
and Bognanno, 1993; Carpenter and Yermack, 1999). Data is collected for the following 
components of CEO compensation: 
1) Stock option data: Consistent with previous studies, the value of stock option 
compensation is calculated using the Black-Scholes (1973) option valuation model. 
For this purpose, the following details about stock option compensation are obtained 
from bank’s annual reports: 
 Total number of options at the end of the year. 
 Exercise price. 
 Time to expiration (time-to-maturity). 
 Price of the underlying stock 
These key parameters for Black-Scholes option pricing model are normally disclosed in 
details in the directors’ remuneration reports. The Black-Scholes formula has become 
standard practice in executive compensation literature to estimate the value of executive 
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options (Conyon and Murphy, 2000; Coles et al. 2006). Appendix A describes the option 
valuation model in more details. 
2) Cash compensation: The total annual cash compensation (annual salary and annual 
cash bonus) data is obtained from bank’s annual reports. Salary and cash bonuses 
represent an important and common proportion of executive compensation (Balsam, 
2001). It is common for empirical studies to use the value of executive cash pay as the 
measure for risk aversion (Coles, et al., 2006). 
3) Stock Grants: The bank’s annual report is also used to collect data on executive stock 
compensation (restricted stock and long term incentive plan). To calculate the value 
of executive stock compensation the total number of stock holding is multiplied by 
closing stock price. Executive ownership as a percentage of stock holding at the end 
of the year is also included. 
CEO characteristics:  Data on CEO characteristics (i.e., age and tenure) is hand-collated 
from bank annual reports.  
Recently, more detailed information about managerial compensation has been made available 
in annual reports, especially after adopting the Greenbury Report (1995), Hampel Report 
(1998) and Directors’ Remuneration Report Regulations (2002). Furthermore, in a 2004 
report, the European Union (EU) Commission formally recommended that all listed 
companies in the EU report details on individual executives’ compensation packages 
(Conyon, et al., 2013).
30 
The reason for choosing annual reports as a main source for the key variables in this thesis is 
because banks’ annual reports are considered a more dominant, reliable, and significant 
source of information (Cowton, 1998). Moreover, both CDS and compensation data disclosed 
                                                          
30
 Hand-collecting data of European CEO Compensation data is both labour  and time-intensive  This is because 
compensation data is not reported in the same tabular form across different European companies, making data 
collection more difficult (Conyons et al., 2011). 
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in annual reports is edited and complies with the reporting requirements (Bartram et al., 2011; 
Conyon et al., 2011). 
The second source of data used in this thesis is the Datastream database. Datastream was used 
to collect data on banks’ characteristics and control variables. Data on banks’ book value of 
debt and book value of assets are used to estimate banks’ leverage. Furthermore, Datastream 
is used to obtain data on market-to-book value of assets and total sales to measure growth 
opportunities and bank size respectively. 
Datastream is also used to gather data on the number of geographical segments to measure 
diversification. There are different inputs used to measure vega, delta, and beta are obtained 
from Datastream, such as the volatility of the bank’s stock return, the volatility of the 
market’s return index, and risk-free rate. 
Datastream covers a large number of stock markets and financial data for companies. In 
addition, it is a major source of data for global stock markets and empirical research for 
European companies. If accounting data is missing in Datastream, the company annual report 
is used. Datastream has also been used as a source in previous studies (e.g., Bartram et al., 
2011; Renneboog and Zhao, 2011). All figures have been translated into the pound sterling 
currency using the Datastream exchange rate at the annual report date. Data was analysed 
using the Statistics Data Analysis (STATA) 10. 
3.3 Research philosophy: Positivism 
There are various philosophical assumptions which have a direct implication for adopting a 
specific research methodology and influencing the selection process of an appropriate 
research paradigm. These assumptions are views about the nature of reality, the nature of 
knowledge and of human nature. These philosophical assumptions influence the research 
process of examining, collecting, analysing and interpreting findings (Burrell and Morgan, 
1979). 
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Empiricism as a philosophical position comes from arguments about the nature of knowledge 
and how to acquire knowledge. Empiricism takes the point of view that logic and 
mathematics are tools for exploring the implications of observed knowledge. Traditionally, 
empiricists accepted that: 
1. Certainty of belief in what we know can only be approached through perceived 
experience. 
2. Ultimately, all knowledge is derived from experience. 
3. In the realm of discourse statements are either true or false because of the way the 
world is or because of some formal properties of the language we use. 
Empiricism leads quite naturally to the idea that science should be ‘value free’, that is free 
from beliefs and ideologies which cannot be justified in terms of the objects of experience 
under study. 
The influence of empiricism has been extremely pervasive and has led to one of the most 
significant philosophical movements of modern times: positivism. Positivism is now regarded 
as rather passé in certain quarters although it has been particularly influential in the recent 
development of the disciplines of finance, economics and accounting.  
Research based on positivist approach usually involves a deductive process and is 
underpinned by the belief that reality is independent from the researcher and the goal is to 
empirically discover knowledge using information that can be verified scientifically 
(Bryman, 2004). 
Social researchers adopting a positivist paradigm are goal orientated and focus on theories to 
explain or predict social phenomena (Bailey, 1996). Within this paradigm, theories provide 
the basis for explanation, permitting anticipation of phenomena, and predicting their 
occurrence. The positivist position can be described by the following: 
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i. There is a mind-independent reality, which can be described by objective observation 
language.  
ii. Statements are only meaningful if they are synthetic (representing contingent or 
empirical truths) or analytic (representing formal truths). 
iii. Synthetics statements cannot be known a priori. 
iv. All metaphysical statements (which contain statements of value or non-observable 
reality) may be said to be meaningless. 
v. The meaning of a statement is derived from the method of its verification31(Ryan et al, 
1992, P6) 
In the present research a positivist approach is adopted in order to investigate the validity of 
the theoretical arguments of Smith and Stulz (1985), who suggests that stock options 
compensation can reduce executives risk aversion and influence their derivatives use.   
3.4 Key Variables and regression model 
There are two primary objectives of this research: The first one is to examine the relationship 
between CDS use and risk-taking incentives generated by a CEO’s stock option 
compensation. The second is to investigate how CDS use influences bank’s risk. The 
structure of the test may be expressed by the following two stage equation: 
CDS = ƒ (CEO Risk-taking incentives + control variables)          (1) 
CDS i,t = β0 +  β1.vegai,t + β2.Salary,t  + β3.Cash bonusi,t  +  β4.Stock granti,t  +   β5.Ownershipi,t  +  β6.Hedging 
derivativesi,t +  β7.Trading derivativesi,t +  β8 Investment opportunitiesi,t +  β9.Leverage i,t +  β10. Sizei,t +  β11. 
Diversificationi,t +  μt + έ i,t 
 
              Firm risk = ƒ (CDS + control variables)                               (2) 
 Risk i,t = β0 +  β1.CDSi,t + β2.Age,t  + β3.Tenure,t  +  β4. Leveragei,t  +   β5 Investment opportunitiesi,t  +  β6.Sizei,t +  
β7.Salary i,t +  β8 bonusi,t +  β9. Diversificationi,t +  μt + έ i,t 
 
                                                          
31
  A verification principle added by logical positivism.  
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Equation (1) provides a specification for modelling the purpose of CDS use as a function of 
the CEO’s risk-taking incentives generated by stock option compensation. Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) is used to examine how the risk-taking incentives influence CDS use. Eq. (2) 
specifies the influence of the CDS use on the firm’s risk.  
3.4.1 Risk–taking incentives (Vega) 
The measure of CEO incentives to increase risk induced by stock options is referred to as 
vega. Vega measures the changes in managers’ options value generated by changes in stock 
return volatility. Core and Guay (2002) methodology for measuring the risk-taking incentive 
effects arising from CEO stock option compensation is employed. Vega is measured based 
upon the partial derivative of the dividend-adjusted Black–Scholes equation with respect to 
the annual standard deviation of stock returns. The partial derivative is then multiplied by 
0.01 to represent the pound change in option value from a 1% change in the standard 
deviation. The CEO incentive to increase risk is then calculated by multiplying the generated 
value with the number of stock options (Guay, 1999b; Core and Guay, 2002; Rogers, 2002; 
Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Gao, 2010).
32
  
Core and Guay's approximation method is widely-used in the empirical compensation 
literature (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hagendorff and Hagendorff, 
2011). The Core and Guay (2002) procedure allows researchers to apply a Black-Scholes 
option pricing model to accurately measure managerial incentives to increase risk using data 
that is typically available in a single corporate annual report.
33
 In particular, the data needed 
for estimating the risk-taking incentives of the stock option compensation are: the number of 
stock options, exercise price, stock price, and time-to-maturity of all the options in the 
                                                          
32
 Guay (1999b) find that vega of stock holdings is zero. Following much prior literature the calculation of vega 
is based on stock options compensation (e.g. Rogers, 2002; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011; Hagendorff and 
Vallascas, 2011). 
33
 Therefore they refer to this technique as the "one-year approximation" (OA) method.  
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portfolio of stock options held by each CEO.
34
 Most publicly-listed banks provide the 
information necessary for computation of a Black-Scholes value for CEO’s stock options. 
Core and Guay (2002) suggest that the method they propose to measure risk-taking incentives 
of CEO option portfolios would be useful in a study of financial risk management. Further 
details on the Black-Scholes model and the calculation of the risk-taking incentives of stock 
options are provided in Appendix (D 1).  
Some empirical studies use different measures for the risk-taking incentives of stock option 
compensation such as using binary variables for existence or absence of stock options 
(Conyon and Freeman, 2004) or the number of options (Tufano, 1996; Gay and Nam, 1998; 
Allyannis and ofek, 2001) or the value of the stock options compensation (Datta et al., 2001; 
Ryan and Wiggins, 2002). These studies rely on the readily available measures (i.e., existence 
or absence of stock options, number of options, value of stock options) because they were 
constrained by the data availability of more detailed information of stock option 
compensation (Core and Guay, 2002). However, using such simple measures for the risk-
taking incentives of stock options does not fully capture managers’ incentive to alter a firm’s 
risk and are expected to suffer from predictable measurement error (Core and Guay, 2002; 
Coles et al., 2006). In this thesis vega is used because it has been recognised as an effective 
and unbiased proxy that provides a better estimation for the risk-taking induced by stock 
options (Knopf et al., 2002; Gao, 2010).
35 The complete list of the variables and definitions 
are presented in Table 3.3.   
Similar to previous empirical studies (e.g., Géczy et al. 1997; Datta et al., 2001; Knopf et al., 
2002; Adkins et al., 2007) stock options value are used as an alternative measure of the risk-
                                                          
34
 Stock return volatility, dividend yield, and the risk-free rate are also inputs to the Black-Scholes model that 
can be computed using data available on Datastream. More details on these variables are in Appendix B 
35
 Vega as a measure for risk-taking incentive is effectively unbiased and 99% correlated with the measures that 
would be obtained if the parameters of a CEO’s option portfolio were completely known (Gao, 2010). 
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taking incentives generated by stock option compensation. Black-Scholes model is used to 
calculate the total value of CEO stock options at the end of the year.  
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Table 3.3: Variables definitions and data sources 
Variable Definition  Data source 
  
Salary The natural logarithm of the CEO’s annual base salary. 
 
Annual report 
Cash bonuses The natural logarithm of the total CEO’s cash bonuses. 
 
Annual report 
Stock grants The natural logarithm of the value of shares held by the CEO at the end of the year.  Annual report 
Option value 
The natural logarithm of the value of stock options held by the CEO at the end of 
the year. 
Annual report 
 
Delta 
 
The pay performance sensitivity: the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 
1% change in stock price, measured by partial derivatives of Black-Scholes value 
of options and value of stock holdings with respect to stock price (measured by 
natural logarithm). 
Annual report 
& 
Datastream 
 
Vega 
 
The pay-risk sensitivity: the change in the dollar value of CEO wealth for a 0.01 
change in stock return volatility, measured by partial derivatives of Black-Scholes 
value of options with respect to stock return volatility (measured by natural 
logarithm). 
Annual report 
& 
Datastream 
Ownership The percentage of the bank common stock owned by CEO. 
 
Annual report 
CDS (Hedging) Total notional value of a CDS hedging contracts scaled by total assets. 
 
Annual report 
CDS (Trading) 
Total notional value of a CDS trading contracts scaled by total assets. 
 
Annual report 
Derivatives (Hedging) 
The natural logarithm of total notional value of derivative contracts scaled by total 
assets. 
 
Annual report 
Derivatives (Trading) 
The natural logarithm of total notional value of CDS hedging contracts scaled by 
total assets. 
 
Annual report 
Growth opportunities The natural logarithm of the market-to-book value of assets.  Datastream 
Leverage Book value of debt / book value of asset. Datastream 
Size The natural logarithm of total sales. Datastream 
Diversification Number of geographical segments. Datastream 
 
Default risk (DD) 
 
The number of standard deviations that the market value of bank assets are above 
default point (the point where the market value of assets is less than the book value 
of total liabilities)  
 
Datastream 
Beta The volatility of the firm’s stock return in relation to the volatility of the market’s 
return index.  
CAPM &  
Datastream 
Age CEO age 
Annual report 
Tenure The natural logarithm of the number of years of the CEO has held the position of 
CEO at bank 
Annual report 
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3.4.2 CDS  
The extent of CDS use is measured using the notional values of the CDS contracts reported 
by the bank at the end of the year. Previous empirical studies on the topic also used the 
notional value of derivatives contracts (e.g., Gay and Nam, 1998; Hentschel and Kothari, 
2001; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). Similarly to previous studies (e.g., Knopf et al., 2002; 
Rogers, 2002) the notional value of a CDS contract is scaled by total assets. 
The literature illustrates that assessing the extent of corporate derivatives use represents one 
of the significant challenges that faces most empirical studies (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Aretz and Bartaram, 2010). For this reason many studies typically use binary variables to test 
theories of corporate risk management to indicate whether a firm uses derivatives or not (e.g., 
Nance, Smith, and Smithson, 1993; Mian, 1996; Géczy, et al., 1997; Allayannis and Weston, 
2001; Judge, 2006; Lin and Smith, 2007; Kim, Nam, and Thornton, 2008; Bartram, Brown, 
and Fehle, 2009). Previous literature has used binary variables to test whether or not the 
managers have an incentive to use derivatives. 
In contrast to previous studies, more recent empirical studies have used a notional value of 
the derivative contract. These empirical studies prefer the notional value because it represents 
a continuous variable to study the determinants of the amount of derivatives use (Allayannis 
and Ofek, 2001; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Borokhovich, Brunarski, and Crutchley, 2004; 
Adam and Guettler, 2010; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010).  
More recently, Gay, Lin, and Smith (2010) use binary and the notional amount of derivatives 
holdings to measure a firm’s derivatives use. They use indicator variable equal to one if a 
firm reports the use of derivatives, and zero otherwise. They also use firm’s total notional 
amount of derivatives scaled by its total assets. In this thesis, a binary variable is used for 
CDS use decision and the notional value of CDS contract is used to measure the extent of 
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credit derivatives use in the bank. Similarly to previous studies, variables are transformed to 
the natural logarithm and scaled with total assets in the case of skewed distribution where 
appropriate (Rogers, 2002; Guay and Kothari, 2003; Chen et al., 2006; Bai and Elyasiani, 
2013). 
3.4.3 Firm risk  
3.4.3.1 Distance to default  
This thesis examines the effect of CDS use on banks’ risk and uses two different measures for 
banks’ risk.  The first one is Merton Distance-to-Default which provides a direct assessment 
of default likelihood of the bank default using both accounting and market data (Saldías, 
2013). Distance to default is a market-based measure of corporate default risk which is based 
on evaluation of firm’s assets in the stock markets, and book values of short-term debts. This 
model measures both solvency risk and liquidity risk (Harada, Ito, and Takahashi, 2010). 
Empirical studies use Merton distance to default model to assess the risk of insolvency of 
firms using firm’s balance sheet and market data. The distance to default represents the 
number of standard deviations away from the default point, where the default point is defined 
as the point when the assets of the bank are just equal to its liabilities (Gropp, Vesala, and 
Vulpes, 2006). In other words, distance to default measure the probability that the firm fails 
to repay the debt (Gestel and Baesens, 2009). The advantage of using distance to default to 
capture banks’ risk is that it implicitly captures a bank’s expected returns via the inclusion of 
the market value of assets (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011). Distance to default reflects 
three crucial factors of bank risk-fragility: the market value of the firm's assets, leverage, and 
the volatility of assets. Therefore, it is considered as an appropriate indicator of banks’ risk 
(Gropp et al., 2006; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013).  
Distance to default is calculated for each bank in the sample and for each time period, using 
that period's equity market data and balance sheet data. A shorter distance-to-default (i.e., 
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lower distance to default) indicates higher bank’s risk (Gropp et al., 2006). The calculation of 
distance to default requires data on bank share prices and accounting information. Data to 
compute annual distance to default were gathered from Datastream. Further details on the 
estimated DD are provided in Appendix (D 2). 
3.4.3.2 Beta 
The second measure is firm’s beta which is obtained from the CAPM model (Nijskens and 
Wagner, 2011; Chen et al. 2006). Empirical studies in financial risk management (e.g., 
Bartram et al., 2011) have examined the association between derivatives usage and beta to 
capture the impact of derivatives use on banks’ risk. Beta measures the volatility of the firm’s 
stock return in relation to the volatility of the market’s return index and defined as the relative 
change in the bank stock return with respect to stock index return (Bessis, 1998). In this 
thesis, each domestic stock market index is used as a benchmark to estimate the market beta 
for the banks in the sample. The data on banks’ stock return and market index return are 
obtained from Datastream. Following prior research (e.g., Chen et al. 2006; Nijskens and 
Wagner, 2011; Fung et al., 2012) banks’ betas are calculated as follows:  
 
 
β = 
covi;M 
 
        σ2M  
where : 
COVi;M is the covariance of the annual banks’ stock with the market index return using 
monthly returns from Datastream. 
σ2M is the variance of the annual market index return using monthly returns from 
Datastream. 
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3.5 Control variables  
The control variables used in this thesis were selected based on previous literature.  
Including the variables that previous researchers have shown to influence firm derivatives use 
will improve the explanatory power of the model (Knopf et al., 2002).  
3.5.1 Control variable for “CDS model”  
Drawing upon the existing literature in derivatives use, CDS use is modeled as a function of 
CEOs’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock options compensation (vega) and the 
following control variables: growth opportunities, financial distress (leverage), firm focus 
(diversification), managers’ risk aversion, delta, bank size, and other derivatives. 
Growth opportunities are considered in previous studies to affect derivatives use (Froot et al., 
1993; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). A positive association between growth opportunities 
and derivatives has been proposed in existing literature (Froot et al., 1993; Gay and Nam, 
1998). Firms with greater growth opportunities are more likely to derive greater benefits from 
derivatives use. As this is mainly related to the reduction in underinvestment problems; 
derivatives use helps ensure that managers have the sufficient internal funds to take 
advantage of available risky positive NPV projects that they might otherwise forgo (Tufano, 
1996; Géczy., et al., 1997; Coles et al., 2006; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). Growth 
opportunities are measured with the book to market ratio (e.g., Gay and Nam, 1998; Graham 
and Rogers, 2002; Rogers, 2002; Géczy et al., 2007).  
According to Smith and Stulz (1985), firms that face higher expected costs of financial 
distress have larger incentives to use derivatives because derivatives can reduce the present 
value of bankruptcy and the probability of financial distress. Firms can use derivatives to 
reduce the variance of a firm's cash flow or earnings which enable a firm to have sufficient 
cash flow to fulfill its fixed payment obligations and reduce the probability of financial 
distress (Aretz and Bartram, 2010; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). Similarly to previous 
94 
 
studies, leverage is used as a proxy for financial distress (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Rogers, 2002; 
Aretz and Bartram, 2010). Leverage is measured with the ratio of total debt to book value of 
assets (e.g., Coles et al; 2006).  
I include diversification as a control variable for firm focus. Earlier empirical studies (e.g., 
Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 2007) suggest a negative relationship between the degree of 
diversification and derivatives use. Firms can choose to reduce firm risk through changing the 
level of diversification (Coles et al., 2006; Bartram et al., 2011). For all the banks in the 
sample, data is collected on the number of geographical segments of the firm at the end of 
each year to measure the degree of diversification (Géczy et al., 1997; Fung et al., 2012). The 
primary source of data on the number of segments is Datastream supplemented with the 
hand-collection of missing items from the annual reports. 
In line with empirical literature, data were also collected on CEO’s cash and share 
compensation and included in the control variables to control for CEO’s risk aversion.  
Literature predicts that CEO’s fixed salaries and cash bonuses will be positively associated 
with derivatives use (e.g., Barton, 2001; Adkins et al., 2007). Higher fixed salaries and cash 
bonuses may increase the likelihood of derivatives; this is because the CEO of the firm is 
likely to have little diversification in personal wealth (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999; Coles et 
al., 2006; Adkins et al., 2007).
36
 Consistent with the existing literature, data is collected on 
CEO base salary, cash bonuses using banks’ annual reports.  
In addition to cash compensation, the literature suggests a positive association between 
executives’ share compensation and derivatives use. Based on the arguments of Smith and 
Stulz (1985), when executives hold more shares they are likely to use more derivatives to 
reduce firm’s risk in order to protect their private wealth in the firm. Stock-based 
                                                          
36 Others argue that higher cash compensation will be negatively related to derivatives use for hedging (e,g., 
Knopf et al., 2002; Ertugrul et al ., 2008; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). They believe that higher cash 
compensation will make it easier for the CEO to build wealth that is not tied to firm value, thus make the CEO’s 
better diversified. 
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compensation increases the risk aversion of non-diversified managers and provides the 
managers with an incentive to reduce the fluctuations in the firm share price to reduce the risk 
of their wealth invested in the firm. The value of CEO stock grant is calculated by 
multiplying the number of the CEO’s stock by the price of the bank stock at the end of the 
fiscal year (Tufano, 1996; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Géczy et al., 2007; Kim et al., 2008). 
The percentage of CEO shareholdings of all shares outstanding also included controlling for 
the effect of managerial ownership (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999). 
The sensitivity of CEOs’ stock and stock options to stock price (delta) is also included.  The 
effects of delta on firm risk are of some interest, because delta can provide risk preference 
and risk avoidance incentives (Coles et al., 2006). Higher delta increases the expected payoff 
to the managers and could induce managers to accept higher risky positive NPV projects 
because managers share gains with shareholders. Nevertheless, higher delta will expose the 
undiversified managers to more risk compared with the shareholders when stock prices 
decrease, which induces managers to adopt more conservative strategies and to choose less 
risky projects (Guay, 1999b). CEOs’ with large deltas are more sensitive to firm performance 
which may increase managers’ risk aversion (Knopf, et al., 2002; Rogers, 2002). Core and 
Guay (2002) find a positive association between delta and derivatives use, executives’ with a 
higher delta are more likely to use derivatives to hedge firm risk. In line with existing 
literature, delta is mainly used as a control variable (Coles et al., 2006). 
Several of the previous empirical studies of derivative use show a positive relationship 
between firm size and derivatives use (e.g., Tufano 1996; Allayannis and Ofek, 2000). Large 
banks are expected to use more derivatives because they are more able to take advantage of 
economies of scale that generate transactions and information cost advantage (Mian, 1996; 
Géczy et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000; Judge, 2006). In this thesis, bank size is measured by 
natural logarithm of total sales (Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). 
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In this thesis, the use of other derivatives by banks is also considered as a control variable. 
Empirical studies in credit derivatives indicate that CEOs can use other types of derivatives 
like interest-rate, foreign exchange, equity, and commodity derivatives to manage firm risk 
(Minton et al., 2009). Fung et al., (2012) find a positive association between CDS use and the 
use of other derivatives. The notional amount of other derivatives has been hand-collected 
from banks’ annual reports. 
3.5.2 Control variables for “firm risk model” 
 
The firm risk model involves a regression analysis control for a set of variables that are 
expected to be associated with bank risk. The control variables that are used as determinants 
of the firm’s risk are all based on existing literature (e.g., Guay, 1999a; Coles et al., 2006; Bai 
and Elyasiani, 2013). These control variables are as follows: investment opportunities, 
leverage, size, tenure, age, diversification, and the cash compensation component (CEO’s 
salary and CEO’s bonus).   
The market value of assets to book value of assets is included as a proxy for growth 
opportunities (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006; Bartram, Brown, and Stulz, 
2011). Earlier empirical studies control for the effect of firm investment opportunities on firm 
risk (e.g., Cohen et al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006). Literature shows that firm risk is expected to 
be positively associated with investment opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992; Bartram, 
Brown, and Stulz, 2011). Smith and Watts (1992) document evidence that firms with 
substantial investment opportunities use compensation package to mitigate managers’ risk-
related incentive problems and induce them to invest in risky projects. Therefore, firms with 
greater investment opportunities are expected to undertake riskier projects (Rajgopal and 
Shevlin; 2002).  
Among the control variables, total debt to book value of assets serves as a measure of bank 
leverage (Guay and Kothari, 2003; Coles at al., 2006). Leverage is expected to be positively 
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associated with banks’ risk, because higher leverage translates into higher probability of 
financial distress and hence higher firm risk (Tufano, 1996; Coles et al., 1996). In this thesis 
the total debt to book value of assets is used to control for leverage (e.g., Coles et al; 2006). 
Consistent with the existing literature (e.g., Guay, 1999; Whidbee and Wohar, 1999; Cohen et 
al., 2000; Coles et al., 2006) CEO tenure and, CEO age are used as proxy for the CEO 
characteristics. CEO cash compensation (salary and bonus) are also used to proxy for the 
level of risk aversion. The natural logarithm of total sales is used as a proxy for bank size.  
Firm diversification is also included because it can be used to reduce risk (Gao, 2010; 
Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011). In this thesis the number of geographical segments is 
used as a proxy for bank diversification. 
3.6 Endogeneity Issues 
3.6.1 CDS model  
  
This thesis contributes to the corporate derivatives literature by analysing the risk-taking 
incentives of CEOs generated from stock options in relation to the CDS use by the European 
banks. Prior literature in compensation and derivatives suggest the presence of endogeneity 
problems in the relationship between risk-taking incentives and derivatives use when CEO 
risk-taking incentives and derivatives usage are jointly determined (Rogers, 2002; Kim et al., 
2008; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). In the CDS model, the problem of endogeneity could 
result due to the potential of joint determination of the decisions to use CDS and CEO risk-
taking incentives.   
Many of the previous empirical studies on derivatives assumed that managers’ risk-taking 
incentives of stock options are exogenous, rather than choice variables in examining the 
determinants of derivatives use (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Whidbee and Wohar, 
1999; Haushalter, 2000; Knopf et al., 2002; Kim et al., 2008). However, modelling CEO risk-
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taking incentive as an exogenous variable could bias the results towards finding no 
relationship between the CEO incentives to increase risk and derivatives use when the 
independent variable is endogenously determined along with the dependent variable or due to 
an omitted control variable (Rogers, 2002; Coles et al., 2006).  
Using a model that controls the endogeneity problem can provide a more efficient estimate of 
the relationship between the variables and isolate the endogeneity effects (e.g., Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002, Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). In this thesis, the analysis is 
conducted using two approaches; the first analysis assumes that the CEO risk-taking 
incentives are exogenous variables, where in the second analysis the CEO risk-taking 
incentives are modelled as an endogenous variable. 
In the first part of the analysis the risk-taking incentives generated by stock option 
compensation are assumed to be exogenous variables to test the effect of risk-taking 
incentives on CDS use (Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Gay and Nam, 1998; Whidbee and 
Wohar, 1999; Haushalter, 2000).  
The presence of endogeneity represents an empirical challenge and potential shortcoming that 
may limit the conclusions that can be drawn from some of the existing evidence provided by 
the literature on the relationship between CEO risk-taking incentives and derivatives use 
(Aretz and Bartram, 2010). Few studies try to address this issue with models that may remedy 
endogeneity effects and take a step toward yielding unbiased estimates of the relationship 
since risk-taking incentives and derivatives usage can be determined simultaneously. 
In order to address the endogeneity problem, the risk-taking incentive generated by stock 
option (vega) is included as a choice variable in the second part of the analysis. The 
specifications used to predict vega are based on variables used elsewhere in the literature. 
The regression specifications closely follow those in the existing literature (Guay, 1999b; 
Rogers, 2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). vega is regressed with the 
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following variables: CEO’s cash compensation (salary and bonuses), delta, bank size, growth 
opportunities, leverage, and risk. Table 3.4 summarises the variables used by previous 
empirical studies to predict the CEO’s risk-taking incentives. 
 
Literature includes CEO cash compensation as the proxy for the CEO’s level of risk aversion 
(Rogers, 2002; Nam et al., 2003; Coles et al., 2006). CEOs with higher cash compensation 
are more likely to become more risk averse. CEO’s with high cash compensation will seek to 
avoid risk.37 Cash compensation is measured using the natural logarithm of the salary and the 
natural logarithm bonus. Following existing literature (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002) the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock price is also included as an additional control variable for 
CEO risk aversion in the risk-taking incentive model.   
Guay (1999b) documents a positive relationship between firm size and CEO risk-taking 
incentives. Firm size is measured as the total sales at the end of the year. Previous empirical 
studies show that growth opportunities are also expected to be positively related to CEO risk-
                                                          
37 Guay (1999) and Ertugrul et al. (2008) suggest that higher CEO’s total cash compensation is an indicator for a 
better diversified manager. He argues that higher cash compensation increases the CEOs’ degree of 
diversification because they have more money to invest outside the firm, thus they become less risk averse. 
Table 3.4: A summary of the main variables  that are considered in modelling the CEO’s risk-taking 
incentives 
Guay (1999b) Cash compensation, age, investment opportunities, firm size, and 
sensitivity of wealth to stock price. 
Rogers (2002) Firm risk, cash compensation, growth opportunities, leverage, firm size, 
marginal tax rate, and regulated industry dummy. 
Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) Investment opportunities, cash compensation, sensitivity of wealth to stock 
price, liquidity, and firm size. 
Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2006) Leverage, firm risk, growth opportunities, age, delta, firm size, CEO 
tenure, and cash compensation. 
Bai and Elyasiani (2013) CEO pay share,  leverage,  cash compensation, firm risk, and firm size 
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taking incentives (Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). Consistent with earlier 
compensation studies, the market-to-book value of assets is used as a proxy for growth 
opportunities. In contrast, leverage is expected to be negatively associated with the risk-
taking incentives (Rogers, 2002). Financial leverage increases the probability of financial 
distress increase and, therefore, there is lesser need to provide the CEO with a risk-taking 
incentive. Debt ration (book value of debt to book value of assets) is utilised as a proxy for 
leverage (Rogers, 2002). 
Similar to previous studies, this thesis controls for the effect of risk on the risk-taking 
incentives generated by stock options (e.g., Guay, 1999; Rogers, 2002). Firm’s stock return 
volatility should play a role in determining CEO incentives (Rogers, 2002). Guay (1999) 
shows that vega is a positive function of stock return volatility, executives at risky firms may 
prefer a riskier pay package that is associated with a higher risk levels. Thus, vega is expected 
to depend positively on risk level. The stock return volatility of the firm is included to control 
for the risk level (Coles et al., 2006). As a proxy for the total risk of the firm, each bank’s 
annualised standard deviation was calculated using monthly stock returns data over a 12 
months (Rogers, 2002). 
As shown in existing literature vega and delta are jointly determined, and shareholders 
consider a combination of delta and vega when they choose an executive compensation 
contracts. Thus, the CEO’s risk-taking incentives can be affected by the CEO’s delta (Coles 
et al., 2006; Gao, 2010). Shareholders consider a combination of delta and vega when they 
choose executive compensation contract. As in previous literature (e.g., Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006) delta is mainly used as a control variable.  
In line with the existing literature, delta is also predicted as a function of growth 
opportunities, vega, CEO tenure, volatility, leverage, and size (Rogers, 2002; Coles et al., 
2006). Consistent with the existing literature, cash compensation (salary and cash bonuses), 
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CEO stock value, CEO ownership, derivatives use, investment opportunities, leverage, bank 
size, and diversification are included as control variables in the CDS model.  
Based on the above, the structure of the CDS model after including the risk-taking incentives 
as endogenous variable may be expressed by the following system: 
CDS = ƒ (Predicted risk-taking incentives (vega) + control variables)          (3) 
3.6.2 Risk model 
The firm risk is also subject to endogeneity issues. Literature shows that the effect of 
derivative use on firm risk is sensitive to endogeneity concerns (Guay, 1999a; Bartram et al., 
2011; Fung et al., 2012). Endogeneity is an issue that has received great attention in recent 
accounting research (Aretz and Bartram, 2010; Fung et al., 2012).  
Endogeneity, in the context of the risk model, refers to the fact that CDS use can impact firm 
risk. However, firm risk which is determined by a set of variables can simultaneously 
influence firm CDS use. The endogeneity arises from the simultaneity or joint determination 
of derivatives use and firm risk.  
These endogeneity issues are expected to make observing the change on firm risk from 
derivatives use difficult (Guay, 1999a). In an attempt to mitigate this concern and to adjust 
for the potential endogeneity of CDS usage with respect to firm risk, CDS use is treated as an 
endogenous variable using the predicted value of the CDS model measured by the risk-taking 
incentives; predicted value is then incorporated as an independent variable in the risk model 
(Bartram et al., 2011; Fung et al., 2012). 
3.7 Two stage tests of risk-taking incentives and credit risk management 
3.7.1 First stage test of risk-taking incentives and credit risk management  
This thesis investigates the relationship between CDS use and different alternative proxies for 
CEO’s risk-taking incentives (vega or the value of the CEO's stock options) in one-stage 
regressions (Eq. 1). It also examines how CDS use influences firm risk using different 
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alternative proxies for firm risk (Eq. 2). Similar to many previous empirical studies (e.g., 
Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Haushalter, 2000) the first stage represents estimation for 
the relationship between CDS use and the risk-taking incentives by modelling CEOs’ risk 
taking-incentives as an exogenous variable. 
3.7.2 Second stage test of risk-taking incentives and credit risk management  
In this thesis, the risk-taking incentive of stock option compensation utilised in the CDS 
model is considered also as a choice variable. This choice is modelled by first solving for a 
specification of CEO risk-taking incentives as suggested by prior empirical studies. The 
predicted value from the risk-taking incentives model in the first stage regression is then 
incorporated as an explanatory variable in the CDS model.  
In the firm risk regression, CDS is treated as a choice variable to correct for the endogenity 
problem. The predicted value from the CDS model choice in Eq. 3 (which corrects for the 
endogenity problem of the risk-taking incentives) incorporates into the model of firm risk. 
Based on the above, the structure of the relationship between firm risk and CDS use after 
including the CDS as an endogenous variable may be expressed by the following system: 
               Firm risk = ƒ (predicted CDS + control variables)                               (4) 
In the risk model (Eq.4) CDS use is modelled as an endogenous variable.  In doing so, the 
design of the empirical analysis addresses the potential endogenity issues in the CDS model 
and in the firm risk model by using control variables suggested by prior literature, and using 
the predicted value of vega and CDS as an instrumental variable.  
3.8 Robustness checks 
 
In this thesis, several robustness checks are conducted.  Tobit and probit models are used to 
check the robustness of the results from OLS model. Tobit model is used to investigate the 
relationship between risk-taking incentives (vega) with respect to the extent of CDS use. In 
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tobit model, the extent of CDS use is regressed on risk-taking incentives provided by stock 
options, and other compensation variables such as salary, cash bonuses, stock grant, and 
ownership, as well as, control variables for other derivatives, leverage, investment 
opportunities, diversification, and size. 
The decision of the extent of CDS use can be correlated in their unobserved components 
(erros) and tobit is required for the statistical analysis. The tobit specification assumes that an 
unobserved latent variable determines the level of the dependent variable: 
                                             
                                                 
 
In the model above,    , equals CDS use of bank   in year  . The latent variable,      , models 
the risk-taking incentives provided from stock options; the regressions above estimate the   
coefficients. Tobit regression for the CDS model (Equation 1) can be written as follow:  
The extent of CDS i,t = β0 +  β1.vegai,t + β2.Salary,t  + β3.Cash bonusi,t  +  β4.Stock granti,t  +   β5.Ownershipi,t  +  
β6.Hedging derivativesi,t +  β7.Trading derivativesi,t +  β8 Investment opportunitiesi,t +  β9.Leverage i,t +  β10. Sizei,t +  
β11. Diversificationi,t +  μt + έ i,t 
 
Where the extent of CDSi,t use is measured using the notional value of CDS contracts at the 
end of the year and vega is the risk-taking incentives provided by stock options. The decision 
to use CDS may be different from the decision of how much to use CDS. It is possible that 
common factors affecting these decisions are either unobserved or unobservable (Adkins et 
al., 2007).  
A bank makes two decisions: (1) whether to use CDS and (2) if the extent CDS use. In this 
thesis the association between the risk-taking incentives and the decision to use derivatives or 
not is investigated using probit model. The effect of risk-taking incentives on the decision to 
use derivatives can be different from the effect of the extent of using derivatives (Haushalter, 
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2000; Ertugrul, et al., 2008). Probit regression for the CDS model (Equation 1) can be written 
as follow 
CDS use decisison i,t = β0 +  β1.vegai,t + β2.Salary,t  + β3.Cash bonusi,t  +  β4.Stock granti,t  +   β5.Ownershipi,t  +  
β6.Hedging derivativesi,t +  β7.Trading derivativesi,t +  β8 Investment opportunitiesi,t +  β9.Leverage i,t +  β10. Sizei,t +  
β11. Diversificationi,t +  μt + έ i,t 
 
The dependent variable in the probit estimation is a dummy variable equal to one if the bank 
uses CDS and zero otherwise. In the following section the key variables (dependent and 
independent) utilised in each model are discussed in more details. The tobit and probit 
models have many analogies to OLS regression: they have coefficients for every independent 
variable, a pseudo R-squared statistic to summarise the strength of the relationship. Unlike 
OLS regression, however, tobit regression in general has less stringent requirements on the 
normality of the variables (Davidson and Mackinnon, 2004; Gujarati, 2003). Random effects 
regressions are also used to predict the relationship between risk-taking incentive and CDS 
use for trading purposes.
38
  
As part of a robustness check for CEO risk-taking incentives of stock option, the CEO risk-
taking incentive is measured using the natural logarithm of the value stock option as utilized 
in many prior empirical studies (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997).  
Firm risk is measured using two proxies. The first one is firm’s Beta which is obtained from 
the CAPM (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Chen et al., 2006). The second measure is Merton 
distance to default (Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). 
The second part of the analysis (i.e., firm’s risk model) is also conducted using OLS 
regressions to predict the relationship between firm’s risk and CDS use. Furthermore, random 
effects regressions are employed where appropriate. 
                                                          
38
 The Hausman test is used to choose between fixed and random effect model in panel data. 
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In this thesis, regressions are expanded to broaden the scope of the investigation each round 
by using four sets of subsamples to examine the relationship between the variables. The first 
regression is based on the full sample and the control variables. The second regression is the 
full sample, the control variables and dummy variable based on the number of banks 
operating in each country (the dummy variable equals 1 if the country has more than 3 banks, 
0 otherwise). The third regression is based on the full sample, control variables and countries’ 
dummy variables (Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, Portugal, and others).
39
 The fifth 
regression is based on the full sample, control variables and the countries’ dummy variables 
based on the number of banks operating in each country (dummy equals 1 if the bank 
operates in one of the following countries: the UK, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and 
Sweden, 0 otherwise).
40
 The list of the four samples and classification criteria are presented 
in Appendix E. 
3.9 Summary 
In closing, this chapter describes the research methods and sample selection criteria used in 
the present thesis. The measurement methods used to measure the main variables in both the 
CDS model and the risk model are also explained and discussed in depth. Furthermore, 
sample period and data sources are presented. 
This chapter highlights the importance of controlling for endogeneity problems that could 
exist between the risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation and CDS use when 
CEO risks-taking incentives and CDS usage are jointly determined. Furthermore, this chapter 
discusses the possible endogeneity problem in the relationship between CDS use and firms 
risk. The control variable used in the CDS model and in the risk model, and the various 
robustness checks are explained at the end of the present chapter. 
                                                          
39
  These countries have the highest number of hedging observations. 
40  The number of banks: 5 in the UK, 4 in France, 6 in Italy, 4 in Portugal, 5 in Spain and 4 in Sweden. 
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Chapter 4: Data Visualisation 
 
 This chapter explores and visualizes the data used in this thesis. This chapter tries to give 
some insight into the data by identifying patterns within the data and visualizing different 
variables in this thesis, such as: sample of the study, CDS users and non-users, correlation 
matrix per year, risk-taking incentives, CDS use for trading and for hedging, bank’s risk, 
banks’ leverage, the main CDS users by countries, and the average age of CEOs. In addition, 
this chapter visualizes the different types of executive compensation like cash based 
compensation (salary and bonuses), and stock-based compensation (stock grant and stock 
options). 
4.1 Sample of the study 
The sample of the study is taken from different European countries. Figure 1.1 provides a 
breakdown of the sample by country and the number of banks included from each country. 
Figure 4.1: The number of banks included from each country. 
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Italy has the largest number of banks included in the sample and accounts for 10% of the 
sample size with six banks. UK and Spanish banks represent together 16% of the sample with 
five banks for each. France, Portugal and Sweden account for four banks from each country. 
Three banks are included from Germany, Malta, Poland, Slovenia and Bulgaria. Six 
European countries account for 20% (2 banks from each country) of the sample these are 
Denmark, Cyprus, Lithuania, Belgium, Hungary and Romania. The other European countries 
represent countries with one bank such as Czech Republic, Ireland, Switzerland, Norway and 
Austria. This indicates that executive compensation and derivatives disclosure in annual 
reports covers different European countries. 
The banks in the sample can be also CDS user or non-user. Table 4.1 classifies the sample of 
the study into CDS user and non-users with detailed information about the country and size. 
Table 4.1: CDS users and non-users and their market capitalisation 
Country 
CDS users   Non-users   
Total 
banks 
Total market 
capitalisation 
(£m) 
No. of 
banks 
Total market 
capitalisation 
(£m)   
No. of 
banks 
Total market 
capitalisation 
(£m) 
 Austria 1 8,856 
 
0 - 
 
1 8,856 
Belgium 2 20,296 
 
0 - 
 
2 20,296 
Bulgaria 0 - 
 
3 470 
 
3 470 
Cyprus 1 1,949 
 
1 2,608 
 
2 4,557 
Czech Republic 0 - 
 
1 4,411 
 
1 4,411 
Denmark 2 11,710 
 
0 - 
 
2 11,710 
France 4 102,774 
 
0 - 
 
4 102,774 
Germany 3 40,814 
 
0 - 
 
3 40,814 
Hungary 0 - 
 
2 4,948 
 
2 4,948 
Ireland 0 - 
 
1 4,113 
 
1 4,113 
Italy 5 46,702 
 
1 1,965 
 
6 48,667 
Lithuania 0 - 
 
2 140 
 
2 140 
Malta 0 - 
 
3 759 
 
3 759 
Norway 0 - 
 
1 9,902 
 
1 9,902 
Poland 0 - 
 
3 12,946 
 
3 12,946 
Portugal 4 10,228 
 
0 - 
 
4 10,228 
Romania 0 - 
 
2 2,793 
 
2 2,793 
Slovenia 0 - 
 
3 598 
 
3 598 
Spain 2 97,121 
 
3 14,903 
 
5 112,024 
Sweden 2 31,478 
 
2 15,362 
 
4 46,840 
Switzerland 0 - 
 
1 5,310 
 
1 5,310 
United Kingdom 5 217,336 
 
0 - 
 
5 217,336 
 
31 589,264 (88%) 
 
29 81,228 (12%) 
 
60 670,492 (100%) 
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Across all countries, 51.67% of the banks in the sample use CDS at least one year during the 
sample period 2006 - 2011. The CDS users are mainly from UK, Portugal, Italy, Germany, 
and France. Data reported in table 4.1 shows that all banks operating in UK, Portugal, France, 
and Germany are CDS users, and that 5 Italians banks out of 6 are CDS users,  
The CDS non-users are mainly from Bulgaria, Hungary, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Romania, 
Slovenia, and Spain. Though CDS users vary across countries, some clear patterns emerge. 
CDS users are in general large banks (Total market capitalisation is about £589,264 million), 
whereas CDS non-users are small banks (£81,228 million). Although the number of CDS 
users in the sample is 31 banks out of 60, CDS users represent about 88% of the total market 
capitalisation of the sample banks. This is consistent with existing empirical studies on 
derivatives use that provide evidence that large firms are more likely to use derivatives 
(Nance et al., 1993; Mian, 1996; Graham and Rogers, 2002, Minton et al., 2009).
  
Table 4.2: Yearly correlation matrix 
  
CDS trading 
Derivative 
trading 
CDS 
hedging 
Derivatives 
hedging 
Beta Vega Salary 
2006 
CDS trading 1 0.476** 0.092 0.274* 0.090 0.334** 0.356** 
Derivative trading 0.476** 1 0.002 0.573** 0.092 0.277* 0.522** 
CDS hedging 0.092 0.002 1 0.418** 0.087 0.108 0.140 
Derivatives hedging 0.274* 0.573** 0.418** 1 0.077 0.076 0.434* 
Beta 0.090 0.092 0.087 0.077 1 0.085 -0.002 
Vega 0.334** 0.277* 0.108 0.076 0.085 1 0.178 
Salary 0.356** 0.522** 0.140 0.434** -0.002 0.178 1 
2007 
CDS trading 1 0.499** -0.045 0.276* 0.118 0 .544** 0.359** 
Derivative trading 0.499** 1 -0.071 0.537** 0.253 0.265* 0.442** 
CDS hedging -0.045 -0.071 1 0.124 -0.010 0.068 0.020 
Derivatives hedging 0.276* 0.537** 0.124 1 0.184 0.093 0.309* 
Beta 0.118 0.253 -0.010 0.184 1 0.221 0.368** 
Vega 0.544** 0.265* 0.068 0.093 0.221 1 0.191 
Salary 0.359** 0.442** 0.020 0.309* 0.368** 0.191 1 
2008 
CDS trading 1 0.544** -0.155 0.442** 0.291* 0.194 0.274* 
Derivative trading 0.544** 1 -0.057 0.743** 0.359** 0.129 0.409** 
CDS hedging -0.155 -0.057 1 -0.045 0.030 -0.185 0.096 
Derivatives hedging 0.442** 0.743** -0.045 1 0.321* 0.058 0.284* 
Beta 0.291* 0.359** 0.030 0.321* 1 -0.091 0.463** 
Vega 0.194 0.129 -0.185 0.058 -0.091 1 -0.086 
Salary 0.274* 0.409** 0.096 0.284* 0.463** -0.086 1 
2009 
CDS trading 1 0.554** 0.086 0.392** 0.264* 0.376** 0.334** 
Derivative trading 0.554** 1 0.041 0.673** 0.466** 0.143 0.427** 
CDS hedging 0.086 0.041 1 0.283* 0.010 -0.038 0.141 
Derivatives hedging 0.392** 0.673** 0.283* 1 0.419** 0.079 0.366** 
Beta 0.264* 0.466** 0.010 0.419** 1 0.326* 0.563** 
Vega 0.376** 0.143 -0.38 0.079 0.326* 1 0.171 
Salary 0.334** 0.427** 0.141 0.366** 0.563** 0.171 1 
2010 
CDS trading 1 0.530** 0.150 0.395** 0.250 0.361** 0.315* 
Derivative trading 0.530** 1 0.086 0.653** 0.289* 0.153 0.408** 
CDS hedging 0.150 0.086 1 0.391** -0.091 0.003 0.139 
Derivatives hedging 0.395** 0.653** 0.391** 1 0.188 0.072 0.375** 
Beta 0.250 0.289* -0.091 0.188 1 0.255* 0.352** 
Vega 0.361** 0.153 0.003 0.072 0.255* 1 0.059 
Salary 0.315* 0.408** 0.139 0.375** 0.352** 0.059 1 
2011 
CDS trading 1 0.562** 0.237 0.442** 0.324* 0.483** 0.287* 
Derivative trading 0.562** 1 0.184 0.649** 0.400** 0.235 0.492** 
CDS hedging 0.237 0.184 1 0.320* 0.002 0.142 0.046 
Derivatives hedging 0.442** 0.649** 0.320* 1 0.425** 0.015 0.363** 
Beta 0.324* 0.400** 0.002 0.425** 1 0.078 0.543** 
Vega 0.483** 0.235 0.142 0.015 0.078 1 0.067 
Salary 0.287* 0.492** 0.046 0.363** 0.543** 0.067 1 
 
All variables are defined in Table 3.3  
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed) 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed) 
Table 2 displays a yearly univariate correlations matrix for the main variables. These are 
CDS trading, derivatives trading, CDS hedging, derivatives hedging, beta, vega, and salary. 
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The banks CDS use for trading is positively correlated with the CEO vega (ranging from 
0.334 to 0.544) and positively correlated with salary (ranging from 0.274 to 0.359). These 
results suggest that bank CDS trading variable is associated positively with CEO risk-taking 
incentives (vega) and does in fact capture basic attributes of risk-taking incentives. CDS 
hedging is positively correlated with hedging derivatives for the period before and after the 
financial crisis.  
The bank risk measure (beta) is positively correlated with CDS trading (ranging from 0.291 
to 0.324), derivatives trading (ranging from 0.289 to 0.466), and CEO salary (ranging from 
0.357 to 0.563) in between 2008 and 2011.  The correlations between the other explanatory 
variables are reported in table in table (3.1). 
4.2 Risk-taking incentives (vega) 
It is important to understand the association between risk-taking incentives of CEOs and risk 
for the banking industry in general because top managers play a crucial role in decisions 
concerning the stability of the financial system. Figure 4.2 displays the average vega of bank 
CEOs during the period from 2006 to 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2: CEO vega (pay sensitivity to stock return volatility) of European banks. 
111 
 
This figure shows that vega was very high before the start of the financial crisis and 
decreased sharply during the financial crisis in 2007and 2008. In 2009 vega increased, this 
increase indicates that the CEOs in the banking industry were taking more risks after the end 
of the financial crisis to increase the value of their stock options. The increase in 2009 is 
possibly due to the announcements of bank rescue packages and government interventions. 
Duchin and Sosyura (2014) find an increase in risk-taking incentives in banking sector as a 
result of government intervention. Banks approve riskier loans and shift investment portfolios 
toward riskier strategies. Indeed, figure 4.3below illustrates that in 2009 European banks 
increased the use of CDS for trading activities. However, vega in 2009 and 2010 is still very 
low compared with vega in 2006 and 2007. 
In 2010 and 2011 the risk-taking incentives decreased again. In comparison to the empirical 
studies for industrial firms, Coles et al. (2006) report that the average vega for executives is 
$79,586 between 1992 to 2002. This is close to the average vega for executives in the 
European banking industry before the start of the financial crisis (about £66,200 by the end of 
2006).  
4.3 Banks CDS use 
Figure 4.3 highlights the amount of CDS use for trading by European banks as measured 
using the notional amount of CDS scaled by total assets.  
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Figure 4.3: Average CDS use for trading purposes by European banks 
The notional amount of CDS use for trading increased exponentially in the run up to the 
financial crisis, from £81.7 million in 2006 to £171.6 million in 2007. 
This shows how CDS use for trading purposes in European banks is doubled before the 
financial crisis period. The total notional amount of CDS use for trading remains high even 
during and after the years of the financial crisis. In 2008 and 2009 the average total notional 
amount was almost £161 million and £169 million, respectively. This is consistent with 
empirical studies that provide evidence that firms do not reduce their derivatives use even 
during the financial crisis (e.g., Norden et al., 2011; Corsi et al., 2011; Bedendo and Bruno, 
2012). In the subsequent year the notional amount of CDS trading decreased slightly by £28 
million in 2010 (from £169 million to £141 million), but rises again in 2011.  
Figure 4.4 below illustrates the changes in CDS use for hedging purposes during the sample 
period (2006-2011).  
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Figure 4.4: CDS use for hedging purposes by European banks. 
European banks use CDS for trading purposes much more than using CDS for hedging 
purposes. The notional value of CDS use for hedging purposes increased steadily between 
2006 and 2008. The average CDS use for hedging purposes in 2006 was £1.42 million and 
£1.94 million in 2007. The notional of CDS use for hedging reached a peak in 2008 at around 
£3 million. This suggests that banks were trying to use more CDS for hedging purposes 
during the financial crisis period in order to reduce their credit risk exposure. However, the 
average notional use of CDS for hedging purposes is still very limited compare with CDS use 
for trading.  
After the end of the financial crisis period banks reduced their CDS use for hedging purposes. 
The average notional CDS use for hedging decreased by 28% in 2009 (from £3.2 million to 
£2.3 million). In 2010 the average notional value increased again to almost £3 million and 
declined in 2011 to £1.9 million. 
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4.4 CEO cash compensation (salary and bonuses) 
Salaries and cash bonuses are two of the basic components in an executive compensation 
packages. The executive compensation package most often contains both types of cash 
compensation. Salary is the fixed contractual amount of compensation that does not vary 
explicitly. However, it can be affected by banks financial results, as good financial results can 
lead to higher salary and bad financial results can lead to lower salary in the future period 
(Balsam, 2002). Figure 4.5 displays the relative importance of the cash compensation 
package of CEOs in European banks between 2006 and 2011.  
Figure 4.5: CEOs’ salary and cash bonuses 2006 and 2011. 
 
As illustrated in Figure 4.5 salaries face less variation compared with cash bonuses. The 
average salary increased from £507 thousand in 2006 to £603 thousand in 2007. However, 
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after the financial crisis the average executive salary declines by 10 %, from £753 thousand 
in 2008 to £675 thousand in 2009. After the financial crisis period the average executive 
salaries faces a steady increase by 3% in 2010 (from £675 thousand to £692 thousand), and 
by 1% in 2011 (from £692 thousand to £699 thousand). 
In contrast, executive annual cash bonuses face a substantial variation between 2006 and 
2011. Cash bonuses ranged from a low of £137 thousand to a high of £704 thousand. In 2007 
the average cash bonuses increase by 20% (from £587 in thousand in 2006 to £704 thousand 
in 2007). As a consequence of the financial crisis, cash bonuses decreased by 43% in 2008 
(from £704 thousand to £398 thousand). In 2009, the average cash bonuses also decreased to 
reach £264 thousand. This may be related to the public concern about executive pay 
arrangements aftermath the financial crisis.  
Even after the financial crisis executive cash bonuses face more fluctuation. The average cash 
bonuses increased by 37% in 2010 (from £264 thousand to £362 thousand), then decreased in 
2011 to £137 thousand which indicate that CEO are less compensated with cash bonuses.  
4.5 CEO stock-based compensation  
Stock grants and stock options are among the major and most common components of 
executive compensation. Stock grants occur when the firm give shares to their executives. 
The main difference between stock grants and stock options is that stock grants have no 
exercise price. Whereas a stock option only has value if the firms share price is above the 
exercise price.  
Stock-based compensation represents an important component of executive compensation 
plans. These components (stock grant and stock options) have different effects on executive 
incentives, as well as different costs for the corporation. A well-constructed executive 
compensation package normally makes trade-offs between these form of compensation to 
maximize the benefit to both the shareholders and the executives. 
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Executive stock grants can be restricted or unrestricted. For example a restriction imposed 
upon stock grants might be that the executive cannot sell the shares until a predetermined 
period of time. Stock options can be extremely valuable when the firm’s share price rises, but 
can be expired worthless if the share price declines. Figure 4.6 illustrates how the values of 
executive stock-based compensation (shares and stock options) changes between 2006 and 
2011. 
Figure 4.6: The value of CEOs’ stock-based compensation (shares and stock options). 
The value of executive share rises dramatically for the period before the start of the financial 
crisis and reaches the highest value in 2007. However, executives’ share value has witnessed 
a sharp decrease during the financial crisis which can be explained by the large declines in 
stock prices (Chaudhury, 2014). 
After 2009 the share values face less fluctuations and seems to increase and decrease in a 
small percentage compared with the period before and during the financial crisis.  
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The figure above also shows that CEOs suffered large losses on their stock option portfolios 
during the financial crisis. This was probably due to the uncertainty and the decline of share 
prices during the period of the financial recession, where the exercise price can be much 
higher than the share price (Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 2011). In other words, as the share price 
goes down the executive merely lose a potential profit opportunity because the value of stock 
option depends on the underlying share price (Carpenter and Yermack, 1999). As shown in 
figure 4.6, the value of stock options were higher than the value of stock grants in 2006, but 
the value of stock options face a substantial decline during the financial crisis period. 
Executive stock options bring more reward with the rising share prices, and bring more losses 
with the falling of share prices. After the financial crisis the value of stock options increases 
in 2009, but decline again in 2010 and 2011. 
4.6 Banks’ risk (beta) 
Figure 4.7 shows how the systematic risk (beta) evolves over the sample period. Beta for 
European banks has an inverted U-shape during the financial crisis period, peaking in 2008. 
In 2009 and 2010 the banks beta declined which can be explained by the end of the financial 
crisis period. However, banks seem to take more risk again as the banks beta start to increase 
in 2011.  
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Figure 4.7: European banks’ risk (beta) between 2006 and 2011. 
  
Stângă (2014) documents evidence that the stabilization effects of bank bailouts on banking 
sector in the aftermath of the crisis are temporarily and limited across the European countries. 
She shows that bank bailouts lead to a temporarily improve in the creditworthiness of the 
European banking sector after the financial crisis and thereafter the banks’ risk increase 
again. 
4.7 CEO age  
Prior studies suggest that old CEOs may have less incentive to increase the firm’s risk as they 
approach their expected retirement dates (e.g., Yermack, 1995). Adkins et al. (2007) report 
that the average age of CEO in US bank holding companies in 1996–2000 was 56 years, the 
average age of the CEO in this European banks sample is 54 years. 
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Figure 4.8 Executives’ characteristics: The average age for CEO by country 
Figure 4.8 summarizes the difference between CEO’s age based on the country during the 
2006-2011 sample period. In 2006 CEOs’ in Italian banks are the youngest with an average 
age of 48 years, while the CEOs of Spanish and German banks are the oldest with an average 
age of 59 and 60 years, respectively. For CEOs in French and Portuguese banks the average 
age is 57 and 56, respectively. The average age of CEOs in other countries including UK 
banks is 52 years. Figure 4.8 indicates that in 2006 CEOs in Spanish and German banks are 
near to retirement and can be more sensitive to risk-taking as they approach retirement. 
In 2007 CEOs’ in Italian banks are still the youngest compared to other countries with an 
average age of 49 years, while the average age of Spanish and German banks CEOs is 55 
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years. This means that some Spanish and German banks changed their CEOs in 2007 as some 
of them retired or left their job. CEOs in French and Portuguese banks are the oldest in 2007 
with an average age 57 and 56 respectively. The average CEOs age for other countries is 51 
years. In 2008 the average age for CEOs in Portuguese banks is the highest with an average 
age of 61 years, while the lowest average age is for CEOs in Germans banks with 50 years. In 
2009 , 2010, and 2011the figure shows that CEOs in Portuguese banks are still the closest to 
the retirement age with an average age of 62, 63, and 64 years, respectively, while CEOs in 
other countries are the youngest with an average age of 52 and 53 and 53 years, respectively. 
4.8 Leverage  
Earlier empirical studies discuss the effect of leverage and argue that higher leverage is 
associated with higher firm risk (Tufano, 1996; Coles et al., 1996). Figure 4.9 summarizes the 
difference between banks based on leverage ratio (Book value of debt / book value of asset). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9 European banks’ leverage by countries  
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The figure illustrates that in 2006 the average leverage ratio for Spanish banks is the highest 
(with average ratio of 0.502), while the lowest average leverage ratio is for French banks 
(with average ratio of 0.235). The average leverage ratio for Italian, German, Portuguese and 
other countries banks is 0.453, 0.427, 0.428 and 0.268, respectively. 
During the financial crisis period the leverage ratio for Spanish banks is still the highest (with 
average ratio of 0.505 and 0.475 in 2007 and 2008, respectively), while the average leverage 
ratio for French banks is the lowest (0.237 and 0.192 in 2007 and 2008, respectively). 
The average leverage ratio for Spanish banks decreased in 2009 but was still the highest, 
while the average leverage ratio in French banks are the lowest. In 2010 and 2011 the average 
leverage ratio for Italian banks is the highest (0.4652 and 0.5030, respectively), while the 
leverage ratio for French banks is still the lowest (0.2032 and 0.1954, respectively).  
4.9 Diversification 
Literature suggests that executives can use different strategies and tools to reduce bank’s risk. 
For example, corporate diversification contributes to bank risk reduction. Hedging derivatives 
is also considered as an alternative way to diversify firms’ risk. For example, executives can 
achieve risk reduction by using interest rate derivatives, currency exchange derivatives, and 
equity derivatives. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
122 
 
 
Figure 4.10 Hedging derivatives and diversification 
 
Figure 4.10 presents the changes in banks diversification (measured by the number of 
geographical segments) and the use of hedging derivatives over the period of 2006 through 
2011. The two variables are moving in a similar pattern, banks increase the use of hedging 
derivatives and diversification during and after the financial crisis compares with the period 
before the crisis. This indicates that banks were trying to reduce banks’ risk by using more 
derivatives and by increasing the level of diversification.  
4.10 CDS trading in large banks  
Figure 4.11 presents how banks CDS use for trading differs during the sample period for the 
main countries in the sample. Italian banks increase their use of CDS for trading largely after 
the financial crisis compare with the period before and during the financial crisis. For 
example the average notional value for CDS trading is £63 million between 2006 and 2008, 
but this usage increased to £118 and £480 million in 2010 and 2011, respectively. 
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Figure 4.11: CDS trading for large European countries (countries with more than 3 banks in the sample) 
French banks also increased their CDS use for trading for the period following the financial 
crisis. For example, in 2006 the average notional value for CDS trading increased from £1163 
million in 2007 to £1444 million in 2009.  
In contrast, CDS trading declines after the financial crisis in other countries like Spain, 
Portugal, Sweden and the UK. For example, UK banks decrease their CDS trading after the 
financial crisis from £868 million and £737 million in 2007 and 2008 to £545 million and 
£473 million in 2010 and 2011, respectively. Spanish banks also decrease their CDS trading 
from £27 million in 2006 to £8 million in 2011.  
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Chapter 5: Empirical tests and results for banks using 
CDS for trading purposes 
5.1 Introduction  
This chapter reports the results of empirical tests carried out to investigate the two aspects of 
this thesis: 1) The relationship between the risk-taking incentives generated by stock options 
and CDS use; 2) The impact of CDS use on a firm’s risk. The results are based on data 
collected from the annual reports and Datastream for 60 European banks over a period of 6 
years (2006-2011).  
The results are displayed in accordance with the purpose of CDS use (i.e., trading purposes). 
The first part of this chapter is organised as follows. 1) The results of the relationship 
between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and CDS use for trading purposes are reported. 2) The 
results of the relationship between firm risk and CDS use for trading purposes are reported. 
Moreover, the results for the control variable are also discussed.   
5.2 Empirical tests 
The analysis is conducted entirely in a multivariate framework. OLS model is used to 
examine the relationship between the extent of CDS use for trading purposes and CEO risk-
taking incentives in the European banking sector. Moreover, a two stage regressions model is 
used to address the endogeneity issues and to eliminate the possible simultaneity bias of 
modelling risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation as an exogenous variable (e.g., 
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). The analysis is based on the 
research method outlined in Chapter 3. 
In the first stage model CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (vega) are assumed as an exogenous 
variable. In the second stage, CEOs’ risk-taking incentives (vega) are used as an endogenous 
explanatory variable. The risk-taking incentives are estimated using specifications very 
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similar to those used by previous studies (e.g., Guay, 1999b; Rogers, 2002; Rajgopal and 
Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006).
41
 The predicted value of vega is then incorporated as an 
explanatory variable in the CDS use model. Table 5.1 shows the descriptive statistics for the 
variables (mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum). 
The relationship between firm risk and CDS use for trading purposes is conducted using OLS 
and panel data random effects models. In order to address the potential endogeneity of CDS 
use with respect to firm risk, the predicted value of CDS is used as an explanatory variable in 
the firm risk model. Regressions are expanded to broaden the scope of the investigation by 
using different sets of subsamples. More details for the subsamples used in the analysis are 
presented in Appendix (E).  
                                                          
41 These specifications include regress vega with the following variables: CEO’s cash compensation (salary and 
bonuses), delta, bank size, growth opportunities, leverage, and risk.  
Table 5.1: Descriptive statistics, mean, standard deviation, minimum, and maximum 
Variables Mean Std.Dev Min Max 
Age 53.978 7.271 35 70 
Tenure 4.833 4.057 1 28 
Ownership (%) 0.004 0.019 0 0.190 
Salary(ln) 5.988 1.240 1.609 8.154 
Bonus(ln) 2.774 3.141 -0.843 8.697 
Sharevalue(ln) 1.852 3.241 0 10.622 
Optionvega(ln) 2.397 4.411 -9.269 14.163 
Delta(ln) 3.943 4.860 -9.436 13.488 
Trading CDS (ln) 1.607 2.619 -3.72 8.03 
Hedging CDS (ln) 0.211 0.926 -4.52 4.74 
Trading derivatives(ln) 5.350 3.485 -1.129 11.106 
Hedging derivatives(ln) 3.162 2.746 -2.416 10.476 
Leverage 0.317 0.194 0 0.932 
Investment opportunities(ln) 0.058 0.728 -2.04 1.848 
Diversification 
(number of geographical segments) 
3.639 2.485 1 10 
Beta (ln) 0.123 0.732 -4.086 1.596 
Distance to default 7.260 6.780 2.544 62.172 
Size(ln) 9.103 3.395 2.639 18.189 
Number of observations =360 
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5.3 Risk-taking incentives and CDS use for trading purposes  
5.3.1 First stage analysis  
In this subsection, the relationship between vega (as a proxy for CEOs’ risk-taking incentives 
generated by stock option compensation) and CDS use for trading purposes is examined in 
first stage regressions. The analysis is conducted mainly using OLS regressions. Tobit, probit, 
and panel data random effects models are also used to further examine the robustness of the 
results.  
The models employed in this subsection assume that CEO risk-taking incentives of stock 
options are an exogenous variable. Tables 5.2 and 5.3 report the results of the first stage OLS 
regressions. The dependent variable is the extent of CDS use for trading purposes as 
measured using the notional value of a CDS contract scaled by total assets (e.g., Knopf et al., 
2002; Rogers, 2002). The dependent variable is expressed in the natural logarithm of its 
value. 
The independent variable in the first stage analysis is the CEO risk-taking incentives 
provided by stock option compensation. The risk incentive feature of managerial stock option 
compensation is measured as vega. Vega represents a measure of the extent of change in the 
value of a CEO’s stock options in response to changes in the bank stock return volatility. 
Similar to several other studies, the vega of the stock option compensation is used to calculate 
the vega of a CEO’s total stock-based compensation (Gao, 2010; Fahlenbrach and Stulz, 
2011; Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). The reason is that stock 
option vega is many times higher than stock vega, and the risk-taking incentives of CEOs’ 
stock-based compensation to volatility is driven primarily by stock options, where the risk-
taking incentive of stock compensation is negligible (Guay, 1999b; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). 
Vega is expressed in the natural logarithm of its value. 
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Table 5.2, column (1) shows the results from the first stage risk-taking incentives (vega) 
model incorporating different independent variables. This study also controls for time and 
countries differences through the inclusion of countries and years dummy variables in column 
(2). The country dummy variable used in column (2) is based on the number of banks 
operating in each country. The countries divided into tow categories, dummy variable equals 
one if the country has more than 3 banks, and zero otherwise. 
 
The results reported in Table 5.2 show that the coefficient of vega is positive and statistically 
significant to the extent of CDS for trading purposes (at the 1% level). This indicates a 
positive association between the risk-taking incentives generated by stock option 
compensation and the extent of CDS use for trading purposes. This relationship is still 
Table 5.2: First stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for trading purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega) 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Vega 0.113*** 0.026 0.000  0.086*** 0.025 0.001 
Salary -0.265** 0.117 0.025  -0.596*** 0.122 0.000 
Bonus 0.076* 0.039 0.055  0.034 0.037 0.361 
Shares 0.059 0.038 0.119  -0.006 0.036 0.878 
Ownership -0.018 0.053 0.728  0.032 0.050 0.525 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.004 0.051 0.941  -0.076 0.049 0.119 
Derivatives (trading) 0.319*** 0.042 0.000  0.290*** 0.040 0.000 
Investment opportunities -0.846*** 0.156 0.000  -0.642*** 0.190 0.001 
Leverage -1.301** 0.558 0.020  -2.159*** 0.533 0.000 
Size 0.136*** 0.040 0.001  0.481*** 0.090 0.000 
Diversification 0.150*** 0.049 0.002  0.060 0.047 0.205 
Bank dummy 
   
 -1.329*** 0.237 0.000 
Year1 
   
 0.437 0.429 0.308 
Year2 
   
 -2.744*** 0.753 0.000 
Year3 
   
 0.292 0.338 0.388 
Year4 
   
 0.344 0.345 0.319 
Year5 
   
 0.139 0.338 0.681 
Adjusted R²  0.446      0.530     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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positive and statistically significant after controlling for year and countries differences in 
column (2).   
This finding is consistent with the implication of theoretical arguments, which state that stock 
option compensation increases the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs (Smith and Stulz, 
1985). Accordingly, the results suggest that CEO risk-taking incentive generated by stock 
option compensation is an important determinant of bank CDS use for trading. 
This finding is consistent with the hypothesis that a higher incentive to take risk is associated 
with greater CDS use for trading purposes, and suggests that CDS use for trading purposes is 
positively related to risk-taking incentives (Fung et al., 2012; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; 
Rossi, 2011). Higher vega can align the interests of executives with their shareholders who 
typically prefer more risk-taking and would like firm managers to undertake risky projects.  
Similar results are found in previous empirical studies. For example, Chen et al. (2006) find 
that stock options can make managers select projects that increase firm risk. Guay (1999b) 
and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that the use of stock options reduces the CEOs’ risk-
related incentives problem and motivates them to take in risky projects. 
Similar results are obtained in Table 5.3 after using different sets of country dummies. In 
column (1), country dummy variables are used based on the use of CDS. Dummy variables 
equal one is used for countries that have the highest number of CDS observations (Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, and Portugal, zero otherwise). In column (2), year and country 
dummies are used for the countries that have the largest number of banks included in the 
sample (dummy variable equals one if the bank operates in one of the following countries: 
the UK, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, zero otherwise).
42
  
 
 
                                                          
42
 The number of banks: 5 in the UK, 4 in France, 6 in Italy, 4 in Portugal, 5 in Spain and 4 in Sweden.   
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Vega coefficient in column (1) is positive and statistically significant to the notional value of 
CDS use for trading (at the 1% level). This shows a positive relationship between the risk-
taking incentives (vega) and the extent of CDS use for trading purposes. In column (2) the 
relationship between risk-taking incentives (vega) and the extent of CDS use for trading 
purposes is also positive and significant (at the 5% level). This finding is consistent with the 
results presented in Table 5.2.  
Table 5.3: First stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for trading purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega) including country dummies 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Vega 0.102*** 0.026 0.000  0.049** 0.024 0.041 
Salary -0.233* 0.119 0.051  -0.425*** 0.117 0.000 
Bonus 0.033 0.039 0.401  0.038 0.036 0.293 
Shares -0.126*** 0.038 0.001  -0.086** 0.042 0.040 
Ownership -0.020 0.052 0.705  0.068 0.048 0.162 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.005 0.049 0.913  -0.023 0.046 0.618 
Derivatives (trading) 0.278*** 0.045 0.000  0.201*** 0.040 0.000 
Investment opportunities -0.650*** 0.156 0.000  -0.479** 0.188 0.011 
Leverage -0.634 0.586 0.280  -0.425 0.541 0.432 
Size 0.098** 0.038 0.011  0.393*** 0.086 0.000 
Diversification 0.105** 0.051 0.041  0.050 0.049 0.309 
Country dummy1 1.633*** 0.568 0.004  -3.662*** 0.458 0.000 
Country dummy2 1.894*** 0.663 0.005  -3.283*** 0.557 0.000 
Country dummy3 2.063*** 0.684 0.003  -2.876*** 0.559 0.000 
Country dummy4 1.320* 0.728 0.070  -0.404 0.566 0.477 
Country dummy5 4.504*** 0.696 0.000  -2.533*** 0.579 0.000 
Country dummy6 2.264*** 0.679 0.001  -3.384*** 0.531 0.000 
Year1 
 
     0.230 0.401 0.566 
Year2 
   
 -2.286*** 0.717 0.002 
Year3 
   
 0.174 0.312 0.576 
Year4 
   
 0.237 0.318 0.457 
Year5 
   
 0.073 0.311 0.813 
Adjusted R²  0.515      0.604     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The results reported in Tables 5.2 and 5.3 of the OLS regressions show that adjusted R² 
ranges from 0.446 to 0.604. This indicates that the models fit the data and 44.6% to 60.4% of 
the variation in the dependent variable is explained by variations in the independent variables. 
5.3.2 The results for the control variables (firs stage regressions) 
Independent control variables are used as proxies for the determinants of CDS use. These 
variables are selected based on the previous literature (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; 
Rogers, 2002). Cash compensation variables (salary and cash bonuses) are included in the 
analysis as a control variable for managerial risk aversion. A negative association is expected 
between cash compensation (salary and cash bonuses) and CDS use for trading purposes. In 
general, the results reported for the OLS models in the first stage regressions reveal 
significant negative relationship between CEOs’ salaries and CDS use for trading. This 
negative linkage indicates that as CEOs’ salaries increase, the CDS use for trading purposes 
decreases because managers prefer to reduce firm risk as a result of their risk aversion. The 
results in Table 5.2 show that cash compensation variables are positively related to CDS use 
for trading. This finding is consistent with pervious empirical studies that find cash bonuses 
are linked to less risk management and more risk-taking (e.g., Ertugrul et al., 2008; 
Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). 
The value of stock grants is also used as a proxy for managerial risk aversion. Stock grants 
increase the risk aversion of non-diversified managers and provide the managers with 
incentive to reduce firm risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985). The results show a negative 
relationship between the value of managers’ stock grants and CDS use for trading purposes in 
Table 5.3. This negative relationship between CDS use for trading purposes and the value of 
stock grants implies that as the value of share compensation increases, the managers tend to 
use less CDS for trading purposes. 
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The use of other types of derivatives for trading purposes (e.g., interest rates derivatives, 
exchange rate derivatives, commodity derivatives) is found to be positively and significantly 
associated with CDS use for trading purposes (at the 1% level). This is consistent with the 
finding of Minton et al. (2009), that banks which use credit derivatives are more likely to use 
other derivatives.  
The results displayed in the first stage regressions indicate that there is a significant negative 
association between investment opportunities and CDS use for trading purposes. This is 
consistent with existing literature that finds a positive association between investment 
opportunities and the incentives to reduce firm risk by using more derivatives for hedging 
(Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 1997; Coles et al., 2006; Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). Banks 
with greater investment opportunities use less CDS for trading purposes.  
Leverage as a proxy for financial distress is negatively association with CDS use for trading 
purposes. This result is consistent with theoretical and empirical studies that point out that 
firms facing higher expected costs of financial distress have larger incentives to reduce firm 
risk and are more likely to use more derivatives for hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Rogers, 
2002; Géczy et al., 2007).  
The relationship between CDS use for trading purposes and bank diversification is positive 
and significant. This is consistent with prior empirical studies that document a negative 
relationship between the degree of diversification and derivatives use for hedging to reduce 
firm risk (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 2007; Fung et al., 2012). Similarly, the results 
presented in the tables for the first stage regression above show a positive and significant 
linkage between bank size and CDS use for trading purposes. Large banks are found to use 
more CDS for trading purposes. This finding is consistent with previous empirical studies 
that find evidence that large companies are more likely to speculate in the derivatives market 
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(e.g., Géczy et al., 2007). This suggests that economies of scale in costs are important 
determinants of CDS use for trading purposes. 
5.4 Second stage analysis  
This subsection presents the results of the second stage regression on the relationship 
between CDS use for trading purposes and vega as a proxy for CEOs risk-taking incentives 
generated by stock option compensation when vega is modelled as an endogenous variable. 
The risk-taking incentives (vega) are estimated using specifications very similar to those used 
by previous studies (e.g., Rogers, 2002; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006).
43
 
The predicted value of vega is then incorporated as an explanatory variable in the CDS use 
model.  Similar to the first stage analysis, Table 5.4 shows the results of the second stage 
OLS regressions after including year and country dummy variables based on the number of 
banks operating in each country (dummy variable equals one if the country has more than 3 
banks, and zero otherwise). 
                                                          
43 These specifications include regress vega with the following variables: CEO’s cash compensation (salary and 
bonuses), delta, bank size, growth opportunities, leverage, and risk.  
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The results reported in Table 5.4 show that vega is positive and statistically significant to the 
extent of CDS for trading purposes. This finding is consistent with the results presented in the 
first stage analysis. The results support the hypothesis that higher incentive to take risk is 
associated with greater CDS use for trading purposes.  
Table 5.5 below shows the results of the second stage regressions after including dummy 
variables in column 1 for countries that have the highest number of CDS observations 
(Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, and Portugal, zero otherwise), and dummy 
variables in column 2 for year and the countries that have the largest number of banks 
included in the sample (dummy equals one if the bank operates in one of the following 
countries: the UK, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden, zero otherwise). 
Table 5.4: Second stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for trading purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega) 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Predicted vega 0.051*** 0.016 0.002  0.033** 0.016 0.034 
Salary -0.191 0.129 0.140  -0.556*** 0.137 0.000 
Bonus 0.079** 0.040 0.049  0.037 0.038 0.329 
Shares -0.016 0.048 0.743  -0.052 0.045 0.251 
Ownership -0.035 0.053 0.506  0.021 0.051 0.674 
Derivatives (hedging) -0.012 0.051 0.813  -0.092* 0.049 0.062 
Derivatives (trading) 0.336*** 0.042 0.000  0.307*** 0.039 0.000 
Investment opportunities -0.764*** 0.159 0.000  -0.643*** 0.192 0.001 
Leverage -1.355** 0.565 0.017  -2.232*** 0.538 0.000 
Size 0.129*** 0.041 0.002  0.479*** 0.095 0.000 
Diversification 0.169*** 0.049 0.001  0.073 0.048 0.129 
Bank dummy 
   
 -1.344*** 0.241 0.000 
Year1 
   
 0.669 0.426 0.117 
Year2 
   
 -2.585*** 0.782 0.001 
Year3 
   
 0.372 0.341 0.276 
Year4 
   
 0.483 0.346 0.164 
Year5 
   
 0.252 0.340 0.459 
Adjusted R²  0.432      0.520     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The results reported are consistent with the finding of OLS model in the first stage regression. 
The columns show that the coefficients of vega are consistently positive and statistically 
significant. The results confirm the finding of the first stage OLS regression, vega is linked to 
higher extent of CDS use for trading purposes. 
The results reported in Tables 5.4 and 5.5 of the second stage OLS regressions show that 
adjusted R² rang from (0.432 to 0.584). This indicates that the models fit the data and 43.2% 
Table 5.5: Second stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for trading purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega) including country dummies 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Predicted vega 0.032** 0.016 0.046  0.030** 0.014 0.041 
Salary -0.185 0.130 0.156  -0.145 0.115 0.207 
Bonus 0.051 0.040 0.199  0.053 0.037 0.149 
Shares -0.089*** 0.049 0.072  -0.103** 0.051 0.044 
Ownership -0.031 0.052 0.554  0.025 0.048 0.601 
Derivatives (hedging) -0.007 0.049 0.881  0.023 0.045 0.601 
Derivatives (trading) 0.282*** 0.045 0.000  0.223*** 0.041 0.000 
Investment opportunities -0.581*** 0.158 0.000  -0.507*** 0.192 0.009 
Leverage -0.594 0.596 0.319  -0.330 0.555 0.552 
Size 0.100*** 0.040 0.012  0.001** 0.000 0.015 
Diversification 0.121*** 0.052 0.020  0.132*** 0.048 0.006 
Country dummy1 1.517*** 0.576 0.009  -4.043*** 0.461 0.000 
Country dummy2 1.838*** 0.674 0.007  -3.341*** 0.573 0.000 
Country dummy3 1.668** 0.684 0.015  -2.982*** 0.565 0.000 
Country dummy4 0.918 0.729 0.209  -0.356 0.585 0.543 
Country dummy5 4.475*** 0.709 0.000  -3.030*** 0.578 0.000 
Country dummy6 1.971*** 0.685 0.004  -3.560*** 0.541 0.000 
Year1 
 
     0.348 0.408 0.394 
Year2 
   
 0.128 0.427 0.764 
Year3 
   
 0.318 0.318 0.319 
Year4 
   
 0.370 0.324 0.254 
Year5 
   
 0.156 0.318 0.623 
Adjusted R²  0.499      0.584     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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to 58.4% of the variation in the dependent variable is explained by variations in the 
independent variables. 
As stated before, in addition to OLS regressions, the panel data random effects model is used 
to control for the presence of unobserved firm heterogeneity in the sample.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results reported in Table 5.6 are consistent with the results reported for OLS models.  
The risk-taking incentive generated from stock option compensation (vega) is positively 
related to CDS use for trading purpose; however, this relationship is not statistically 
significant.  
5.4.1 The results for the control variables (second stage regressions) 
The results for the second stage analysis (displayed in Tables 5.4 and 5.5) show a negative 
association between CEO’s salaries and CDS use for trading. This negative relationship is 
statistically significant in column 2 of Table 5.4. Cash bonus variable is positively associated 
with CDS use for trading in column (1). However, previous studies had difficulties 
Table 5.6:  Panel data random effect model of CDS use for trading 
purposes and the predicted risk-taking incentives (vega) 
Independent variables Coefficients Standard error P value 
Predicted vega 0.002 0.009 0.868 
Salary 0.051 0.110 0.639 
Bonus -0.007 0.018 0.710 
Shares 0.010 0.030 0.730 
Ownership -0.022 0.030 0.459 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.102 0.036 0.004 
Derivatives (trading) 0.198 0.033 0.000 
Investment opportunities -0.164 0.098 0.095 
Leverage -0.305 0.712 0.669 
Size 0.026 0.016 0.115 
Diversification 0.120 0.051 0.019 
Year -0.031 0.034 0.363 
R² within 0.122 
  
R² between 0.381 
  
R² overall 0.362 
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documenting the relationship between cash compensation (salary or cash bonuses) and 
derivatives use (Adkins et al., 2007; Knopf et al., 2002). 
The value of the stock grants is also associated with less CDS use for trading purposes in 
Table 5.5. These results are consistent with prior studies that show negative relationship 
between stock grants and the risk-taking strategies (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Rogers, 2002).   
The use of trading derivatives is found to be positively and significantly associated with CDS 
use for trading. While hedging derivatives variable is negatively related to the extent of CDS 
use for trading. This finding is consistent with the results of Minton et al. (2009), that banks 
which use credit derivatives are more likely to use other derivatives.  
The results from the second stage regressions confirm the finding shown in the first stage 
regression for each of the investment opportunities, leverage, diversification and size. A 
significant and negative association is found between investment opportunities and CDS use 
for trading. Consistent with prior studies, banks with greater investment opportunities are less 
likely to use CDS for trading purposes (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 2007; Supanvanij 
and Strauss, 2010). Leverage in the second stage regression is also negatively associated with 
CDS use for trading. Diversification and size are positive and significant with CDS use for 
trading.  
Overall, the results reported for the control variables of the first stage regressions (Tables 5.2 
and 5.3) and the second stage regressions (Tables 5.4 and 5.5) in the CDS use model suggest 
that investment opportunities, bank size, other derivatives use, and diversification are 
important determinants for CDS use.  
This thesis also controls for delta (CEO pay-performance sensitivity). Few previous empirical 
studies tend to control for delta because the effect of delta in the risk-taking incentives is less 
important compare with vega (e.g., Rogers, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). However, in the present 
thesis delta is used as an additional control variable. The results are largely unchanged after 
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the inclusion of delta as an explanatory variable.  The results of the main variables when delta 
used as a control variable are summarised in Appendix F (Panel B). 
5.4.2 Robustness checks 
As mentioned before, tobit and probit models are included to further examine the robustness 
of the results from the OLS model. A tobit model is used to examine the relationship between 
the extent of CDS use for trading purposes and CEO risk-taking incentives. The dependent 
variable in tobit model is the extent of CDS use for trading purposes (the notional value of a 
CDS contract scaled by total assets), while the independent variable is CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives (predicted vega).  
Probit model is also used in an effort to disentangle the decision to use CDS from the extent 
of using CDS (e.g., Haushalter, 2000; Graham and Rogers, 2002; Ertugrul et al., 2008). The 
dependent variable in probit model is a dummy variable equals to one if the bank uses CDS 
for trading and zero otherwise, while the independent variable is CEO risk-taking incentives 
generated by stock options as an endogenous variable. Table 5.7 reports the results of tobit 
and probit models. Dummy variables equal one is used for countries that have the highest 
number of CDS observations (Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, and Portugal, zero 
otherwise).   
The results reported for tobit model show that the coefficient of vega is positive and 
statistically significant to CDS use for trading. This finding is consistent with the hypothesis 
that a higher incentive to take risk is associated with greater CDS use for trading purposes, 
and suggests that the extent of CDS use for trading purposes is positively related with risk-
taking (Fung et al., 2012; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Rossi, 2011). 
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The results for probit model also show positive and significant relationship between the 
decision to use CDS for trading purposes and CEO risk-taking incentives generated by stock 
options. Similar results are found in previous empirical studies. For example, Chen et al. 
(2006) find that stock options can make managers select projects that increase firm risk. Guay 
(1999) and Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002) find that the use of stock options reduces the CEOs’ 
risk-related incentives problem and motivates them to take in risky projects.  
These findings are consistent with the results presented for the first and second stage OLS 
regressions. The results support the hypothesis that higher incentive to take risk is associated 
with greater CDS use for trading purposes. These results are consistent with the implications 
of the theoretical arguments that the risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation 
Table 5.7: Second stage tobit and probit regressions of CDS use for trading 
purposes and the risk-taking incentives (vega) 
 
Tobit model  Probit model 
Independent variables Coefficients P value  Coefficients P value 
Predicted vega 0.095*** 0.003  0.044*** 0.009 
Salary 0.295 0.454  0.188 0.327 
Bonus 0.093 0.238  0.010 0.780 
Shares 0.066 0.479  -0.035 0.440 
Ownership 0.030 0.810  -0.005 0.927 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.163 0.158  0.040 0.423 
Derivatives (trading) 0.928*** 0.000  0.353*** 0.000 
Investment opportunities -1.758*** 0.000  -0.685*** 0.000 
Leverage -0.939 0.630  -1.866** 0.037 
Size 0.339*** 0.000  0.131*** 0.002 
Diversification 0.333*** 0.004  0.169*** 0.003 
Country dummy1 -1.955** 0.027  -1.445* 0.089 
Country dummy2 0.240 0.838  0.619 0.490 
Country dummy3 -1.983 0.192  -0.934 0.339 
Country dummy4 -1.554 0.248  -0.480 0.606 
Country dummy5 0.663 0.575  0.255 0.778 
Country dummy6 -1.079 0.416  0.587 0.512 
Pseudo R- squared 0.286 
  
  
 0.574 
  
  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
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(vega) can align the interests of executives with their shareholders and induce them to take 
more risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985).  
5.5 CDS use for trading purposes and firm risk  
5.5.1 Distance to default  
The literature has largely focused on investigating the purposes of corporate derivatives use 
and has tried to find whether executives are using derivatives to hedge or to speculate. 
However, the relationship between the purposes of derivative use and a firm’s risk has gained 
less attention. Prior studies assume that firms that engage in derivatives use for hedging 
purposes seek mainly to minimize risk, where firms that use derivatives for trading purposes 
do so to take more risk. 
This section explores the influence of CDS use on a firm’s risk and reports the results of the 
firm risk model based on OLS and panel random effects regressions. The analysis is 
conducted in a setting in which CDS use for trading purposes is modelled as an endogenous 
variable.  
In this section, the relationship between CDS use and banks’ risk is examined using the same 
subsamples used in previous section. Four different subsamples are used: The first column is 
based on the full sample. In the second column a dummy variable is allocated to the number 
of banks operating in each country which equals 1 if the country has more than three banks 
and 0 otherwise. In the third column a country dummies are added for countries that have the 
highest number of CDS observations: Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, and Portugal. 
In the fourth subsample country dummies are used for the following countries: the UK, 
France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. The list of the four subsamples and classification 
criteria are presented in Appendix E.  
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Table 5.8 shows the results of the relationship between the independent variable, which is 
CDS use for trading purposes, and the dependent variable, which is firm risk as measured 
using Merton distance to default model.  
 
The results reported in all columns show that the coefficients of CDS trading are consistently 
negative and statistically significant (below the 10% level). 
Table 5.8: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for trading purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.267*** 0.003 -0.356*** 0.000 -0.255** 0.016 -0.438*** 0.000 
Salary -0.175 0.616 -0.727* 0.061 -0.550 0.143 -0.526 0.180 
Bonus -0.074 0.542 -0.158 0.193 -0.328*** 0.007 -0.216* 0.083 
Leverage 4.807*** 0.005 5.413*** 0.002 4.335** 0.014 5.202*** 0.006 
Investment 
opportunities   
-4.166*** 0.000 -4.241*** 0.000 -3.494*** 0.000 -4.173*** 0.000 
Size (sales log ) 0.510*** 0.000 1.510*** 0.000 1.168*** 0.000 1.939*** 0.000 
Tenure -0.045 0.607 0.002 0.978 0.090 0.287 0.019 0.822 
Age 0.061 0.221 0.062 0.202 -0.020 0.672 -0.002 0.976 
Diversification  0.280* 0.077 0.138 0.393 -0.089 0.586 -0.051 0.771 
Bank dummy 
  
1.797** 0.022     
Country dummy1    
 -1.450 0.287 -2.792** 0.021 
Country dummy2    
 -1.964 0.232 -3.476** 0.014 
Country dummy3    
 -1.404 0.464 -1.589 0.293 
Country dummy4    
 8.588*** 0.000 3.920*** 0.005 
Country dummy5    
 4.177** 0.019 -3.827*** 0.007 
Country dummy6    
 -1.857 0.393 -3.344** 0.013 
Year1 
  
0.870 0.528   0.679 0.623 
Year2 
  
-8.444*** 0.000   -11.48*** 0.000 
Year3 
  
-0.320 0.772   -0.568 0.600 
Year4 
  
-2.134* 0.059   -2.331** 0.035 
Year5 
  
-1.584 0.153   -1.631 0.132 
Adjusted R²  0.195    0.236   0.340   0.279  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that the increase in CDS use for trading 
purposes is associated with higher firm risk. The results indicate that CDS use for trading 
purposes lowers the distance to default (i.e., increase the default risk). This empirical finding 
is consistent with previous empirical findings of Fung et al. (2012), which state that CDS use 
for trading purposes is positively associated with firm risk. Table 5.9 shows the results of the 
firm risk (distance to default) using a random effects regression.  
Table 5.9: Random effects regressions of firm risk (distance to default ) and CDS use for trading purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.267*** 0.003 -0.250*** 0.006 -0.302*** 0.001 -0.300*** 0.003 
Salary -0.175 0.616 -0.101 0.776 0.200 0.571 0.246 0.510 
Bonus -0.074 0.542 -0.063 0.603 -0.185 0.129 -0.098 0.434 
Leverage 4.807*** 0.005 5.444*** 0.002 5.919*** 0.001 5.988*** 0.002 
Investment 
opportunities   
-4.166*** 0.000 -4.189*** 0.000 -3.730*** 0.000 -4.240*** 0.000 
Size (sales log ) 0.510*** 0.000 0.521*** 0.000 0.452*** 0.000 0.571*** 0.000 
Tenure -0.045 0.607 -0.064 0.462 0.030 0.730 -0.064 0.461 
Age 0.061 0.221 0.068 0.175 0.001 0.988 0.025 0.626 
Diversification  0.280* 0.076 0.306* 0.053 0.010 0.950 0.199 0.250 
Bank dummy 
  
1.138 0.147     
Country dummy1    
 -6.097*** 0.000 -2.792** 0.035 
Country dummy2    
 -6.614*** 0.000 -3.476** 0.003 
Country dummy3    
 -6.605*** 0.000 -1.589 0.004 
Country dummy4    
 -1.081 0.495 3.920*** 0.126 
Country dummy5    
 -6.546*** 0.002 -3.827*** 0.001 
Country dummy6    
 -1.643 0.180 -3.344** 0.013 
Year1 
  
0.870 (0.528)   0.543 0.659 
Year2 
  
-8.444*** (0.000)   -7.049** 0.039 
Year3 
  
-0.320 (0.772)   -0.401 0.640 
Year4 
  
-2.134 (0.059)*   -2.301*** 0.009 
Year5 
  
-1.584 (0.153)   -1.608* 0.057 
R2 within 0.200 
 
0.207  0.288  0.243  
 R2 between 0.579 
 
0.569  0.600  0.540  
R2 overall 0.213 
 
0.217  0.301  0.249  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The results are consistent with the regression coefficients reported in Table 5.8. All columns 
show that the coefficients of CDS trading are consistently negative and statistically 
significant (below the 1% level). The results indicate that CDS use for trading purposes lower 
the distance to default (i.e., increase the default risk).   
In summary, the results reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show consistent results. CDS use for 
trading purposes is negatively related to firm risk. Greater CDS use for trading leads to an 
increase in bank risk (lowering the distance to default).  
5.5.2 Beta 
This subsection reports the results of the firm risk model based on OLS and random effects 
regressions using beta as a proxy for firm risk (e.g., Chen et al. 2006; Nijskens and Wagner, 
2011; Bartram et al., 2011). The analysis is conducted in a setting in which CDS use for 
trading purposes is modelled as an endogenous variable. Table 5.10 shows the results of the 
relationship between CDS use for trading purposes and firm risk (beta). The results reported 
generally show that the coefficients of CDS trading are positive and statistically significant 
(below the 5% level).  
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These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that more CDS use for trading purposes will 
increase firm risk (beta). Accordingly, this positive association between CDS use for trading 
purposes and beta confirms the results for distance to default and shows that CDS use for 
trading increases a bank’s risk. 
The results of the random effects regression are consistent with those reported in the OLS 
regressions. Table 5.11 shows the coefficients of CDS use for trading purposes are positive 
and statistically significant (at the 1% level).  
Table 5.10: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for trading purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
0.035*** 0.000 0.026*** 0.008 0.031*** 0.006 0.024** 0.035 
Salary 0.127*** 0.001 0.062 0.131 0.148*** 0.000 0.071* 0.098 
Bonus -0.012 0.336 -0.021* 0.099 -0.009 0.524 -0.024** 0.080 
Leverage 0.026 0.887 0.040 0.828 0.071 0.730 -0.029 0.888 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.089 0.117 -0.069 0.314 -0.120 0.480 -0.082 0.246 
Size (sales log ) 0.001 0.981 0.096*** 0.002 0.005 0.729 0.125*** 0.000 
Tenure 0.004 0.651 0.009 0.329 0.002 0.913 0.011 0.241 
Age -0.004 0.468 -0.004 0.454 -0.005 0.361 -0.008 0.129 
Diversification  0.017 0.323 0.004 0.832 0.003 0.860 -0.014 0.454 
Bank dummy 
  
0.101 0.225     
Country dummy1    
 -0.047 0.764 -0.215 0.100 
Country dummy2    
 -0.218 0.257 -0.173 0.256 
Country dummy3    
 -0.147 0.504 -0.135 0.410 
Country dummy4    
 -0.210 0.341 0.273* 0.073 
Country dummy5    
 0.158 0.435 -0.100 0.513 
Country dummy6    
 0.068 0.786 -0.262* 0.073 
Year1 
  
0.066 0.652   0.082 0.581 
Year2 
  
-0.787*** 0.002   -0.974*** 0.000 
Year3 
  
0.196* 0.095   0.187 0.112 
Year4 
  
-0.156 0.191   -0.156 0.192 
Year5 
  
-0.142 0.227   -0.138 0.239 
Adjusted R²  0.218 
 
0.261  0.217  0.270  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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In summary, the results reported in Tables 5.8-5.11 show consistent results in the OLS and 
random effects models. CDS use for trading purposes is positively related to firm risk. 
Furthermore, this finding is confirmed using different risk measures (i.e., distance to default 
and beta). The results are in line with the finding of Fung et al. (2012) that CDS use for 
trading leads to an increase in bank risk. The conclusion derived from these results shows that 
CDS use for trading purposes leads to an increase in bank risk.  
Table 5.11: Random effects regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for trading purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
0.035*** 0.002 0.036*** 0.002 0.032** 0.013 0.034*** 0.008 
Salary 0.134*** 0.002 0.136*** 0.002 0.153*** 0.001 0.153*** 0.001 
Bonus -0.015 0.262 -0.015 0.269 -0.013 0.359 -0.015 0.274 
Leverage 0.082 0.707 0.094 0.677 0.120 0.614 0.130 0.598 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.072 0.236 -0.072 0.234 -0.095 0.134 -0.083 0.181 
Size (sales log ) -0.007 0.607 -0.007 0.617 -0.003 0.834 -0.005 0.733 
Tenure 0.005 0.604 0.005 0.634 0.004 0.711 0.005 0.601 
Age -0.006 0.339 -0.005 0.354 -0.007 0.274 -0.007 0.234 
Diversification  0.018 0.364 0.019 0.353 0.005 0.812 0.007 0.754 
Bank dummy 
  
0.023 0.822     
Country dummy1    
 -0.089 0.630 -0.202 0.215 
Country dummy2    
 -0.243 0.289 -0.170 0.363 
Country dummy3    
 -0.171 0.507 -0.110 0.590 
Country dummy4    
 -0.210 0.422 0.277 0.140 
Country dummy5    
 0.128 0.594 -0.116 0.543 
Country dummy6    
 0.020 0.947 -0.247 0.175 
Year1 
  
0.092 0.379   0.054 0.723 
Year2 
  
0.044 0.767   -0.980*** 0.001 
Year3 
  
-0.801*** 0.006   0.182 0.109 
Year4 
  
0.192* 0.088   -0.168 0.147 
Year5 
  
-0.166 0.149   -0.145 0.199 
R2 within 0.029 
 
0.028  0.029  0.030  
 R2 between 0.545 
 
0.547  0.576  0.568  
R2 overall 0.326 
 
0.236  0.247  0.246  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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5.5.3 The results for the control variables 
The purpose of this subsection is to discuss the results for the control variables in the firm 
risk model. These variables are selected based on previous literature (e.g., Coles et al., 2006; 
Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). The control variables are as follows: investment opportunities, 
leverage, size, tenure, age, diversification, and the cash compensation component (CEO’s 
salary and CEO’s bonus).   
Prior studies show that firm risk is expected to be positively associated with investment 
opportunities (Smith and Watts, 1992; Bartram et al., 2011). The results presented for 
distance to default show that greater investment opportunities are associated with lower 
distance to default risk (i.e., increase the default risk). The coefficients are negative and 
significant in all columns in the OLS and random effects models (below the 1% level). This 
finding is consistent with prior empirical studies that document a positive association 
between investment opportunities and firm risk (Guay, 1999; Rajgopal and Shevlin; 2002). 
However, the results when using beta as a risk measure show no association between 
investment opportunities and firm risk.  
Contrary to the expected sign of the relationship between bank risk and leverage, the results 
that are reported in Tables 5.8 and 5.9 show that the coefficients of leverage are positive and 
significant (below the 5% level). This indicates that leverage increases bank distance to 
default (i.e., reduce the default risk). This finding is inconsistent with previous empirical 
studies that show a positive relationship between leverage and firm risk (e.g., Guay, 1999a; 
Coles at al., 2006). However, this negative association between leverage and firm risk is in 
line with the empirical finding of Rajgopal and Shevlin (2002), who find a positive 
association between leverage and the incentives to undertake riskier projects.  
The explanation for such a positive association is that managers in high leverage firms 
(banks) have an incentive to accept risky projects because shareholders will enjoy a 
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significant part of the benefits of these risky projects and debt holders will bear more risk 
(Leland; 1998; Aretz and Bartram, 2010). The coefficients of leverage when firm risk is 
measured by beta in Tables 5.10 and 5.11 are not significant.  
The results of the regression analysis for bank size are significant and positive with distance 
to default (below the 1 % level). This shows that large banks have a lower risk level as the 
distance to default increase (i.e., reduce bank default risk). These results are consistent with 
prior empirical studies that show a negative relationship between bank size and firm risk 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Coles et al., 2006; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). However, the results in 
beta regressions show a positive or no relationship with bank size. These positive results are 
consistent with the result of Bartram, Brown, and Conrad (2011) who find firm size to be 
positively related to beta and cash flow volatility but not related to firm total risk. 
In term of the relationship between bank risk (distance to default) and the variable of bank 
diversification, the findings are consistent with previous literature, which finds that 
diversification reduces bank risk (e.g., Chen et al. 2006; Bartram, Brown, and Conrad, 2011). 
The results in beta regressions are generally not significant for bank diversification. 
The results displayed in this section indicate that there is no significant association between 
the firm risk variables (distance to default and beta) and each of the CEOs’ age, tenure, and 
cash bonuses. However, the results show that the CEOs’ salaries are positively related to 
beta. This is inconsistent with previous studies that show that high CEO salaries will result in 
less firm risk because of managerial risk aversion (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999; Coles et al., 
2006; Adkins et al., 2007) and is consistent with the argument that higher salaries will give 
the managers the chance to build wealth that is not tied to firm value, thus make the CEOs 
better diversified (Knopf et al., 2002; Ertugrul et al., 2008). 
Overall, the results for the control variables in the risk model suggest that financial distress 
(leverage), investment opportunities, bank size, and diversification are important 
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determinants for firm risk. Delta is included as an additional control variable (Coles et al., 
2006). The results for the regression after controlling for delta show consistent results to 
those reported in this chapter. Appendix F (Panel C) presents the results of the key measures 
for firm risk and using the OLS and random effects models.   
5.6 CDS use for trading purposes and the financial crisis 
This section reports on the results of empirical analyses that investigate the influence of CDS 
use for trading purposes on banks risk in relation to the financial crisis of 2007–2008. The 
results are discussed and explained according to the time period of the sample, which is 
divided into three subsamples: before, during, and after the financial crisis.  
The first subsample is the year 2006, which represents the period before the onset of the 
crisis. The second subsample covers the period between 2007-2009, which is considered the 
period of the crisis (e.g., Calice et al., 2012; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). The third subsample is 
the period after the financial crisis and covers the last two years of the sample period 2010 
and 2011. To keep consistency with previous sections, two different measures are used to 
examine the influence of CDS use for trading purposes on bank risk. These are distance to 
default and beta.  
This section is organised as follows. Firstly, the influence of CDS use for trading purposes on 
banks’ risk before the financial crisis is reported in section 5.6.1. Secondly, section 5.6.2 
presents the results of the relationship between CDS use for trading purposes and banks risk 
during the financial crisis. Thirdly, section 5.6.3 displays the regression analysis of the 
influence of CDS use for trading purposes on banks’ risk after the financial crisis.  
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5.6.1 CDS use for trading purposes and firm risk before the financial crisis  
As mentioned above the analysis is based on the time period of the sample. This sub-section 
presents the results of how CDS use for trading purposes influences banks’ risk before the 
financial crisis (i.e., 2006). Table 5.12 shows the results of the relationship between CDS use 
for trading purposes and bank risk using Merton distance to default.  
 
The results reported in table 5.12 shows that CDS use for trading purposes is negatively 
associated with bank distance to default. The coefficients are statistically significant in 
columns 1, 2 and 4 (at the 1% level) and significant in column 5 (at the 10 % level). The 
Table 5.12: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for trading purposes (before the 
financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.342*** 0.006 -0.331*** 0.007 -0.247* 0.058 -0.427*** 0.002 
Salary -0.202 0.684 -0.169 0.729 -0.136 0.767 -0.035 0.948 
Bonus -0.023 0.903 -0.036 0.848 -0.190 0.309 -0.017 0.936 
Leverage 1.856 0.375 2.675 0.211 2.549 0.194 3.233 0.168 
Investment 
opportunities   
-1.889* 0.075 -1.874* 0.074 -0.984 0.308 -1.657 0.129 
Size (sales log ) 0.869** 0.027 0.977** 0.014 0.743** 0.048 1.057** 0.017 
Tenure 0.063 0.543 0.019 0.858 0.101 0.463 0.014 0.895 
Age 0.070 0.264 0.072 0.241 0.031 0.615 0.103 0.141 
Diversification  0.033 0.886 0.082 0.719 0.008 0.971 0.069 0.789 
Bank dummy 
  
1.512 0.127     
Country dummy1    
 -1.162 0.476 -0.663 0.681 
Country dummy2    
 -1.043 0.612 -3.869** 0.031 
Country dummy3    
 -2.553 0.247 -0.208 0.918 
Country dummy4    
 6.205 0.012 -1.072 0.559 
Country dummy5    
 -0.682 0.752 -1.835 0.320 
Country dummy6    
 -2.242 0.513 -1.106 0.533 
Adjusted R²  0.138 
 
0.162  0.336  0.127  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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results imply that CDS use for trading purposes lower bank distance to default in the period 
before the financial crisis (i.e. higher bank risk). 
Table 5.13 reports the results of the relationship between banks risk as measured by beta and 
CDS use for trading purposes as measured using the notional value scaled by total assets.  
The results show no association between CDS use for trading purposes and beta. The 
coefficients are consistently insignificant in all columns in table 5.13. This can be explained 
by the small sample size before the financial crisis. 
 
Table 5.13: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for trading purposes (before the financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
0.017 0.398 0.016 0.419 0.009 0.720 0.006 0.802 
Salary -0.139* 0.092 -0.141* 0.092 -0.136 0.124 -0.135 0.125 
Bonus -0.017 0.586 -0.016 0.603 -0.016 0.644 -0.014 0.699 
Leverage 0.234 0.495 0.193 0.589 0.126 0.734 0.146 0.703 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.080 0.640 -0.081 0.640 -0.032 0.859 -0.052 0.771 
Size (sales log ) 0.055 0.387 0.049 0.446 0.053 0.449 0.072 0.311 
Tenure -0.004 0.803 -0.002 0.909 -0.000 0.996 -0.004 0.838 
Age -0.005 0.600 -0.005 0.594 -0.004 0.741 -0.003 0.815 
Diversification  0.029 0.434 0.027 0.481 0.030 0.484 0.035 0.415 
Bank dummy 
  
-0.076 0.646     
Country dummy1    
 -0.384 0.218 0.332 0.217 
Country dummy2    
 0.018 0.963 -0.104 0.718 
Country dummy3    
 -0.380 0.364 0.261 0.434 
Country dummy4    
 -0.204 0.654 0.167 0.582 
Country dummy5    
 -0.137 0.738 -0.165 0.586 
Country dummy6    
 -0.382 0.558 -0.204 0.486 
Adjusted R²  0.122 
 
0.126  0.203  0.211  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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5.6.2 CDS use for trading purposes and bank risk during the financial crisis  
This sub-section presents the results of the influence of CDS use for trading purposes on 
bank’s risk during the financial crisis period (2007-2009). The results using Merton distance 
to default as a measure for bank’s risk are displayed in Table 5.14.  
 
The results displayed in table 5.14 show that the relationship between CDS use for trading 
purposes and banks risk is negative and statistically significant. This findings suggest that 
CDS use for trading purposes increases the bank risk during the financial crisis period and 
lowers bank distance to default (i.e. higher bank risk). 
The results reported for bank risk as measured by beta in Table 5.15 are similar to those 
reported in the above table. A positive association is found in Table 5.15 between the 
Table 5.14: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for trading purposes (during the 
financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.335*** 0.005 -0.303*** 0.010 -0.349*** 0.005 -0.343** 0.013 
Salary -0.201 0.672 -0.020 0.966 0.146 0.761 0.137 0.792 
Bonus -0.108 0.501 -0.081 0.610 -0.156 0.335 -0.087 0.613 
Leverage 3.711 0.103 4.701** 0.041 6.063*** 0.010 5.902** 0.023 
Investment 
opportunities   
-6.185*** 0.000 -6.244*** 0.000 -5.262*** 0.000 -6.400*** 0.000 
Size (sales log ) 0.776*** 0.000 0.793*** 0.000 0.628*** 0.000 0.812*** 0.000 
Tenure -0.019 0.864 -0.058 0.601 -0.000 0.998 -0.059 0.600 
Age 0.004 0.949 0.020 0.761 -0.029 0.673 -0.003 0.966 
Diversification  0.169 0.422 0.210 0.315 -0.086 0.691 0.097 0.672 
Bank dummy 
  
2.196** 0.034 -7.014*** 0.000 -3.867** 0.020 
Country dummy1    
     
Country dummy2    
 -8.768*** 0.000 -2.566 0.198 
Country dummy3    
 -7.719*** 0.001 -0.523 0.799 
Country dummy4    
 -5.170** 0.017 -0.365 0.854 
Country dummy5    
 -6.157** 0.031 -3.423* 0.077 
Country dummy6    
 6.178 0.229 -1.265 0.482 
Adjusted R²  0.262 
 
0.277  0.352  0.271  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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dependent variable (beta) and the independent variable (CDS use for trading purposes during 
the financial crisis). 
The coefficients for beta are positive and significant. This finding suggests that CDS use for 
trading purposes increases banks’ risk during the financial crisis period (2007-2009).  
 
5.6.3 CDS use for trading purposes and bank risk after the financial crisis  
Tables 5.16 and 5.17 reports the results of the relationship between CDS use for trading 
purposes and banks’ risk after the financial crisis period (2007-2009)using Merton distance to 
default and beta respectively.  
The dependent variable in Table 5.16 is bank risk as measured by Merton distance to default, 
and the independent variable is CDS use for trading purposes as measured using the notional 
Table 5.15: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for trading purposes (during the financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
0.035*** 0.005 0.022* 0.067 0.043*** 0.003 0.045*** 0.002 
Salary 0.162*** 0.001 0.077 0.134 0.160*** 0.004 0.169*** 0.002 
Bonus -0.008 0.628 -0.011 0.483 -0.003 0.885 -0.005 0.799 
Leverage -0.388 0.102 -0.269 0.225 -0.383 0.146 -0.409 0.127 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.167* 0.058 -0.031 0.711 -0.195* 0.042 -0.221** 0.016 
Size (sales log ) 0.003 0.865 0.144*** 0.000 0.003 0.882 0.009 0.601 
Tenure 0.009 0.416 0.012 0.284 0.002 0.859 0.007 0.558 
Age -0.001 0.903 0.001 0.915 -0.001 0.938 -0.001 0.931 
Diversification  0.007 0.763 -0.003 0.901 -0.009 0.723 -0.003 0.884 
Bank dummy 
  
0.302*** 0.003     
Country dummy1    
 0.278 0.179 -0.397** 0.022 
Country dummy2    
 -0.054 0.829 -0.128 0.538 
Country dummy3    
 0.208 0.481 -0.399 0.064 
Country dummy4    
 0.372 0.193 -0.091 0.658 
Country dummy5    
 0.259 0.335 -0.001 0.998 
Country dummy6    
 0.591* 0.083 -0.276 0.142 
Adjusted R²  0.278 
 
0.393  0.284  0.289  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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value of CDS scaled by total assets. The coefficients are negative in all columns. However, 
the coefficients are statistically significant in columns 3 and 4. This finding implies that CDS 
use for trading purposes increases bank risk after the financial crisis (i.e., lowers the bank 
distance to default). 
  
Table 5.17 shows the results of the relationship between CDS use for trading purposes and 
beta as a proxy for banks risk after the financial crisis. The results show that beta is positively 
associated with CDS use for trading purposes after the financial crisis. The coefficients are 
positive and significant in columns 1 and 2 at the 5% level and at the 10% level respectively. 
This finding suggests that CDS use for trading purposes increased bank riskiness after the last 
credit crisis.  
Table 5.16: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for trading purposes (after the financial 
crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.257 0.224 -0.252 0.236 -0.416** 0.060 -0.381* 0.089 
Salary -0.858 0.317 -0.863 0.317 -0.410 0.614 -0.607 0.453 
Bonus -0.154 0.573 -0.155 0.572 -0.177 0.506 -0.201 0.448 
Leverage 7.336* 0.071 7.668* 0.074 5.642 0.197 4.277 0.304 
Investment 
opportunities   
-3.613*** 0.006 -3.634*** 0.006 -2.650** 0.041 -2.550** 0.044 
Size (sales log ) 1.160 0.087 1.207* 0.088 1.420** 0.038 2.054 0.002 
Tenure 0.079 0.736 0.082 0.729 0.028 0.903 -0.044 0.842 
Age 0.120 0.267 0.121 0.264 -0.014 0.894 -0.059 0.575 
Diversification  0.125 0.737 0.123 0.742 -0.116 0.763 0.022 0.954 
Bank dummy 
  
0.448 0.805     
Country dummy1    
 -3.879 0.114 -2.148 0.449 
Country dummy2    
 -2.976 0.364 -1.935 0.543 
Country dummy3    
 -4.377 0.206 13.012*** 0.000 
Country dummy4    
 10.235*** 0.005 -5.081 0.110 
Country dummy5    
 -5.864 0.174 -5.253** 0.062 
Country dummy6    
 -0.118 0.809 -1.263 0.682 
Adjusted R²  0.107 
 
0.175  0.248  0.263  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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In summary, this section displays the results of the how CDS use for trading purposes 
influence banks risk. The sample is divided into three subsamples that cover the period 
before, during, and after the financial crisis. The results reported in Tables 5.12 to 5.17 show 
a positive association between banks’ risk and CDS use for trading purposes before, during, 
and after the financial crisis.  
5.7 Summary  
This chapter focuses on the examination of the relationship between the risk-taking incentives 
generated by stock option compensation and CDS use for trading purposes. The results of the 
first and the second stage of the analysis suggest a positive and significant association 
Table 5.17: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for trading purposes (after the financial crisis)  
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Trading CDS 
(predicted) 
0.042** 0.046 0.040* 0.059 0.010 0.669 0.031 0.208 
Salary 0.153* 0.072 0.148* 0.084 0.171** 0.045 0.172* 0.051 
Bonus -0.022 0.420 -0.018 0.507 -0.003 0.916 -0.019 0.499 
Leverage 0.429 0.280 0.440 0.297 0.674 0.140 0.614 0.204 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.144 0.259 -0.120 0.364 -0.250* 0.062 -0.155 0.266 
Size (sales log ) 0.061 0.360 0.062 0.374 0.157** 0.028 0.096 0.186 
Tenure 0.020 0.395 0.019 0.412 0.021 0.381 0.024 0.312 
Age -0.011 0.307 -0.011 0.320 -0.009 0.429 -0.014 0.232 
Diversification  -0.013 0.729 -0.012 0.748 -0.050 0.206 -0.045 0.290 
Bank dummy 
  
-0.026 0.883   -0.311 0.297 
Country dummy1    
 -0.046 0.883 -0.210 0.507 
Country dummy2    
 -0.517 0.190 0.202 0.563 
Country dummy3    
 -0.527 0.232 0.529 0.106 
Country dummy4    
 -1.053 0.015 0.011 0.975 
Country dummy5    
 0.374 0.370 0.013 0.966 
Country dummy6    
 -0.118 0.809   
Adjusted R²  0.265 
 
0.256  0.319  0.263  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives provided by stock option compensation and CDS use 
for trading.  
This chapter also investigates how CDS use for trading purposes influence banks risk. The 
results for distance to default and beta show a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between banks riskiness and CDS use for trading. 
The chapter also show the influence of CDS use for trading purposes on banks risk in relation 
to the financial crisis. The results suggest that CDS use for trading purposes increase banks 
risk before, during, and after the financial crisis. This positive association between CDS use 
for trading and banks risk is statistically significant using different subsamples and different 
risk measures. Table 5.18 summarises the main results in this chapter.  
Table 5.18: A summary of the main results in chapter 5 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CDS  The dependent variable is CDS for trading and the independent variable is vega 
OLS model (First stage) 0.113*** 0.086*** 0.102*** 0.049** 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.041) 
OLS model (second stage) 0.051*** 0.033** 0.032** 0.030** 
 
(0.002) (0.034) (0.046) (0.041) 
Random effects 0.002 
   
 
(0.868) 
   
Tobit model  0.095*** 
   
 
(0.003) 
   
Probit model  0.044*** 
   
  (0.009) 
   
Firm risk model  The dependent variable is firm risk and the independent variable is CDS trading 
Distance to default (OLS) -0.267*** -0.356*** -0.255** -0.438*** 
 
(0.003) (0.000) (0.016) (0.000) 
Beta (OLS) 0.035*** 0.026*** 0.031*** 0.024** 
 
(0.000) (0.008) (0.006) (0.035) 
Distance to default (random effects) -0.267*** -0.250*** -0.302*** -0.300*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) (0.001) (0.003) 
Beta (random effects) 0.035*** 0.036*** 0.032** 0.034*** 
  (0.002) (0.002) (0.013) (0.008) 
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6 Chapter 6: Empirical tests and results for banks using CDS 
for trading purposes 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter of the thesis reports the results for the analysis conducted when CDS use for 
hedging purposes. The chapter is organised as follows. The first two sections (6.2 and 6.3) 
reports the results of the relationship between CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and CDS use for 
hedging purposes. Section 6.2 presents the results for first stage analysis. Section 6.3 reports 
the results for the second stage analysis.   
The results of the relationship between firm risk and CDS use for hedging are discussed in 
Sections 6.4. Subsection 6.4.1 discusses the results when bank risk is measured using Merton 
distance to default. Subsection 6.4.2 reports the results when bank risk is measured using 
beta. Similar to the CDS use for trading purposes in the previous chapter, the relationship 
between CDS use for hedging and CEOs’ risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation 
is analysed using first and second stage regression OLS regressions. In the first stage 
regressions the risk-taking incentives are considered as an exogenous variable. In the second 
stage regressions the risk-taking incentives are modelled as an endogenous variable. 
The OLS model is used to examine the relationship between the extent of CDS use for 
hedging and CEOs’ risk-taking incentives using a continuous measure of CDS use for 
hedging purposes (i.e., notional value of a CDS contract). In this chapter tobit, probit, and 
panel data random effects models are also used to further examine the robustness of the 
results from the OLS model. Tobit model is employed to examine the linkage between the 
extent of CDS use for hedging and risk-taking incentives, while probit model is used to 
investigate the linkage between the decision to use CDS for hedging and risk-taking 
incentives. The influence of CDS use for hedging on firms’ risk is also tested using the OLS 
and the random effects models. Consistent with previous chapter, predicted value of CDS is 
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used as an explanatory variable in the firm risk model to control for endogeneity issues 
between CDS use for hedging and firm risk.  
6.2 Risk-taking incentives and CDS use for hedging purposes  
6.2.1 First stage analysis  
The main objective of the first stage analysis is to examine the relationship between vega (as 
a proxy for CEOs’ risk-taking incentives) and CDS use for hedging purposes assuming that 
CEO risk-taking incentives generated by stock options are an exogenous variable.  
Table 6.1 presents the results from first stage OLS regressions on the relationship between 
risk-taking incentives (vega) and CDS use for hedging purposes. The dependent variable is 
the extent of CDS use for hedging which is measured using the notional value of a CDS 
contract scaled by total assets (e.g., Knopf et al., 2002; Rogers, 2002).  
Table 6.1: First stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for hedging purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega) 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Vega -0.012 0.012 0.997  -0.001 0.012 0.964 
Salary 0.013 0.053 0.807  0.036 0.059 0.544 
Bonus 0.016 0.018 0.351  0.017 0.018 0.340 
Shares 0.062*** 0.017 0.000  0.067*** 0.018 0.000 
Ownership 0.025 0.024 0.283  0.024 0.025 0.330 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.115*** 0.023 0.000  0.118*** 0.024 0.000 
Derivatives (trading) -0.047** 0.019 0.013  -0.044** 0.019 0.022 
Investment opportunities 0.041 0.070 0.558  -0.001 0.093 0.994 
Leverage 0.443* 0.249 0.077  0.501* 0.260 0.055 
Size -0.006 0.018 0.742  -0.024 0.044 0.583 
Diversification -0.044** 0.022 0.043  -0.041* 0.023 0.080 
Bank dummy 
   
 0.095 0.116 0.413 
Year1 
   
 0.067 0.209 0.747 
Year2 
   
 0.197 0.367 0.593 
Year3 
   
 -0.091 0.165 0.579 
Year4 
   
 -0.016 0.168 0.922 
Year5 
   
 0.076 0.165 0.647 
Adjusted R²  0.113      0.104     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The independent variable is the CEO risk-taking incentives which are measured as vega. 
Years and dummies are similar to those included in the previous chapter (see Section 5.3 of 
Chapter 5). The results reported in Table 6.1 show that the coefficients of vega are negative 
and statistically insignificant. This indicates that the extent of CDS use for hedging is 
negatively related to risk-taking incentives generated by stock option compensation when 
extent of CDS use is measured using the continuous variable (notional value).  
Consistent results are found in Table 6.2, after including year and country dummies.  
Table 6.2: First stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for hedging purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega)  including country dummies 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Vega -0.002 0.011 0.889  -0.007 0.012 0.593 
Salary -0.093** 0.051 0.069  -0.024 0.060 0.688 
Bonus -0.005 0.017 0.743  0.001 0.018 0.993 
Shares 0.074*** 0.016 0.000  0.119*** 0.022 0.000 
Ownership 0.034 0.022 0.129  0.003 0.025 0.901 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.085*** 0.021 0.000  0.106*** 0.024 0.000 
Derivatives (trading) 0.013 0.019 0.510  -0.005 0.021 0.795 
Investment opportunities 0.084 0.067 0.208  0.002 0.097 0.980 
Leverage -0.046 0.251 0.854  0.178 0.279 0.523 
Size -0.013 0.016 0.413  -0.038 0.045 0.396 
Diversification -0.051** 0.022 0.021  -0.018 0.025 0.491 
Country dummy1 -1.941*** 0.243 0.000  0.973*** 0.236 0.000 
Country dummy2 -1.364*** 0.284 0.000  1.248*** 0.287 0.000 
Country dummy3 -1.077*** 0.293 0.000  1.316*** 0.288 0.000 
Country dummy4 -0.860*** 0.311 0.006  0.825*** 0.292 0.005 
Country dummy5 -1.697*** 0.298 0.000  0.737** 0.299 0.014 
Country dummy6 -1.772*** 0.291 0.000  0.620** 0.274 0.024 
Year1 
   
 0.110 0.207 0.595 
Year2 
   
 0.320 0.370 0.387 
Year3 
   
 -0.028 0.161 0.863 
Year4 
   
 0.011 0.164 0.945 
Year5 
   
 0.110 0.160 0.491 
Adjusted R²  0.288 
  
 0.157   
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The negative sign is consistent with the theoretical arguments that stock option compensation 
provides managers with incentives to use less hedging derivatives (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
However, the results of the regressions that are reported in Table 6.1 and 6.2 fail to capture 
any significant coefficient for vega of the stock option compensation. These results are 
consistent with Knopf et al. (2002) and Géczy et al. (1997), but inconsistent with Rajgopal 
and Shevlin (2002), Ertugrul et al. (2008).  
Knopf et al. (2002) find negative and insignificant association between derivatives use for 
hedging and the sensitivity of the CEO's option portfolio to stock return volatility as a 
measure for risk-taking incentives. Géczy et al. (1997) find an insignificant relationship 
between derivatives use and managerial risk-taking as measured by the value of managerial 
options derivatives use. Rogers (2002) also report a negative and insignificant association 
between predicted risk-taking incentives and derivatives use.  
The results reported for OLS models in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show weak associations between 
the CEO risk-taking incentives generated by stock options and the extent of CDS use for 
hedging purpose. In general, the results show that the use of stock options can reduce the 
CEOs’ risk-related incentives problem and motivates them to use less CDS for hedging 
purposes.  
The results reported in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 of the OLS regressions show that adjusted R² range 
from (0.104 to 0.288). This indicates that the models fit the data and 10.4% to 28.8% of the 
variation in the dependent variable is explained by variations in the independent variables. 
6.2.2 The results for the control variables (firs stage regressions) 
This subsection discusses the result for the control variables used in CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives. Control variables are selected based on the previous literature (e.g., Guay, 1999a; 
Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Rogers, 2002). Cash compensation (salary and cash bonuses) as 
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a proxy for managerial risk aversion is expected to be positively related to CDS use for 
hedging purposes. In general, the results reported for OLS model reveal no relationship 
between cash compensation variables (salary and bonuses) and CDS use for hedging. Many 
empirical studies also find no relationship between cash compensation and derivatives use 
(e.g., Adkins et al., 2007; Knopf et al., 2002). 
The value of stock grants is also used as a proxy for managerial risk aversion in the CDS 
model. Smith and Stulz (1985) predict a positive association between stock grants and 
derivatives use. The results reported for the first stage regressions in Tables 6.1 and 6.2 show 
that the relationship between the value of managers’ stock compensation and CDS use for 
hedging is positive and significant. The results indicate that stock grants increase executive 
risk aversion and associated with more CDS use for hedging purposes. This positive 
relationship between the CEO’s stock compensation and CDS use for hedging is consistent 
with the results documented in previous studies (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Rogers, 2002; 
Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010).  
Other derivatives use for hedging is positively related to CDS use for hedging. The results 
also show significant positive association between leverage and CDS use for hedging. This 
suggests that as financial distress increases, banks tend to use more CDS for hedging. This 
finding is consistent with theoretical and empirical studies that predict a positive relationship 
between the expected costs of financial distress and the incentives to reduce firm risk using 
more derivatives for hedging (Smith and Stulz, 1985; Rogers, 2002; Géczy et al., 2007).  
Diversification is negatively association with CDS use for hedging. This finding is consistent 
with prior empirical studies that document a negative relationship between the degree of 
diversification and derivatives use for hedging purposes (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 
2007; Fung et al., 2012).  
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6.3 Second stage analysis  
Tables 6.3 and 6.4 report the results of the second stage OLS model of relationship between 
vega as a proxy for CEOs risk-taking incentives generated by stock option compensation 
(when vega is modelled as an endogenous variable) and CDS use for hedging purposes.  
The risk-taking incentive (vega) is predicted using variables very similar to those used in 
earlier empirical studies (e.g., Guay, 1999b; Rajgopal and Shevlin, 2002; Coles et al., 2006). 
The predicted value of vega is then incorporated as an independent variable in the CDS use 
model.  The results reported in table 6.3 show that the coefficients of vega are negative and 
statistically insignificant. The negative sign of the relationship between vega and CDS use for 
hedging purposes is consistent with the theoretical prediction of Smith and Stulz (1985). 
Table 6.3: Second stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for hedging purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega) 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Predicted vega 0.003 0.007 0.662  0.005 0.008 0.550 
Salary 0.024 0.057 0.679  0.055 0.066 0.407 
Bonus 0.015 0.018 0.412  0.015 0.018 0.401 
Shares 0.056*** 0.021 0.008  0.059*** 0.022 0.007 
Ownership 0.026 0.024 0.272  0.023 0.024 0.339 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.116*** 0.022 0.000  0.120*** 0.024 0.000 
Derivatives (trading) -0.048** 0.019 0.011  -0.045** 0.019 0.018 
Investment opportunities 0.044 0.070 0.529  0.002 0.093 0.981 
Leverage 0.444* 0.249 0.076  0.500* 0.260 0.055 
Size -0.008 0.018 0.660  -0.034 0.046 0.462 
Diversification -0.045** 0.022 0.041  -0.040* 0.023 0.087 
Bank dummy 
   
 0.088 0.116 0.452 
Year1 
   
 0.064 0.206 0.757 
Year2 
   
 0.252 0.377 0.505 
Year3 
   
 -0.091 0.164 0.582 
Year4 
   
 -0.017 0.167 0.917 
Year5 
   
 0.079 0.164 0.629 
Adjusted R²  0.113      0.105     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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Table 6.4 below shows the results of the second stage regressions after including the same 
countries and year dummy variables used in the first stage analysis. 
 
The results are consistent with the finding of OLS model in the first stage regression. Vega 
coefficients are negatively related to CDS hedging. The results reported in Tables 6.3 and 6.4 
of the second stage OLS regressions show that adjusted R² range from (0.105 to 0.280).  
Table 6.4: Second stage OLS regressions of the extent of CDS use for hedging purposes and the 
risk-taking incentives (vega)  including country dummies 
 
Column (1) 
 
Column (2) 
Independent variables Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
 
Coefficients 
Standard 
error 
P value 
Predicted vega -0.002 0.007 0.803  -0.003 0.007 0.832 
Salary -0.089 0.055 0.107  -0.044 0.058 0.448 
Bonus -0.006 0.017 0.724  0.000 0.019 0.997 
Shares 0.071*** 0.021 0.001  0.114*** 0.026 0.000 
Ownership 0.033 0.022 0.131  0.006 0.024 0.802 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.085*** 0.021 0.000  0.100*** 0.022 0.000 
Derivatives (trading) 0.013 0.019 0.513  -0.007 0.021 0.734 
Investment opportunities 0.086 0.067 0.198  0.006 0.097 0.950 
Leverage -0.048 0.251 0.848  0.170 0.280 0.543 
Size -0.014 0.017 0.399  0.000 0.000 0.509 
Diversification -0.050** 0.022 0.021  -0.023 0.024 0.329 
Country dummy1 -1.940*** 0.243 0.000  0.977*** 0.232 0.000 
Country dummy2 -1.363*** 0.284 0.000  1.226*** 0.289 0.000 
Country dummy3 -1.079*** 0.288 0.000  1.275*** 0.284 0.000 
Country dummy4 -0.859*** 0.307 0.005  0.799*** 0.295 0.007 
Country dummy5 -1.702*** 0.299 0.000  0.738** 0.291 0.012 
Country dummy6 -1.770*** 0.288 0.000  0.611** 0.272 0.026 
Year1 
 
     0.124 0.205 0.546 
Year2 
   
 0.118 0.215 0.585 
Year3 
   
 -0.034 0.160 0.832 
Year4 
   
 0.015 0.163 0.929 
Year5 
   
 0.115 0.160 0.474 
Adjusted R²  0.280      0.156     
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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Panel data random effects regression is used to control for the presence of unobserved firm 
heterogeneity in the sample. Table 6.5 shows the results of random effects regressions. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The results reported in Table 6.5 are consistent with results of OLS model (firs and second 
stage analysis). The risk-taking incentive generated from stock option compensation (vega) is 
negatively associated with CDS use for hedging.  
6.3.1 The results for the control variables (second stage regressions) 
The results for the control variables in the second stage regression are consistent with those 
reported in the first stage regressions. The coefficients for the value of stock compensation in 
the second stage regressions are positively related to CDS use for hedging. The positive 
relationship between the CEO’s stock compensation and CDS use for hedging purposes is 
consistent with corporate hedging literature (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Rogers, 2002).  
Tables 6.3and 6.4 show that the coefficients for derivatives use for hedging (e.g, interest rates 
derivatives, exchange rate derivatives, commodity derivatives) is positively related to CDS 
Table 6.5:  Panel data random effect model of  CDS use for hedging 
purposes and the predicted risk-taking incentives (vega) 
Independent variables Coefficients Standard error P value 
Predicted vega -0.004 0.007 0.625 
salary -0.076 0.074 0.305 
bonus 0.013 0.015 0.369 
shares 0.060*** 0.023 0.008 
ownership -0.028 0.023 0.223 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.080*** 0.026 0.002 
Derivatives (trading) -0.038 0.023 0.100 
Investment opportunities 0.048 0.078 0.542 
Leverage -0.212 0.420 0.614 
Size 0.001 0.013 0.924 
Diversification -0.013 0.033 0.696 
Year 0.009 0.028 0.747 
R² within 0.053   
R² between 0.105   
R² overall 0.087   
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use for hedging. This finding is consistent with the argument that banks use credit derivatives 
are more likely to use other derivatives (Minton et al., 2009). 
In general, diversification is negatively related to CDS use for hedging purposes. These 
results are consistent with the results reported for the first stage regression and prior empirical 
studies (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Géczy et al., 2007; Fung et al., 2012).  
Overall, the results reported for the control variables in the CDS model for both the first and 
the second stage regression are consistent with the findings of many previous empirical 
studies. The analysis is also conducted using delta as an additional control variable in the 
CDS model for hedging. The results are largely consistent with those reported in this chapter. 
The results of the key variables after including delta are summarised in Appendix G (Panel 
B). 
6.3.2 Robustness checks 
This subsection reports the results for tobit and probit models that are used to further examine 
the robustness of the results from the OLS model. A tobit model is used to investigate the 
relationship between the extent of CDS use for hedging and CEO risk-taking incentives. 
Probit model is used to examine the relationship between the decision to use CDS and CEO 
risk-taking incentives. Table 6.6 reports the results of tobit and probit models after including 
countries dummy variables for countries that have the highest number of CDS observations 
(Germany, Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, and Portugal). 
The results reported for probit model show that the coefficient of vega is negative but 
statistically insignificant to CDS use for hedging. This finding is consistent with the results 
reported for OLS model, and suggests that decision using CDS use for hedging is negatively 
related to risk-taking incentives (Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Rossi, 2011). 
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The negative association between the risk-taking incentives generated by CEOs’ stock 
options and the decision to use CDS for hedging is consistent with the theoretical predictions 
of Smith and Stulz (1985), who expect a negative relationship between derivatives use and 
the risk-taking incentives of the CEO's stock option compensation. 
Overall, the results reported in this chapter for the OLS, tobit, probit, and random effects 
models show that the risk-taking incentives of stock options (vega) are negatively related to 
CDS use for hedging when such incentives are modelled as an endogenous variable. These 
findings are consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature (Smith and Stulz, 1985; 
Tufano, 1996; Knopf et al., 2002; Rogers, 2002).  
Table 6.6: Second-stage tobit and probit regressions of CDS use for hedging 
purposes and the risk-taking incentives (vega)  
 
Tobit model  Probit model 
Independent variables Coefficients P value  Coefficients P value 
Predicted vega 0.011 0.640  -0.014 0.501 
Salary -0.186 0.599  -0.056 0.841 
Bonus -0.005 0.938  0.020 0.716 
Shares 0.312*** 0.001  0.099 0.153 
Ownership -0.082 0.526  0.005 0.954 
Derivatives (hedging) 0.511*** 0.000  0.896*** 0.000 
Derivatives (trading) 0.317*** 0.001  0.212* 0.057 
Investment opportunities -0.141 0.677  -0.257 0.325 
Leverage 6.197*** 0.007  3.596* 0.051 
Size 0.038 0.598  0.137** 0.022 
Diversification 0.142 0.179  0.078 0.432 
Country dummy1 -3.863*** 0.001  -1.333* 0.070 
Country dummy2 1.468 0.127  1.573* 0.061 
Country dummy3 1.711 0.133  1.147 0.231 
Country dummy4 2.933*** 0.002  5.830*** 0.001 
Country dummy5 0.124 0.888  1.652** 0.038 
Country dummy6 4.034*** 0.000  8.065*** 0.000 
Pseudo R- squared 0.430 
 
 0.666 
  
  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level. 
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The conclusion derived from these results shows that CEOs’ stock option compensation 
reduces the risk-related incentives problem by providing a disincentive to use CDS for 
hedging. This thesis also uses the value of CEOs stock options as an additional proxy for the 
risk-taking incentives, and to check the robustness of the results of the relationship between 
the risk-taking incentives and CDS use for hedging. The inference of the results is no 
different compared to the results reported using vega. The results are presented in Appendix 
G (Panel A). 
6.4 CDS use for hedging purposes and firm risk  
6.4.1 Distance to default  
In this thesis OLS and panel data random effects regressions are primarily employed to test 
how CDS use influences firm risk. Previous empirical studies have focused essentially on the 
reason of derivatives use, while the influence of derivatives use on firm risk has received less 
attention. 
The analysis is conducted in a setting in which CDS use for hedging purposes is modelled as 
an endogenous variable. Table 6.7 shows the results of the relationship between the 
independent variable, which is CDS use for hedging purpose, and the dependent variable 
which is firm risk.  
CDS use for hedging is measured using the notional value of a CDS contract and firm risk is 
measured using Merton distance to default. The results show that the coefficients of CDS use 
for hedging are consistently negative. This negative relationship is statistically significant in 
columns 3 and 4 (below the 10% level). 
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The results suggest that CDS use for hedging purposes lowers bank distance to default (i.e., 
increases bank default risk). This finding contrasts with the argument established in the 
theoretical literature of derivatives use for hedging purposes (Smith and Stulz, 1985). The 
results show that CDS use for hedging increases bank riskiness. However, this finding is 
consistent with previous empirical studies that provide evidence that CDS for hedging 
increase firms’ risk (e.g., Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Fung et al., 2012).   
Table 6.8 shows the results of the relationship between CDS use for hedging purposes and 
firm risk (distance to default) using the random effects model.  The results are consistent with 
the regression coefficients of the OLS model reported in Table 6.7. 
Table 6.7: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for hedging purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.113 0.581 -0.215 0.309 -0.381* 0.060 -0.404* 0.058 
Salary -0.410 0.244 -0.809*** 0.041 -0.662* 0.075 -0.846** 0.034 
Bonus -0.145 0.264 -0.211 0.106 -0.339*** 0.006 -0.281** 0.035 
Leverage 5.538*** 0.008 6.805*** 0.001 5.811*** 0.004 5.311** 0.015 
Investment 
opportunities   
-3.579*** 0.000 -3.742*** 0.000 -3.295*** 0.000 -3.565*** 0.000 
Size (sales log ) 0.363*** 0.003 1.115*** 0.000 0.984*** 0.000 1.524*** 0.000 
Tenure -0.043 0.627 -0.008 0.925 0.102 0.234 0.020 0.820 
Age 0.061 0.226 0.067 0.183 -0.027 0.584 -0.009 0.856 
Diversification  0.164 0.290 0.041 0.804 -0.144 0.385 -0.030 0.864 
Bank dummy 
  
1.944** 0.015     
Country dummy1    
 -0.923 0.496 -0.681 0.603 
Country dummy2    
 -1.106 0.505 -2.601* 0.082 
Country dummy3    
 0.464 0.788 4.160*** 0.004 
Country dummy4    
 10.496*** 0.000 -3.441** 0.017 
Country dummy5    
 4.963*** 0.006 -3.557*** 0.008 
Country dummy6    
 -1.051 0.625 1.155 0.407 
Year1 
  
1.238 0.377   -0.086 0.938 
Year2 
  
-6.282*** 0.009   -1.923* 0.089 
Year3 
  
-0.020 0.986   -1.360 0.221 
Year4 
  
-1.830 0.111   -9.194*** 0.000 
Year5 
  
-1.374 0.224   -1.120 0.305 
Adjusted R²  0.172   0.206  0.335  0.234  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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All columns show that the coefficients of CDS use for hedging are consistently negative but 
statistically insignificant, indicating that CDS use for hedging lower the distance to default 
(i.e., increase the default risk). 
In summary, the results reported in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 suggest that CDS use for hedging 
purposes is negatively related to firm risk. More CDS use for hedging leads to an increase in 
bank risk (lower distance to default).  
Table 6.8: Random effects regressions of firm risk (distance to default ) and CDS use for hedging purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) -0.113 0.581 -0.069 0.736 -0.245 0.204 -0.069 0.742 
Salary -0.410 0.243 -0.314 0.375 -0.200 0.549 -0.100 0.785 
Bonus -0.145 0.264 -0.136 0.296 -0.277** 0.023 -0.196 0.139 
Leverage 5.538*** 0.007 6.072*** 0.003 5.605*** 0.006 5.796*** 0.009 
Investment 
opportunities   -3.579*** 0.000 -3.627*** 0.000 -3.218*** 0.000 -3.708*** 0.000 
Size (sales log ) 0.363*** 0.003 0.384*** 0.002 0.334*** 0.003 0.436*** 0.000 
Tenure -0.043 0.626 -0.069 0.440 0.047 0.584 -0.074 0.406 
Age 0.061 0.226 0.069 0.174 -0.019 0.704 0.014 0.788 
Diversification  0.164 0.289 0.206 0.187 0.010 0.949 0.125 0.470 
Bank dummy 
  
1.392** 0.079     
Country dummy1 
   
 -1.863 0.162 -2.775* 0.058 
Country dummy2 
   
 -1.883 0.257 -5.349*** 0.002 
Country dummy3   
 
 -0.367 0.831 -3.757** 0.035 
Country dummy4   
 
 10.063*** 0.000 -3.931** 0.037 
Country dummy5   
 
 3.440** 0.047 -6.049*** 0.001 
Country dummy6   
 
 -1.894 0.380 -5.159*** 0.005 
Year1 
   
   1.582 0.256 
Year2 
   
   -9.267*** 0.000 
Year3 
   
   -0.071 0.948 
Year4 
   
   -1.807 0.106 
Year5 
   
   -1.264 0.250 
R2 within 0.178  0.188 
 0.331  0.223  
 R2 between 0.619 
 
0.605  0.627  0.576  
R2 overall 0.194  0.201 
 0.342  0.231  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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6.4.2 Beta 
Tables 6.9 and 6.10 report the results of the firm risk model for OLS and random effects 
models when firm risk is measured using beta (e.g., Chen et al. 2006; Nijskens and Wagner, 
2011; Bartram et al., 2011). CDS use for hedging is modelled as an endogenous variable to 
avoid potential issues of endogeneity between CDS use and firm risk. Table 6.9 presents the 
results of the relationship between CDS use for hedging and firm risk (beta) using the OLS 
model. The results reported show that the coefficients of CDS for hedging are positive and 
statistically significant in all columns (at the 5% level). 
Table 6.9: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for hedging purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
0.047** 0.031 0.049** 0.025 0.049** 0.029 0.047** 0.037 
Salary 0.145*** 0.000 0.132*** 0.001 0.170*** 0.000 0.155*** 0.000 
Bonus -0.012 0.399 -0.018 0.185 -0.007 0.604 -0.018 0.216 
Leverage -0.246 0.262 -0.287 0.190 -0.125 0.596 -0.199 0.401 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.141*** 0.010 -0.187*** 0.004 -0.158*** 0.006 -0.196*** 0.004 
Size (sales log ) 0.015 0.250 0.032* 0.055 0.017 0.209 0.034* 0.054 
Tenure 0.003 0.781 0.004 0.655 0.000 0.981 0.006 0.558 
Age -0.004 0.405 -0.004 0.408 -0.004 0.439 -0.006 0.272 
Diversification  0.032* 0.053 0.031* 0.063 0.012 0.493 0.012 0.511 
Bank dummy 
  
0.040 0.632   -0.192 0.157 
Country dummy1    
 -0.119 0.443 -0.193 0.182 
Country dummy2    
 -0.334* 0.084 0.100 0.533 
Country dummy3    
 -0.376* 0.061 0.212 0.174 
Country dummy4    
 -0.447** 0.032 -0.010 0.947 
Country dummy5    
 0.045 0.823 -0.051 0.723 
Country dummy6    
 -0.038 0.879 0.274* 0.051 
Year1 
  
0.263 0.054   0.319*** 0.005 
Year2 
  
0.323*** 0.005   -0.021 0.855 
Year3 
  
-0.029 0.798   -0.022 0.846 
Year4 
  
-0.031 0.786   -0.025 0.827 
Year5 
  
-0.142 0.227     
Adjusted R²  0.198 
 
0.223  0.211  0.227  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The results suggest that CDS use for hedging purposes increases banks risk. This finding is 
consistent with the results reported for distance to default and previous empirical literature 
(e.g., Nijskens and Wagner, 2011).  
The results of the random effects model are also consistent with those reported for OLS 
regressions. Table 6.10 shows the coefficients of CDS use for hedging purposes are positive 
and statistically significant. 
Table 6.10: Random effects regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for hedging purposes 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
0.048* 0.055 0.048* 0.058 0.050** 0.048 0.045* 0.077 
Salary 0.151*** 0.001 0.151*** 0.001 0.174*** 0.000 0.174*** 0.000 
Bonus -0.015 0.284 -0.015 0.285 -0.012 0.395 -0.015 0.298 
Leverage -0.191 0.473 -0.192 0.477 -0.088 0.747 -0.054 0.851 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.124** 0.030 -0.124** 0.031 -0.137** 0.018 -0.124** 0.034 
Size (sales log ) 0.007 0.603 0.007 0.606 0.009 0.493 0.006 0.638 
Tenure 0.004 0.671 0.004 0.674 0.002 0.828 0.005 0.616 
Age -0.006 0.279 -0.006 0.281 -0.006 0.314 -0.007 0.244 
Diversification  0.033* 0.090 0.033** 0.096 0.015 0.474 0.016 0.476 
Bank dummy 
  
-0.002 0.986 -0.164 0.373 -0.151 0.369 
Country dummy1    
 -0.359 0.119 -0.194 0.282 
Country dummy2    
 -0.397* 0.094 0.217 0.268 
Country dummy3    
 -0.449 0.071 0.217 0.265 
Country dummy4    
 0.016 0.946 -0.006 0.977 
Country dummy5    
 -0.092 0.757 0.028 0.874 
Country dummy6    
   0.018 0.907 
Year1 
  
0.082 0.447   -1.062*** 0.001 
Year2 
  
0.022 0.882   0.162 0.152 
Year3 
  
-0.900*** 0.002   -0.194* 0.093 
Year4 
  
0.177 0.115   -0.161 0.152 
Year5 
  
-0.190* 0.098   0.018 0.907 
R2 within 0.029 
 
0.0292  0.027  0.031  
 R2 between 0.496 
 
0.4959  0.565  0.532  
R2 overall 0.217 
 
0.2165  0.242  0.233  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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In summary, the results reported in this section show consistent results of OLS and random 
effects models. CDS use for hedging is positively related to bank risk. Furthermore, this 
empirical finding is robust using different risk measures (i.e., distance to default and beta). 
The results contrast the theoretical argument that derivatives use for hedging are regularly 
used to reduce firm risk (Smith and Stulz, 1985), and show that CDS use for hedging can lead 
to an increase in the bank risk. This finding is consistent with prior empirical studies that 
document a positive association between CDS use for hedging and firms risk.  
6.4.3 The results for the control variables 
This subsection discusses the results for the control variables that are included in the firm risk 
model. Previous empirical studies expect a positive relationship between firm risk and 
investment opportunities (e.g., Smith and Watts, 1992; Bartram et al., 2011). The results 
reported for distance to default show that greater investment opportunities are associated with 
lower distance to default risk (i.e., increase the default risk). This finding is consistent with 
prior empirical studies that show a positive association between investment opportunities and 
firm risk (e.g., Guay, 1999a; Rajgopal and Shevlin; 2002).  
The results reported for distance to default in Tables 6.7 and 6.8 show that the coefficients of 
leverage are positive and significant (below the 5% level). This suggest that leverage 
increases the bank distance to default (i.e., reduces the default risk). This finding contrasts 
with previous empirical studies that show a positive relationship between leverage and firm 
risk (e.g., Guay; 1999a; Coles at al., 2006). However, this negative association between 
leverage and firm risk is consistent with the empirical findings of Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002); they show a positive association between leverage and the incentives to undertake 
riskier projects.  
This positive relationship between leverage and bank risk can be related to the attitude of 
managers in high leverage firms (banks) who have an incentive to accept risky projects 
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because shareholders will enjoy a significant part of the benefits of these risky projects and 
debt holders will bear more risk (Leland; 1998; Aretz and Bartram, 2010). The coefficients of 
beta as a proxy for bank risk show no association between bank risk and leverage as reported 
in Tables 6.9 and 6.10.  
Bank size is significant and positive to the distance to default in the OLS model and in the 
random effects model. This finding indicates that large banks have a lower risk level as the 
distance to default increases (i.e., reduced bank default risk). This finding is consistent with a 
wider literature that reports a negative relationship between bank size and firm risk (e.g., 
Coles et al., 2006; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013).  
Bank diversification is positively related to the bank risk (beta). For the OLS and random 
effects models, the coefficients are generally positive and significant. This finding is 
consistent with Hagendorff and Vallascas (2011), and inconsistent with previous literature 
that expects diversification to reduce bank risk (Chen et al. 2006; Bartram, Brown, and 
Conrad, 2011). 
The results also show that cash compensation increases a bank’s risk. In Table 6.7 the 
coefficients for cash compensation (salary and bonuses) are generally negative and 
significantly related to distance to default. The results for beta in Tables 6.9 and 6.10 also 
show that cash compensation (salary) is associated with a higher bank risk. This finding is 
inconsistent with the argument that suggests higher salaries will increase managerial risk 
aversion and result in less firm risk (Whidbee and Wohar, 1999; Coles et al., 2006; Adkins et 
al., 2007). However, this finding is consistent with the results of many empirical studies that 
argue that a higher salary will make the CEO’s better diversified and encourage them to take 
more risk (Knopf et al., 2002; Ertugrul et al., 2008). 
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Overall, the results for the control variables suggest that financial distress (leverage), 
investment opportunities, bank size, diversification and salary are important determinants for 
firm risk.  
In line with Chapter 5, delta is also included as an additional control variable. The results 
using delta as a control variables are largely the same. Appendix G (Panel C) presents the 
results of the main measures for firm risk and using the OLS and random effects models.   
6.5 CDS use for hedging purposes and the financial crisis 
This section will discuss and report the results of regression analysis for the relationship 
between CDS use for hedging purposes and banks’ risk in relation to the financial crisis. 
Consistent with the results reported in the previous chapter, the sample is split into three 
subsamples. The first represents a period before the financial crisis 2006, the second is the 
period of the financial crisis 2007-2009, and the third is the period after the financial crisis 
(2010-2011).  
This section is organised as follows. Section 6.5.1 reports the results for the relationship 
between CDS use for hedging and banks risk before the financial crisis. Section 6.5.2 
presents the results of the relationship between CDS use for hedging and banks risk during 
the financial crisis. The influence of CDS use on banks risk after the financial crisis is 
reported in section 6.5.3.  
6.5.1 CDS use for hedging purposes and bank risk before the financial crisis  
Table 6.11 displays the results for the time period preceding the financial crisis. The 
dependent variable is bank risk (distance to default) and the independent variable is CDS use 
for hedging purposes (notional value of CDS scaled by total assets).  
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The results reported in table 6.11 indicate that CDS use for hedging is negatively associated 
with banks’ distance to default. The coefficients are negative in all columns and statistically 
significant in column 3 (at the 1% level). The results suggest that CDS use for hedging 
purposes lowers banks’ distance to default (i.e. increased bank risk). 
Table 6.12 presents the results using beta as a dependent variable. Similar to the results 
reported in Table 5.13 for the relationship between CDS use for trading and beta in Chapter 
five, no association is found between CDS use for hedging and bank risk (beta). This also can 
be explained by the small sample size before the financial crisis. 
 
 
Table 6.11: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for hedging purposes (before the 
financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
-0.327 0.195 -0.327 0.188 -0.575*** 0.008 -0.374 0.165 
Salary -0.345 0.513 -0.298 0.566 -0.151 0.729 -0.321 0.569 
Bonus -0.057 0.783 -0.066 0.744 -0.189 0.279 -0.099 0.673 
Leverage 4.842* 0.053 5.699** 0.025 5.477** 0.011 6.023** 0.034 
Investment 
opportunities   
-1.122 0.295 -1.138 0.280 -0.569 0.523 -1.039 0.368 
Size (sales log ) 0.573 0.143 0.707* 0.074 0.696 0.044 0.818* 0.080 
Tenure 0.059 0.592 0.011 0.922 0.113 0.394 0.007 0.955 
Age 0.063 0.341 0.066 0.311 -0.002 0.971 0.077 0.304 
Diversification  -0.038 0.875 0.018 0.941 -0.073 0.732 0.011 0.969 
Bank dummy 
  
1.684 0.108     
Country dummy1    
 -0.567 0.714 -1.217 0.486 
Country dummy2    
 -0.124 0.950 -2.506 0.175 
Country dummy3    
 -0.798 0.678 -2.000 0.353 
Country dummy4    
 9.264*** 0.000 -0.948 0.636 
Country dummy5    
 0.837 0.687 -2.255 0.263 
Country dummy6    
 -1.005 0.755 -1.832 0.343 
Adjusted R²  0.177 
 
0.220  0.386  0.231  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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6.5.2 CDS use for hedging purposes and bank risk during the financial crisis  
Table 6.13 and Table 6.14 display the results of the relationship between CDS use for 
hedging and banks’ risk during the financial crisis (2007-2009). In table 6.13 the dependent 
variable is bank risk as measured by Merton distance to default, and the independent variable 
is CDS use for hedging purposes as measured using the notional value of CDS scaled by total 
assets.  
 
 
 
Table 6.12: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for hedging purposes (before the financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
0.006 0.868 0.006 0.869 -0.009 0.834 -0.127 0.143 
Salary -0.128 0.124 -0.130 0.120 -0.125 0.151 -0.010 0.789 
Bonus -0.013 0.696 -0.012 0.709 -0.010 0.766 0.170 0.686 
Leverage 0.134 0.727 0.091 0.818 0.147 0.719 -0.063 0.717 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.121 0.467 -0.120 0.473 -0.052 0.768 0.081 0.252 
Size (sales log ) 0.072 0.238 0.065 0.299 0.065 0.334 -0.003 0.871 
Tenure -0.003 0.839 -0.001 0.951 0.002 0.950 -0.002 0.833 
Age -0.005 0.615 -0.005 0.607 -0.003 0.781 0.034 0.421 
Diversification  0.032 0.402 0.029 0.453 0.030 0.487 0.349 0.192 
Bank dummy 
  
-0.084 0.611     
Country dummy1    
 -0.397 0.199 -0.131 0.638 
Country dummy2    
 0.023 0.953 0.273 0.402 
Country dummy3    
 -0.441 0.249 0.176 0.564 
Country dummy4    
 -0.257 0.539 -0.168 0.582 
Country dummy5    
 -0.149 0.716 -0.202 0.491 
Country dummy6    
 -0.428 0.504 -0.165 0.364 
Adjusted R²  0.110 
 
0.115  0.202  0.211  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The results reported in Table 6.13 show that the relationship between CDS use for hedging 
and bank risk is negative and statistically significant in columns 1 and 3. This finding 
suggests that CDS use for hedging increases the bank risk and lowers bank distance to default 
(i.e. increased bank risk) during the financial crisis period. 
The results reported in table 6.14 show the relationship between CDS use for hedging and 
banks’ risk using beta as a second proxy for banks risk.   
 
 
 
 
 
Table 6.13: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for hedging purposes (during the financial 
crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) -0.444* 0.099 -0.379 0.155 -0.594** 0.014 -0.340 0.217 
Salary -0.390 0.412 -0.183 0.702 -0.283 0.507 -0.191 0.705 
Bonus -0.120 0.482 -0.095 0.574 -0.188 0.217 -0.151 0.392 
Leverage 6.071 0.028 6.792** 0.014 6.998*** 0.006 6.653** 0.026 
Investment 
opportunities   -5.719*** 0.000 -5.811*** 0.000 -5.073*** 0.000 -6.163*** 0.000 
Size (sales log ) 0.634*** 0.000 0.664*** 0.000 0.553*** 0.000 0.711*** 0.000 
Tenure -0.016 0.885 -0.060 0.596 0.073 0.504 -0.058 0.617 
Age 0.011 0.870 0.028 0.684 -0.024 0.706 -0.011 0.877 
Diversification  0.033 0.872 0.091 0.659 -0.057 0.775 0.016 0.946 
Bank dummy 
  
2.371** 0.024     
Country dummy1 
   
 -1.463 0.390 -3.962** 0.020 
Country dummy2 
   
 -2.195 0.293 -0.958 0.611 
Country dummy3 
  
 
 0.054 0.981 -2.040 0.307 
Country dummy4 
  
 
 13.083*** 0.000 -0.381 0.850 
Country dummy5 
  
 
 0.720 0.746 -3.761* 0.055 
Country dummy6 
  
 
 -1.021 0.713 -2.200 0.216 
Adjusted R²  0.239  0.257 
 0.443  0.251  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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The results for beta are consistent with the results of the analysis using distance to default. A 
positive and significant relationship is found between CDS use for hedging purposes and beta 
as reported in Table 6.14. The coefficients are positive and significant for beta in columns 2, 
3, and 4. This finding shows that CDS use for hedging purposes increased banks’ risk during 
the financial crisis period (2007-2009). 
6.5.3 CDS use for hedging purposes and bank risk after the financial crisis  
This subsection displays the results of the influence of CDS use for hedging on banks’ risk 
after the crisis. Table 6.15 reports the results using Merton distance to default as a risk 
measure, and 6.16 reports the results using beta as a proxy for banks’ risk. The results 
Table 6.14: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for hedging purposes (during the financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
0.041 0.146 0.046* 0.098 0.051* 0.084 0.048* 0.099 
Salary 0.184*** 0.000 0.202*** 0.000 0.204*** 0.000 0.212*** 0.000 
Bonus -0.005 0.761 -0.003 0.854 0.005 0.796 0.003 0.888 
Leverage -0.604** 0.036 -0.542* 0.060 -0.522* 0.092 -0.515* 0.095 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.221** 0.012 -0.229*** 0.009 -0.244** 0.011 -0.249*** 0.008 
Size (sales log ) 0.018 0.253 0.021 0.190 0.019 0.271 0.022 0.197 
Tenure 0.010 0.423 0.006 0.631 0.001 0.953 0.006 0.608 
Age -0.002 0.831 -0.000 0.988 0.000 0.952 0.000 0.968 
Diversification  0.021 0.334 0.026 0.233 0.003 0.885 0.008 0.728 
Bank dummy 
  
0.204* 0.063     
Country dummy1    
 0.166 0.423 -0.394** 0.025 
Country dummy2    
 -0.220 0.386 -0.342* 0.080 
Country dummy3    
 -0.153 0.572 -0.209 0.312 
Country dummy4    
 0.037 0.892 -0.099 0.634 
Country dummy5    
 0.095 0.726 -0.165 0.364 
Country dummy6    
 0.418 0.216 -0.202 0.491 
Adjusted R²  0.252 
 
0.263  0.259  0.263  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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reported in table 6.15 show that there is no association between CDS use for hedging and 
banks’ distance to default after the financial crisis.  
 
Table 6.16 shows the results of the relationship between CDS use for hedging and banks risk 
after the financial crisis. The dependent variable is bank risk as measured by beta. The 
independent variable is CDS use for hedging purposes. The coefficients are positive and 
statistically significant in columns 3 and 4. This finding suggests that CDS use for hedging 
increased bank riskiness after the last credit crisis.  
 
 
 
Table 6.15: OLS regressions of firm risk (distance to default) and CDS use for hedging purposes (after the financial 
crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
0.363 0.466 0.395 0.434 0.313 0.514 0.318 0.507 
Salary -0.959 0.267 -0.970 0.264 -0.780 0.341 -0.939 0.251 
Bonus -0.289 0.325 -0.296 0.315 -0.409 0.148 -0.385 0.182 
Leverage 5.079 0.305 5.526 0.275 2.315 0.647 2.316 0.648 
Investment 
opportunities   
-2.978** 0.022 -3.013** 0.021 -1.996 0.116 -2.160* 0.099 
Size (sales log ) 0.620 0.334 0.705 0.293 0.711 0.257 1.542** 0.019 
Tenure 0.085 0.720 0.088 0.710 0.029 0.899 -0.036 0.873 
Age 0.095 0.389 0.096 0.385 -0.062 0.568 -0.077 0.476 
Diversification  0.085 0.818 0.087 0.814 -0.081 0.834 -0.050 0.901 
Bank dummy 
  
0.838 0.647     
Country dummy1    
 -0.854 0.777 -2.119 0.453 
Country dummy2    
 -0.270 0.944 -0.535 0.847 
Country dummy3    
 1.596 0.680 -3.732 0.239 
Country dummy4    
 7.508* 0.056 11.660*** 0.000 
Country dummy5    
 12.747*** 0.002 -5.298 0.102 
Country dummy6    
 -1.799 0.701 -6.424** 0.025 
Adjusted R²  0.168 
 
0.169  0.340  0.338  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
 
 
   
178 
 
 
Overall, this section shows the results of the how CDS use for hedging purposes influenced 
banks’ risk in relationship to the last credit crisis using different risk measures. The analysis 
and the results that are presented in Tables 6.11 to 6.16 reveal a positive association between 
banks’ risk and CDS use for hedging purposes before, during, and after the financial crisis.  
6.6 Summary  
This chapter examined the relationship between the risk-taking incentives generated by stock 
option compensation and CDS use for hedging purposes. The results presented in this chapter 
show a negative and weak statistical significant association between CEOs’ risk-taking 
incentives provided by stock option compensation and CDS use for hedging. Tobit model is 
also used to examine the relationship between the risk-taking incentives of stock option 
compensation and the extent of CDS use for hedging purposes. While probit model is used to 
Table 6.16: OLS regressions of firm risk (beta) and CDS use for hedging purposes (after the financial crisis) 
Independent variables Column (1) Column (2) Column (3) Column (4) 
Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value Coefficients P value 
Hedging CDS 
(predicted) 
0.066 0.179 0.066 0.189 0.083 * 0.087 0.092 * 0.064 
Salary 0.151* 0.078 0.145* 0.094 0.264*** 0.001 0.241*** 0.002 
Bonus -0.028 0.342 -0.024 0.423 -0.004 0.904 -0.018 0.564 
Leverage 0.081 0.869 0.102 0.838 0.257 0.625 0.140 0.793 
Investment 
opportunities   
-0.174 0.172 -0.141 0.285 -0.267* 0.052 -0.218 0.129 
Size (sales log ) 0.093 0.145 0.092 0.168 0.001 0.672 0.006 0.639 
Tenure 0.016 0.498 0.015 0.514 0.004 0.867 0.008 0.745 
Age -0.013 0.252 -0.012 0.263 -0.010 0.377 -0.016 0.183 
Diversification  0.005 0.883 0.006 0.876 0.003 0.930 0.012 0.746 
Bank dummy 
  
-0.025 0.892     
Country dummy1    
 -0.202 0.517 -0.296 0.323 
Country dummy2    
 -0.619 0.126 -0.283 0.339 
Country dummy3    
 -0.628 0.123 0.444 0.175 
Country dummy4    
 -1.079*** 0.010 -0.074 0.829 
Country dummy5    
 0.133 0.784 0.130 0.639 
Country dummy6    
 -0.372 0.438 -0.269 0.756 
Adjusted R²  0.250 
 
0.243  0.288  0.240  
*Significant at the 10% level. 
**Significant at the 5% level. 
***Significant at the 1% level.  
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investigate the association between the risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation 
and the decision of using CDS use for hedging. The results for tobit and probit models are 
consistent with the results from OLS model. 
This chapter also investigates how CDS use for hedging purposes influence banks risk. The 
results that are reported in this chapter show a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between bank risk and CDS use for hedging purposes. Table number 5.17 below 
provides a summary of the main results in this chapter.  
Table 6.17: A summary of the main results in chapter 6  
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
CDS  The dependent variable is CDS for hedging and the independent variable is vega 
OLS model (First stage) -0.012 -0.001 -0.002 -0.007 
 
(0.997) (0.964) (0.889) (0.593) 
OLS model (second stage) 0.003 0.005 -0.002 -0.003 
 
(0.662) (0.550) (0.803) (0.832) 
Random effects -0.004 
   
 
(0.625) 
   
Tobit model  0.011 
   
 
(0.640) 
   
Probit model  -0.014 
   
  (0.501) 
   
Firm risk model  The dependent variable is firm risk and the independent variable is CDS hedging 
Distance to default (OLS) -0.113 -0.215 -0.381* -0.404* 
 
(0.581) (0.309) (0.060) (0.058) 
Beta (OLS) 0.047** 0.049** 0.049** 0.047** 
 
(0.031) (0.025) (0.029) (0.037) 
Distance to default (random effects) -0.113 -0.069 -0.245 -0.069 
 
(0.581) (0.736) (0.204) (0.742) 
Beta (random effects) 0.048* 0.048* 0.050** 0.045* 
  (0.055) (0.058) (0.048) (0.077) 
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Chapter 7: Summary, conclusions and suggestions for 
future research 
7.1 Introduction  
The main purpose of this thesis is to investigate two different issues related to CDS use by 
banks. The first one is to examine the relationship between the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives 
of stock option compensation and CDS use by banks for both hedging and trading 
(speculating) purposes. The second is to investigate how CDS use influences bank risk by 
decomposing CDS use into hedging and trading (speculating) purposes. This decomposition 
enables the estimation of the effect of CDS use which is expected to influence firm risk 
differently. 
Many earlier empirical research on the relationship between the risk-taking incentives of 
stock option compensation and derivatives use almost exclusively focuses on derivatives use 
without distinguishing between the motives of the use (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Geczy et al., 1997; 
Gay and Nam, 1998; Whidbee and Wohar, 1999; Haushalter, 2000). Previous research has 
paid little attention to the effect of derivatives use on firm risk (Allayannis and Ofek, 2001; 
Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Bartram, Brown and Conrad, 2011; Fung et al., 2012). 
Furthermore, the different effects of derivatives use have often been ignored in previous 
studies. 
 A significant body of empirical studies in risk management has been trying to explain why 
firms use derivatives and what motivates firms to use derivatives. This study has a primary 
advantage over previous studies due to the improvements in derivatives disclosure 
requirements, particularly the disclosure requirements by IFRS 9 Financial Instruments 
(replacement of IAS 39), which requires firms to report the purpose of CDS use. 
This enables examining the influence of each purpose of CDS use separately instead of 
examining whether CDS are used for hedging or for trading. Accordingly, the current thesis 
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addresses directly the linkage CEOs’ risk-taking incentives and CDS use for hedging and 
trading. It also examines directly how CDS that are used for hedging and trading influence 
bank risk.  
 The aim of this chapter is to bring together and highlight the primary conclusions related to 
the key aspects of this research. Moreover, this chapter summarises the main findings of the 
present research and the contributions to the literature. Furthermore, key limitations of this 
study and some areas that could potentially be explored in future research are identified. 
7.2 Overview  
The present thesis has explored the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock option 
compensation in relation to CDS use in European banks, and examined how risk-taking 
incentives influence the extent and the decisions to use CDS. The rationale was to examine 
whether the purpose of CDS use is related to the risk-taking incentives provided by stock 
options. Jensen and Meckling (1976) show that shareholders can use stock options to mitigate 
the effects of managerial risk aversion and to increase managers’ risk-taking incentives in 
order to adopt rather than avoid risky projects. Smith and Stulz (1985) illustrate that stock 
options can influence CEOs’ derivatives use decisions and can be used to reduce the risk-
related agency problem by providing CEOs with incentives to increase firm risk on behalf of 
risk-neutral shareholders. 
CDS can be used as risk reduction strategy (hedging) or as risk taking activity (trading) based 
on the purpose of CDS use. Therefore, it is important to consider the motive of CDS use 
when examining the relationship between the risk-taking incentives of stock options and CDS 
use, because the use of CDS for trading purposes can result in completely different results in 
firm risk. 
Previous theoretical and empirical studies have explored the relationship between the risk-
taking incentives and derivatives use assuming that the presence of derivatives is an 
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indication for hedging firm risk. Moreover, there is little research of the relationship between 
the risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation and CDS use which represent the 
major category of credit derivatives market. 
 In order to fill the existing gap in the literature, this thesis provides an investigation of the 
relationship between the risk-taking incentives of stock options and CDS use for hedging or 
trading.  
In addition, the present research investigates how CDS use influences firm risk and 
distinguishes between the possible effects of the different purposes of CDS. This can offer a 
more complete picture of the relationship between CDS use which is expected to be 
determined by the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives. Stulz (1984) discuss corporate derivatives 
use as a risk reduction strategy in the presence of market imperfections such as financial 
distress, transactions costs, or agency conflicts. Guay (1999a) point out that derivatives use 
for hedging purposes are expected to be negatively associated with firm risk, and derivatives 
use for trading (speculating) purposes are anticipated to be positively associated with firm 
risk. 
A few studies have examined the relationship between derivatives use and firm risk. 
However, the empirical studies for the effects of derivatives use on firms’ risk have produced 
mixed results (e.g., Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Fung et al., 2012). Moreover, most of the 
earlier empirical studies focus on derivatives use without distinguishing between the different 
effects of the purpose of derivatives use on the risk profile. 
This thesis uses CDS data collected from the annual reports of European publicly-listed 
banks and distinguishes between CDS use for hedging purposes and CDS use for trading 
purposes to investigate the influence of CDS use on firm risk. Thus, based on the previous 
discussion, the research questions are formulated as follows: 
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Research Question 1: Do the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock option 
compensation influence the use of CDS? This question is extended to include the 
following sub-questions: 
- Do the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation influence the use 
of CDS for hedging purposes? 
- Do the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation influence the use 
of CDS for trading purposes? 
These questions are investigated based on hypotheses H1 (a) and H2 (a) formulated in 
Chapter 2: 
H1 (a): higher risk-taking incentives of stock option compensations are associated with 
less CDS use for hedging purposes. 
H2 (a): higher risk-taking incentives of stock option compensations are associated with 
greater CDS use for trading purposes. 
Research Question 2: Does CDS use influence bank risk? This question is extended to 
include the following sub-questions: 
- Does CDS use for hedging purposes influence bank risk? 
- Does CDS use for trading purposes influence bank risk? 
These questions are investigated based on hypotheses H1 (b) and H2 (b) formulated in 
Chapter 2: 
H1 (b): there is a negative association between CDS use for hedging purposes and 
bank risk. 
 H2 (b): there is a positive association between CDS use for trading purposes and bank 
risk. 
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7.3 Research Design 
7.3.1 Vega as the CEOs’ risk-taking incentives proxy 
  
Different approaches have been used in the literature to measure executives’ risk-taking 
incentives such as the number of stock options granted to the CEO, the value of stock options 
at the end of the year, or the presence of stock option plans (e.g., Tufano, 1996; Conyon and 
Murphy, 2000; Chen et al., 2006). These measures are considered noisy proxies for risk-
taking incentives because they do not take into consideration the time-to-maturity, volatility, 
or exercise price of stock options (Core and Guay, 2002; Knopf et al., 2002). Instead of these 
simple proxies, this thesis uses CEO stock options sensitivity to stock return volatility (vega) 
as a proxy for the risk-taking incentives. This method was developed by Core and Guay 
(2002) to measure managerial incentives to increase risk from CEO stock option 
compensation. Vega has been used in some empirical studies (e.g., Rajgopal and Shevlin, 
2002; Coles et al. 2006; Hagendorff and Hagendorff, 2011) and is considered a better 
measure to capture the risk-taking incentives provided by stock option compensation 
compared to simple proxies such as the number or the value of stock options. 
7.3.2 Measuring CDS use  
The present thesis uses the notional value of a CDS contract as a proxy for the extent of CDS 
use. This measure is widely adopted in previous derivatives literature (e.g., Gay and Nam, 
1998; Hentschel and Kothari, 2001; Knopf et al., 2002; Rogers, 2002; Supanvanij and 
Strauss, 2010).  
In contrast to using binary variables to test whether or not banks have used CDS, the notional 
value of a CDS contract represents a continuous variable for the amount of CDS use. This 
thesis also uses binary variables to test the relationship between the decision to use and 
CEOs’ risk-taking incentives generated by stock options. 
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7.3.3 Measuring firm risk 
This thesis investigates how CDS use influences bank risk using two different measures for 
bank risk. The first measure is Merton distance to default which is adopted by many 
empirical studies and considered as a suitable indicator for bank risk (Gropp et al., 2006; 
Hagendorff and Vallascas, 2011; Bai and Elyasiani, 2013). Following prior empirical studies 
(e.g., Chen et al., 2006; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011; Fung et al., 2012), this thesis also uses 
beta as a second measure for bank risk. Beta measures the volatility of the banks stock return 
in relation to the volatility of the market’s return index (Bessis, 1998). 
7.4 Conclusion 
This section of the thesis presents the conclusion and summarises the results of the analyses. 
Subsection 6.4.1 presents the summary for Chapter 4 which aims to investigate the 
relationship between the risk-taking incentives and CDS use for trading purposes, and how 
CDS use for trading purposes influence bank risk. Subsection 6.4.2 is the summary for 
Chapter 5 that reports the results for the relationship between the risk-taking incentives and 
CDS use for hedging purposes, and how CDS use for hedging purposes influences bank risk. 
7.4.1 CDS use for trading purposes  
Risk-taking incentives and CDS use for trading purposes  
The findings of the present research confirmed that the risk-taking incentives generated by 
stock option compensation induce CEOs in the banking industry to use more CDS for trading 
purposes. The uses of stock options can mitigate the risk-related incentives problem and align 
the interests of the managers with their shareholder by encouraging the adoption of riskier 
strategies through using more CDS for trading purposes. The risk-taking incentives of CEOs’ 
stock option compensation are found to be an important determinant of bank CDS use for 
trading purposes.  
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The findings show a positive and strong association between the risk-taking incentives 
generated from stock options and both the extent and the decision of CDS use for trading 
purposes. The findings are robust across different regression specifications and when an 
alternative measures is used (i.e., stock options value). Moreover, this research corrects for 
the possible endogeneity problem between vega and CDS use. A positive and significant 
association between vega and CDS use for trading purposes is found using one-stage analysis 
(i.e., vega is exogenous). This positive relationship remains significant when the analysis is 
conducted using a two stage regression (i.e., vega is treated as an endogenous variable). 
The results reported are consistent with the theoretical literature that posits that stock option 
compensation aligns the interests of risk-averse managers with those of shareholders by 
encouraging managers to take on more risk (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Smith and Stulz, 
1985). 
CDS use for trading purposes and firm risk 
With regard to the effect of CDS use for trading purposes on firm risk, the findings show that 
CDS use for trading purposes increases a bank’s risk. This research uses Merton distance to 
default as a bank risk measure. Merton distance to default measures how far the bank is from 
the default point (the probability that the bank fails to repay the debt). The findings show that 
CDS use for trading purposes significantly lowers the distance to default (i.e., increases the 
default risk).  
This research has also employed beta as an additional measure for bank risk. Beta measures 
the volatility of the bank’s stock return in relation to the volatility of the market’s index 
return. The results, in the aggregate, show a positive and significant association between CDS 
use for trading purposes and banks’ beta. This finding confirms the results that are found 
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using distance to default and suggests that CDS use for trading purposes contributed to a 
higher bank beta.  
Baseline results from the analysis of the relationship between CDS use for trading purposes 
and firm risk hold even when performing various robustness checks, in particular, when 
building several sub-samples and when using the random effects model. 
Combining these findings, this research concludes that CDS use for trading purposes 
influences banks’ risk. CDS use for trading purposes is associated with a bank’s higher risk 
(lower distance to default and higher beta). These findings have catered for the endogeneity 
problem related to CDS use and firms’ risk. The results are consistent with empirical 
evidence provided in some of the previous empirical studies (e.g., Minton et al., 2009; Fung 
et al., 2012).  
7.4.2 CDS use for hedging purposes  
Risk-taking incentives and CDS use for hedging purposes  
The results, in the aggregate, show that the risk-taking incentives generated by stock option 
compensation encourage CEOs to use less CDS for hedging purposes. The use of stock 
options compensation is likely to mitigate managers’ risk aversion and align their interests 
with the interests of the shareholders. The risk-taking incentives of CEOs’ stock option 
compensation (vega) are found to be negative but weakly related to CDS use for hedging 
purposes.  
This negative insignificant association between CDS use for hedging purposes and the risk-
taking incentives generated by stock options is consistent with the findings of previous 
empirical studies on derivatives (e.g., Géczy et al., 1997; Knopf et al., 2002). However, the 
results suggest that CDS use for hedging purposes is negatively related to the risk-taking 
incentives of stock options.  
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Similar to the analysis of the relationship between risk-taking incentives and CDS use for 
trading purposes, the findings for CDS use for hedging purposes are robust across different 
regression models and use an alternative measure of managerial risk-taking incentives (i.e., 
stock options value). Moreover, the analysis of the relationship between CDS use for hedging 
purposes and risk-taking incentives (vega) corrects for the possible endogeneity problem. In 
the aggregate, a negative and  insignificant association between vega and CDS use for 
hedging purposes is found using one stage analysis (i.e., vega is exogenous). Moreover, the 
relationship remains negative insignificant when the analysis is conducted using a two stage 
regression (i.e., vega is treated as endogenous variable). 
The results reported are consistent with the theoretical literature that stock option 
compensation is expected to reduce managers derivatives use for hedging purposes and align 
the interests of risk-averse managers with those of shareholders (Smith and Stulz, 1985). 
CDS use for hedging purposes and firm risk 
This thesis finds a fairly strong positive association between CDS use for hedging purposes 
and firm risk. The effect of CDS use for hedging purposes on bank distance to default is 
found to be negative in four models, and significant in two models of OLS regression. 
However, the empirical findings show a positive and statistically significant association, 
which is robust across all models, for the relationship between CDS use for hedging purposes 
and firm risk when measured by beta. 
The findings show that CDS use for hedging purposes increases a bank’s risk. CDS use for 
hedging purposes leads to lower banks’ distance to default (i.e., increase the default risk) and 
increases a bank's beta (i.e., higher banks’ risk). The results of the relationship between banks 
risk and CDS use for hedging purposes have controlled for the endogeneity problem between 
CDS use and firms risk.  
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The positive association between CDS use for hedging purposes and bank risk is inconsistent 
with the theoretical literature that expects firms to use derivatives to hedge firm risk (e.g., 
Smith and Stulz, 1985; Froot et al., 1993). Nevertheless, the finding of a positive association 
between CDS use for hedging purposes and firm risk is in line with empirical evidence 
presented in previous studies (e.g., Fung et al., 2012; Nijskens and Wagner, 2011). Fung et al. 
(2012) find that CDS use for hedging purposes is associated with higher firm risk in 
insurance companies.  
This positive relationship between CDS use for hedging purposes and firm risk can be 
explained by the event of the credit crisis that started in 2007. Despite the explosive growth 
in the derivatives market, there was a general debate about the benefits of derivatives and an 
expressed concern regarding the expected effect of using derivatives on the stability of the 
financial system. This negative view for the role of CDS use may amplify the concern of 
market participants on the expected outcome of using this financial instrument under crisis 
conditions.  
The event of the financial crisis can negatively influence the attitude and the behaviour of the 
investors (Shiller, Konya, and Tsutsui, 1988). An interpretation of the results of CDS use for 
hedging purposes and firm risk can also be related to the event of the last financial crisis. 
Eichengreen et al. (2012) show that investors were primarily worried during the financial 
crisis period (abnormal period) and this made them wary of the risks in the banking portfolios 
for reasons that are independent of the evolution of the real economy and this makes all banks 
to look riskier than in normal circumstances. Nevertheless, Nijskens and Wagner (2011) point 
out that the market considered banks that use CDS to be substantially riskier even before the 
onset of the crisis.  
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7.4.3 Contributions  
This research contributes to the literature in several ways. First, although the relationship 
between the risk-taking incentives generated from stock options has been investigated in 
previous literature, the focus of the literature was mainly on derivatives without 
differentiating between hedging and speculative motivations for using derivatives. Thus, the 
present research fills the gap in the literature by examining the relationship between the risk-
taking incentives generated from stock option compensation and the extent of CDS use for 
hedging purposes. This research also investigates the relationship between risk-taking 
incentives of stock option compensation and CDS use for trading purposes.  
Second, in the empirical method, this research adopted an effective approach to capture the 
risk-taking incentives generated from stock options by using vega which accounts for the 
differences in stock option plans such as: the time to maturity, exercise price, and volatility. 
A wide range of previous empirical studies in the literature on risk-taking incentives and 
derivatives rely on simple proxies for risk-taking incentives. Moreover, this thesis controls 
for panel data individual effects by using a random effects model. Few studies appear to 
control for panel data individual effects (e.g., Supanvanij and Strauss, 2010). 
Third, the empirical analysis controls for the problem of endogeneity between the risk-taking 
incentives and CDS use by applying a two-stage regression which represents one of the 
principal approaches of resolving endogeneity. 
Fourth, the present thesis contributes to the existing literature by analysing how CDS use 
influences firm risk. Earlier empirical studies have tried to improve the understanding of how 
firms use derivatives. The assumption in nearly all of this literature has been that derivatives 
are used for hedging purposes. Thus, the findings in this literature are predominately 
interpreted based on this assumption. This research fills this gap by exploring how the 
different purposes of using CDS (i.e., hedging purposes or trading purposes) influence firm 
191 
 
risk. Furthermore, this research control for the problem of endogeneity that could arise 
between CDS use and firm risk. 
Fifth, this research sheds more light on the relationship between CDS use for trading 
purposes and firms’ risk, and investigates the link between the risk-taking incentives and 
CDS use for trading purposes. The theoretical literature in derivatives use for trading 
purposes is nonetheless somewhat limited. The theoretical studies lay the groundwork for 
examining the association between derivatives use for hedging purposes and executive 
compensation (Stulz; 1984; Smith and Stulz, 1985). This thesis tries to empirically 
investigate the nature of the relationship between executive stock options and CDS use for 
trading purposes.  
In conclusion, this thesis contributes to improve the knowledge of different relationships 
between the risk-taking incentives of stock options and the purpose of using CDS. 
Furthermore, this research contributes to the growing debate on the effects of CDS use on 
firm risk.  
7.4.4 Implications  
Examining the relationship between risk-taking incentives of stock option compensation and 
CDS use can make clear to regulators, policy makers and bank shareholders the potential 
effect of the risk-taking incentives generated from stock options. This thesis shows that the 
executive stock option compensation programme induces managers to take more risk. CEOs’ 
compensation, in the form of stock options is sensitive to stock return volatility and gives an 
incentive to implement riskier choices, such as using more CDS for trading purposes and 
reducing the incentives to use CDS for hedging purposes. 
Regulators may benefit from improving transparency of executive remuneration, so that what 
executives are paid is clear and easy to understand. A number of changes can be considered 
to the way that executive compensation is reported, for example, more details about the main 
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purpose of providing these compensation components, any relevant financial targets and 
information about a time period for the compensation plan. These changes can provide 
greater clarity to executives’ remuneration report and can develop clear guidance on the level 
of detail and type of information that should be reported by public companies.  
Regulators in European countries may think about adopting a range of regulatory activities 
regarding the compensation of executives in European listed companies. For instance, by 
encouraging the implementation of appropriate compensation practices across European 
Union members, providing more detailed disclosure rules and higher levels of control over 
different types of executive compensation that induce risk-taking, in order to curb excessive 
risk-taking incentives. These changes should ensure some consistency between different 
remuneration reports. 
This research also confirms the view that the incentive structure of CEO stock option 
compensation has implications for financial stability. Compensation patterns in the European 
banking sector are consistent with the implications of agency theory. Shareholders in 
European banks appear to provide high CEO risk-taking incentives through stock options. 
Stock options increase executives’ risk-taking incentives and increase their desire to use more 
CDS for trading purposes. While this is an important indication that stock option 
compensation is an essential component of executive compensation which motivates 
executives to take more risk, regulators and shareholders may think about the costs and the 
benefits of relying on stock options.  
Moreover, the results suggest that increasing shareholder involvement in setting executive 
compensation is somewhat concerning. For example, giving shareholders a vote on CEOs 
compensation is unlikely to mitigate risk-taking in the European banking industry. 
Shareholders prefer to offer CEOs compensation components that increase the risk-taking 
incentives to engage in risk-taking choices. Consequently, using executive stock option 
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compensation to align the interests of shareholders and management in the banking sector is 
expected to lead to excessive risk-taking. 
Regulating CEO compensation could take the form of introducing limits on the amount of the 
risk-inducing components. Alternatively, they could encourage banks to use more deferred 
compensation (e.g., defined-benefit pensions). The latter could remedy incentives for CEOs 
to shift risk by making executives unsecured bondholders with a financial interest in the 
liquidation value of a firm. Moreover, European regulators should pay particular attention to 
executive compensation packages in bailed-out financial institutions to prevent executives 
from taking unnecessary and excessive risks. 
This thesis also shows that the effects of CDS use on firm risk are also important to policy 
makers. CDS are used mainly for trading purposes and this is associated with a higher bank 
risk. Moreover, the results illustrate that high risk-taking incentives increase CDS use for 
trading, which increases the default risk. Since financial stability considerations are one of 
the essential rationales for regulating the banking sector, the results support the case for 
regulating executives’ stock option compensation in European banks. 
CDS transactions for hedging purposes do not reduce bank risk, but instead contribute to a 
higher bank risk.  An effective regulatory policy that focuses on the costs and benefits of 
CDS use for hedging purposes would be beneficial. 
Overall, the results affirm the importance of further control on the executives’ stock option 
compensation as a “variable component" of executives’ compensation, to reduce excessive 
risk taking as recommended by Capital Requirements Directive IV (CRD IV). Undoubtedly, 
the executive risk-taking incentives of the compensation contract will continue to be a hotly 
debated subject for years to come (Core and Guay, 2010). This thesis highlights the 
importance of stock options compensation in providing executives with incentives to take 
actions to increase risk in the banking industry. 
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7.4.5 Limitations and areas for further research 
This thesis extends the empirical knowledge and adds to the literature on both executive 
compensation and derivatives. The present research, however, has its own limitations that 
have to be considered when interpreting the results. 
The first limitation of this thesis is in its sample size and selection. The sample was chosen 
from European stock market indices and premier indices of the European Union countries 
(EU-27). Therefore, the results are limited to the largest banks. The findings may not be 
generalisable to small banks. This limitation opens an interesting avenue for future research 
by using a sample consisting of small and large banks. 
The second limitation of the present research arises from the examination of a single industry 
(i.e., the banking industry). The results may not be generalised for other industries. Future 
research can examine different industries or focus on nonfinancial firms. 
The third limitation of this thesis can be related to the use of the notional value to measure the 
extent of CDS use. While the notional value is considered to be a good proxy for the extent of 
CDS use and is used in many previous empirical studies, it does not take into account the 
effect of holding both long (sell) and short (buy) positions. CDS users can take multiple CDS 
transactions within a year by taking different CDS buy or sale positions. The net position of 
CDS was not used due to data limitations in the CDS reporting
44
 and the inconsistency in the 
pattern of disclosures between the European banks. 
The fourth limitation is the potential of measurement error from using the Black-Scholes 
model to estimate the risk-taking incentives of stock options (vega). Previous empirical 
studies point out that the risk incentives (vega) could be overstated when it is calculated using 
                                                          
44 The need for data on the date of opening position, date of termination date, date of maturity, amount received 
or paid, and transaction descriptions for CDS . 
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the partial derivatives from the Black-Scholes model (Core and Guay, 2002; Rajgopal and 
Shelvin, 2002). 
A further limitation of the present research arises from the other source of the endogeneity 
problem. While this research has catered for the endogeneity problem related to simultaneity 
of CDS use and risk-taking incentives, there are other sources of endogeneity in some control 
variables, such as leverage and derivatives use. A better model should deal with multiple 
endogeneities for all of endogenously determined variables. However, it is beyond the scope 
of this thesis to consider all of the endogenous control variables. This could be a potential 
area of future research. 
Further research can extend this study in several ways, such as to examine longer time period, 
using different measures for the extent of CDS use, using different proxies for firm risk, or to 
improve the model to control for the multiple endogeneity of the determinants of CDS use. 
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Appendix A: Summary of the empirical literature (risk-taking and derivatives use) 
Derivatives use and risk-taking incentives induced by stock option compensation  
Authors 
Main Risk-taking 
incentives variable 
 
How  derivatives  are 
measured 
Sample (size & Country) Finding  
Tufano (1996) Number of options 
Survey ( Private data provided 
by Ted Reeve)  
48 North American gold and 
mining firms 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use  
Géczy , Minton, and 
Schrand (1997) 
MV of stock options  Keyword search 372 US nonfinancial firms 
Positively related to 
derivatives use 
Nam and Gay (1998) Number of options 
 
Notional value  325 US nonfinancial firms 
Positively related to 
derivatives use 
Knopf, Nam and 
Thornton (2002) 
Vega  
 
Notional value  260 US nonfinancial firms 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use 
Rajgopal and Shevlin 
(2002) 
Vega 
 
Reserves hedged 117 US oil and gas firms 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use 
Rogers (2002) 
Vega-to-Delta  
 
Net notional value 
569 US firms from various 
industries 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use 
Adkins, Carter, and 
Simpson (2007) 
Value of stock options 
 
Notional value  252 US  financial firms (banks) 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use 
Ertugrul, Sezer, and 
Sirmans (2008) 
Vega 
 
Notional value  
112 US  real estate investment 
trust industry 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use 
Supanvanij and Strauss 
(2010) 
Vega-to-Delta  
 
 
Notional value  198 US nonfinancial firms 
Negatively related to 
derivatives use 
Risk-taking incentives induced by stock option compensation and managerial choices 
Chen, Steiner, and 
Whyte (2006) 
Value of stock options - 591 US financial firms (banks) 
Positively related to firm’s 
risk measures 
Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen (2006) 
Vega - 10,687 US nonfinancial firms 
Positively related to firm’s 
risky policy 
Acrey, McCumber, and 
Nguyen (2011) 
value of  stock options  - 84 US financial firms (banks) 
Positively relted to bank 
default risk and risky activities   
Hagendorff and 
Vallascas (2011) 
Vega - 172  US financial firms (banks) 
Positively related to  risky 
investment choices (M&A) 
Bai and Elyasiani 
(2013) 
Vega - 132 US financial firms (banks) 
Positively related  to firm’s 
risky  policies 
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Appendix B: Summary of the empirical literature (derivatives use and firm’s risk) 
 
 
Derivatives use and firms’ risk 
Authors Dependent variable  Finding  Sample (size & Country) 
Guay (1999a) 
Firm’s risk  Negatively related to derivative use 254 US nonfinancial firms 
Allayannis and Ofek 
(2001) 
Firm’s foreign 
exchange-rate exposure Negatively  related to  derivatives use 378 US nonfinancial firms 
Hentschel and Kothari 
(2001) 
Firm’s risk  
Insignificant affect of  derivatives usage on 
firm’s risk  
425 US firms from various 
industries 
Faulkender (2005) 
Firm-specific interest 
rate exposure Positively  related to  derivatives use 133 US chemical firms 
Géczy, Minton, and 
Schrand (2007) 
Managerial risk taking 
incentive 
Positively related to derivatives use in 
speculating firms 
341 US  nonfinancial firms 
Adam and Guettler 
(2010) 
Firm’s risk  Positively  related to  derivatives use 100 US mutual fund industry 
Bartram, Brown and 
Conrad (2011) 
Firm’s risk Negatively related to derivative use 
6888 nonfinancial from 47 
countries 
Nijskens and Wagner 
(2011) 
Firm’s risk Positively  related to  CDS use  
38 financial firms from various 
countries ( banks)  
Rossi (2011) 
Foreign exchange 
exposure Positively  related to  derivatives use 200 Brazilian nonfinancial firms 
Fung, Wen, and Zhang 
(2012) 
Firm’s risk Positively  related to  derivatives use 
191 US financial firms 
(Insurance) 
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Appendix C: the complete list of the banks in the sample:  
Classified as CDS user and CDS non-user, and their market capitalisation  
CDS users 
 market 
capitalisation 
(£m) 
Symbol Country CDS non-users 
market 
capitalisation 
(£m) 
Symbol Country 
Intesa Sanpaolo SpA 28,398 I:ISP Italy Banca Popolare di Milano 1,965 I:PMI Italy 
Mediobanca di credito     6,424 I:MB Italy Banco Popular Espanol SA 7,259 E:POP Spain 
Banco Popolare 3,672 I:BP Italy Banco Sabadell 5,002 E:BSAB Spain 
Banca Monte dei Paschi  5,871 I: BMPS Italy Bankinter 2,642 E:BKT Spain 
Banca Popolare Romagna 2,337 I:BPE Italy Bank of Valletta 578 MT:BOV Malta 
Banco Santander SA 60,453 E:SCH Spain FIMBAnk         92 MT:FIM Malta 
BBVA 36,668 E:BBVA Spain Lombard 89 MT:LOM Malta 
Commerzbank 7,921 D:CBK Germany BRE bank 2,089 PO:BRE Poland 
Deutsche Bank AG 5,080 D:DBK Germany Bank Pekao SA 8,788 PO:PKA Poland 
Deutsche bank 27,813 D:DPB Germany Bank Handlowy 2,069 PO:PHY Poland 
BNP Paribas 44,355 F:BNP France Nova Kreditna banka  313 SV:NOE Slovenia 
Credit Agricole SA 21,963 F:CRDA France Abanka Vipa dd  276 SV:ABV Slovenia 
Societe Generale 27,181 F:SGE France Probanka 9 SV:PPI Slovenia 
Natixis 9,275 F:KN@F France BRD Group 2,170 RM:BRD Romania 
Banco Comercial Portugues 4,157 P:BCP Portugal Banca Transilvania SA 623 RM:TLV Romania 
Banco Espirito Santo 3,766 P:BES Portugal CB First Investment Bank 171 BL:CBF Bulgaria 
 BPI 1,784 P:BPI Portugal Corporate Commercial Bank 187 BL:CBO Bulgaria 
Banif financial group  521 P:BNF Portugal CB Central Cooperative Bank 112 BL:CBC Bulgaria 
Marfin popular Bank Public 1,949 CP:CPB Cyprus Bank Of Cyprus Public 2,608 CP:BCH Cyprus 
Sydbank 1,160 DK:SYD Denmark Siauliu Bankas AB 60 LT:SUB Lithuania 
Danske Bank 10,550 DK:DAB Denmark Ukio Bankas AB 80 LT:UKI Lithuania 
KBC 12,629 B:KB Belgium FHB Mortgage Bank 217 HN:FHB Hungary 
Dexia 7,667 B:DEX Belgium OTP Bank 4,731 SK:INV Hungary 
Nordea    21,433 W:NDA Sweden Skandinaviska Enskild 8,486 W:SEA Sweden 
Svenska Handelsbanken AB 10,045 W:SVK Sweden Swedbank AB 6,876 W:SWED Sweden 
Erste Group Bank AG 8,856 O:ERS Austria Julius Baer Gruppe AG 5,310 S:BAER Switzerland 
Barclays PLC 29,781 BARC UK Bank of Ireland 4,113 BKIR Ireland 
Lloyds Banking Group plc 27,417 LLOY UK DNB NOR ASA 9,902 N:DNB Norway 
RBS  29,658 RBS UK KB Komerční banka 4,411 CZ:KOM Czech Rep. 
Standard Chartered PLC  28,187 STAN UK     
HSBC     102,293 HSBA UK     
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Appendix D. Variables calculation 
D1) Calculating the incentives effects of stock options 
In this paper, Core and Guay's (2002) is used method to measure CEO incentives to increase 
risk (vega) and to increase share prices (delta).The calculation formula for both vega and 
delta are expressed in Equations (1) and (2) below. 
 
      
      
  
                           Eqs. (1) 
 
       
      
  
   
 
   
             
 
   
 Eqs. (2) 
 
        
                     
   
  
N= is the cumulative probability function for the normal distribution 
S=  is the price of the underlying stock at the valuation date 
X= is the exercise price of the option 
σ = is the expected annual stock return volatility 
R= is the annual risk free interest rate 
D2 ) Distance to default calculation 
    
                    
 
     
      
 
                                      
VA, t  is the market value of assets 
Lt  is the book value of total liabilities 
rf is the risk-free rate 
σA, t  is the annualised asset volatility at t 
T  is the time to maturity 
σE the historical volatility of equity 
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Appendix E: Sub-sampling 
First sample  
 
1. Full sample  
2. Control variables  
 
-  
The results are shown 
in the table under 
(Column 1 )  
Second sample  
 
1. Full sample  
2. Control variables  
3. Dummy variable  
 
Dummy = 1 if the country has more than 3 banks, 0 
otherwise.  
The results are shown 
in the table under 
(Column 2 )  
Third sample  
 
1. Full sample  
2. Control variables  
3. Dummy variable.  
 
Dummy variable based on the countries that have the 
highest number of hedging observations: Germany, 
Italy, Spain, Denmark, France, Portugal, and Others.  
Dummy = 1 if the bank operates in one of these 
countries, 0 otherwise.  
The results are shown 
in the table under 
(Column 3 )  
Fourth sample  
 
1. Full sample  
2. Control variable  
3. Dummy variable  
 
Dummy based on the number of banks operating in 
each country (dummy = 1 if the bank operates in one 
of the following countries: UK, France, Italy, 
Portugal, Spain and Sweden, 0 otherwise)  
The results are shown 
in the table under 
(Column 4 )  
215 
 
Appendix F: Robustness checks for CDS model and firm risk model (trading) 
The results of CDS for trading models and firm risk models when using different independent variables: stock 
options value, vega (controlling for delta), and firm risk (controlling for delta) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A 
The dependent variable is CDS for trading 
The independent variable is the value of stock option 
Tobit 0.287*** 0.101* 0.170*** 0.137*** 0.278*** 0.102* 
 
(0.000) (0.071) (0.001) (0.008) (0.000) (0.070) 
Probit  0.082*** 0.104*** 0.183*** 0.179*** 0.115*** 0.063* 
 
(0.007) (0.003) (0.002) (0.004) (0.002) (0.081) 
Random effects 0.141*** 0.136*** - - 0.117*** 0.077** 
  (0.000) (0.000) - - (0.001) (0.020) 
Panel B 
The dependent variable is CDS for trading 
The independent variable is vega (controlling for delta ) 
Tobit 0.231*** 0.182*** 0.104* 0.116** 0.264*** -0.172** 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.067) (0.021) (0.001) (0.029) 
Probit  0.081** 0.089** 0.113* 0.126** 0.115*** 0.151** 
 
(0.011) (0.046) (0.083) (0.037) (0.002) (0.011) 
Random effects 0.111*** 0.112*** - - 0.137*** 0.075*** 
  (0.005) (0.003) - - (0.000) (0.036) 
Panel C 
The dependent variable is firm risk 
The independent variable is CDS use for trading  (controlling for delta ) 
Distance to default (OLS) -0.267*** -0.229** -0.266 -0.670** -0.186* -0.307*** 
 
(0.003) (0.012) (0.312) (0.020) (0.070) (0.003) 
Beta (OLS) 0.036*** 0.028*** -0.003 -0.029 0.026** 0.024** 
 
(0.000) (0.006) (0.914) (0.278) (0.021) (0.033) 
Distance to default (random effects) -0.267*** -0.251*** - - -0.315*** -0.307*** 
 
(0.003) (0.006) - - (0.001) (0.003) 
Beta (random effects) 0.036*** 0.033*** - - 0.026** 0.031*** 
  (0.000) (0.001) - - (0.020) (0.005) 
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Appendix G: Robustness checks for CDS model and firm risk model (hedging) 
The results of CDS for hedging models and firm risk models when using different independent variables: stock 
options value, vega (controlling for delta), and firm risk (controlling for delta) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Panel A 
The dependent variable is CDS for hedging 
The independent variable is the value of stock option 
Tobit 0.026 -0.12 0.083 0.104 -0.003 -0.010 
 
(0.737) (0.886) (0.374) (0.298) (0.961) (0.904) 
Probit  -0.007 -0.007 0.034 0.035 -0.063 -0.022 
 
(0.812) (0.834) (0.764) (0.758) (0.217) (0.543) 
Random effects 0.012 0.012 - - 0.013 0.020 
  (0.459) (0.449) - - (0.392) (0.230) 
Panel B 
The dependent variable is CDS for hedging 
The independent variable is vega (controlling for delta ) 
Tobit -0.079 -0.101 0.127 0.130 -0.066 -0.055 
 
(0.339) (0.232) (0.138) (0.139) (0.368) (0.541) 
Probit  -0.045 -0.054 0.107 0.114 -0.152* -0.053 
 
(0.197) (0.131) (0.324) (0.313) (0.031) (0.237) 
Random effects 0.0104 -0.011 - - -0.008 0.007 
  (0.459) (0.519) - - (0.960) (0.697) 
Panel C 
The dependent variable is firm risk 
The independent variable is CDS use for hedging (controlling for delta ) 
Distance to default (OLS) -0.105 -0.172 0.087 -0.236 -0.150 -0.073 
 
(0.606) (0.349) (0.855) (0.687) (0.130) (0.727) 
Beta (OLS) 0.048** 0.050** 0.093* 0.140** 0.050** 0.047** 
 
(0.029) (0.024) (0.054) (0.010) (0.025) (0.035) 
Distance to default (random effects) -0.105 -0.065 - - -0.257 -0.073 
 
(0.606) (0.749) - - (0.189) (0.727) 
Beta (random effects) 0.042** 0.044** - - 0.042* 0.038* 
  (0.048) (0.043) - - (0.060) (0.068) 
 
 
 
 
  
 
